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7Introduction
Selenelion in October
There was a special celestial event at the time this volume was being 
edited: a total eclipse of the moon was visible with the sun rising si-
multaneously, which, according to geometry, should not be possible 
to see. What could be seen were merely images made possible by the 
atmosphere around the Earth. Except, none of us involved in the pro-
duction of the volume could in fact see this selenelion; it was not vis-
ible from Hungary, Poland or Britain. The perfect Barnesian metaphor: 
take your own shadow; cast it over what you are trying to observe; 
observe the resulting images until you are convinced that whatever 
seems to be there is merely a trick of perception; colour in the shadow 
by ϐiltering light through the pollution you have contributed to; then 
proceed to undercut it all by irony: wait until it is all over and some-
body tells you about your selenelion, since you were not there to see 
it yourself.
This volume of essays on Julian Barnes’s ϐiction is the result of 
the collaboration of a group of doctoral students to mark the occa-
sion of establishing a Division of Literary Studies of the Association 
of Hungarian PhD and DLA Students (DOSZ). The publication was 
supported by the University Student Union (EHÖK) of Eötvös Loránd 
University (ELTE), Budapest.
The contributors were students at the Modern English and 
American Literature Programme of the Doctoral School of Literary 
Studies at ELTE, studying Julian Barnes’s novels and irony at a semi-
nar course hosted by the Department of English Studies within the 
School of English and American Studies. The guest contributor from 
Poland was already known to the group as the author of an MA thesis 
accessible via the JulianBarnes.com website and was invited to join the 
volume once met in person at the 2014 conference of the European 
Society for the Study of English (ESSE) in Košice in September.
The authors of the essays are all exploring various aspects of 
modern literatures in English for their dissertations, whether to be 
written about British or American authors, about ϐiction, drama or 
graphic novels, in the period of the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury or in recent years. As a result, the set of tools and the theoretical 
backgrounds mobilised for the essays are quite diverse. The points of 
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8intersection between the contributors’ respective research areas and 
Barnes’s ϐiction draw a map which shows intriguing paths leading to 
great vistas, detours from well-travelled highways, roads with surpris-
ingly sharp turns or trails climbing over difϐicult terrain.
The structure of the volume attempts to reveal converging ele-
ments within the individual articles. The opinions of the individual au-
thors were not edited for greater coherence or harmony; references, 
however, are presented at the end of the volume as a combined list 
of all works of Julian Barnes discussed in the articles, and all critical 
sources mentioned by the authors in their footnotes.
In the section labelled “Abstractions,” the authors focus on con-
cepts that might enrich our interpretation of Barnes’s ϐiction by cast-
ing a strong beam of theoretical light over a facet of individual texts, 
even as they explore central images.
Dorottya Jászay examines interdisciplinary theories that might ex-
plain the success of what she comes to call “supernormal simulacra” of 
Englishness in England, England, creatively and productively combin-
ing the concept of the simulacrum on the one hand and that of super-
normal stimulus on the other, the latter borrowed from ethology.
Dóra Vecsernyés explores the time-bound existence of humanity 
and, in particular, the way time can be seen as the concept govern-
ing the narrative of The  Sense  of  an  Ending. Vecsernyés applies and 
expands the modernist concepts of time and duration to reveal the in-
timate similarities among the ϐlow of time, the ϐlow of blood and the 
ϐlow of life. At critical moments, the novel offers the vision of revers-
ibility for them, but, Vecsernyés concludes, with the ϐinal revelation 
Barnes reverts to the unidirectional quality we have come to expect 
from these ϐlows.
Janina Vesztergom ϐinds an abstract treatment of responsibility in 
Arthur & George, a key to explaining the success of Sir Arthur Conan 
Doyle as a novelist, which comes at the expense of his failure as a de-
tective fashioned after the ϐictional character of Sherlock Holmes he 
himself had created. The dialogic nature of this novel is explored here 
on several levels, from the textual through the structural to the on-
tological, while the exploration itself is presented along the division 
between intrapersonal and interpersonal responsibilities.
In the “Anxiety” section, the authors concentrate on one of the core 
human experiences presented in Barnes’s ϐiction around questions of 
identity: the anxiety generated by the attempt to deϐine the position 
of humankind in general, and the place of the ambitious individual in 
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9particular, within the world of all living beings, in the context of poli-
tics or in terms of literary traditions.
Eszter Szép, who takes a fundamentally visual approach to lit-
erature, presents the anxiety Barnes projects on humans in contrast 
with animals. This is the anxiety of imagining what we would look like 
being seen from the outside, for instance in the eyes of animals, as in A 
History of the World in 10½ Chapters. Szép uses the approach of a fairly 
new area, Critical Animal Studies, and relies mainly on John Berger 
and Jacques Derrida for theoretical support.
Ágnes Harasztos is interested in the representation of Eastern 
and Central Europe in British ϐiction. For her, The Porcupine is a nat-
ural choice. In this article Harasztos explores the political anxiety 
surrounding liberalism. According to her argumentation, liberalism 
requires a background of authoritarian politics, against which it can 
emerge and which then stays internalised in it. Harasztos brings to-
gether questions about father-son relationships and political succes-
sion with the political issue of how liberalism may or may not develop 
against a background of a collapsing totalitarian state, examined via 
the process of the emergence of the self as described by Jacques Lacan.
Péter Tamás explores the anxiety of literary inϐluence in Flaubert’s 
Parrot in terms of Harold Bloom’s The Anxiety of Inϔluence. Tamás takes 
the stance that it is not so much the direct inϐluence but the misreading 
of Flaubert that could be an interesting focus of analysis. In his view, it 
is not Barnes but Geoffrey Braithwaite who is affected by the pains of 
trying to grow into an independent author from under the shadow of 
a genius. Within this framework, the most promising path to success 
for Braithwaite is to prove to himself that Flaubert was not as good as 
everybody else seems to think, and, if Flaubert is found weak, there is 
space for Braithwaite to grow into an author. Braithwaite’s greatest 
anxiety would be to become a character in Flaubert’s works, reverting 
the direction of ontological passage and moving down the diegetic lad-
der which he attempts to traverse upward, towards authorship.
The closing cluster of essays is arranged in the “Ascendance” sec-
tion around explorations of human yearnings for transcendence trace-
able in Barnes’s work around concepts such as religion, art, love or na-
tional identity and the relentless human pursuit of meaning that urges 
the characters to use any or all of these concepts in trying to make 
sense of the limited opportunities human life offers.
Wojciech Drąg, our guest contributor invited from Wrocław, 
Poland, addresses the quest for meaning as explored through art, 
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religion and love in Flaubert’s Parrot, Staring at the Sun and A History 
of the World in 10½ Chapters, respectively.
Eszter Tory, in contrast, claims that there is a suppressed desire 
for the transcendental in Barnes’s works. Tory argues that Staring at 
the Sun, far from being simplistic, plays upon the tension it creates by 
exploring various attitudes towars religion, mostly negative, and char-
acters who are yearning for something more than the quotidian and 
are “stunned into uncertainty” by the everyday miracles of life forms 
around us. Tory claims that in spite of the professed lack of any reli-
gious faith in the characters, there is a desire in the text itself towards 
the transcendental.
Miklós Mikecz in his essay that concludes this collection shows 
how Barnes offers us the image of the gentle fall of the woman in 
England,  England, an image thoroughly inauthentic yet rising to the 
status of a symbol promisig delivery, if not divine grace.
The arch of the articles in the volume does not represent the 
chronological order of Barnes’s works, but it does pick up on notes 
struck in the various pieces and constructs a melody, perhaps even 
some harmony, unique to the moment of observation as experienced 
by the authors in Eastern and Central Europe, with their sights kept 
steadily on English literature.
The last section of the volume is a more light-hearted attempt at 
deϐining signiϐicant characteristics of Julian Barnes’s writing. Each 
of us contributed a one-page deϐiniton of “The Barnesian Text,” to 
be written without references, produced without much deliberation 
and submitted without the author’s name speciϐied. As it turns out, 
the deϐinitions were quite different and addressed a range of issues, 
taking various approaches, so that the occasional repetition seemed 
either an emphasis of actual features of the Barnesian text or a result 
of the growing cohesion of the group as a whole. In the end, a kaleido-
scopic collection of deϐinitions seemed a better way to present these 
texts than a cumulative, merged document. The author’s names are 
now attached, below the texts rather than above, to indicate that the 
emphasis this time was less on scholarly performance and more on the 
spontaneous expression of reactions and hunches, as well as informed 
opinions.
The danger is, however, that if we are in the line of light, we might 
obscure what we are trying to observe by casting our long shadows 
over the very object of scrutiny. This October’s selenelion was a per-
fect Barnesian metaphor: humans trying to watch a breathtakingly 
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beautiful, eerily unusual celestial phenomenon that is not really 
there, while blocking the light of the sun and enjoying the colours 
that remained ϐiltered through the atmosphere of the Earth. For lunar 
eclipses, when the Earth, the moon and the sun are perfectly lined up, 
our point of observation is, by necessity, the cause of darkness; our 
object of observation will be obscured by the shadow we cast in our 
temporary position between the sun and the moon. It is only the image 
of the lunar eclipse and the sunrise that we can see, even though the 
moon has already set and the sun has not yet risen, as Earth has an 
atmosphere that bends light, and is ϐilled with debris ϐiltering colours 
until red and brown will be the only ones left to be seen.
The working title of this Introduction was “A Suicide Note,” a 
choice primarily motivated by the circumstances of the production of 
the volume. A reach for the impossible, trying to get funding for the 
publication of the essays, seemed quite a desperate gesture at the 
time, with publication opportunities oscillating with disconcerting 
speed between states of utter hopelessness and immediate need for 
completion.
The phrase that became our title is originally from Staring at the 
Sun. It describes Jean’s reaction upon visiting the Grand Canyon on a 
trip during which she spent her time contemplating the certainty of 
death. Expecting disappointment, not interested in verbal descriptions 
and almost calling off the excursion entirely, Jean is stunned into un-
certainty by the view. The last of the Seven Wonders of the World she 
visits, the one provided by nature rather than erected by man, gives 
her a view of natural magniϐicence but also a view of the impossible: 
she sees an aeroplane ϐlying lower than she is standing, as if ϐlying un-
derground.
If we imagine looking back at ourselves from a yet unimaginable 
future, we may see things differently. Perhaps, even as we are looking 
now, we might ϐind ourselves stunned into uncertainty by the every-
day miracles, like a book published or a degree ϐinished, and all the 
work that is given freely to create the miracle. Coming up with an idea. 
Offering the time. Unearthing funding. Generating the enthusiasm to 
continue after losing funding. Watching a classful of doctoral students 
setting up a conference, drawing the posters, delivering the papers, 
writing the articles, doing the editing. Inviting help form further aϐield, 
accepting the gifts of layout, book cover, editing assistance, language 
supervision.
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Moments of grace, a fall arrested, landing becoming gentler – mo-
ments never left undercut by irony in a book by Julian Barnes, but mo-
ments presented nevertheless. Light reϐlected from its source, mostly 
blocked by ourselves, falling on what we try to observe, creating beau-
tiful images of what is not yet, or is no longer, there.
Judit Friedrich CSc.
series editor
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Abstraction




The Relation of the Human Psyche and the Theme Park 
Phenomenon in Julian Barnes’s England, England
… theme parks and corporate practice have been ac-
cused of: sexism, racism, conservativism, heterosexism, 
andro-centrism, imperialism (cultural), imperialism 
(economic), literary vandalism, jingoism, aberrant sexu-
ality, censorship, propaganda, paranoia, homophobia, 
exploitation, ecological devastation, anti-union oppres-
sion, FBI collaboration, corporate raiding and stereotyp-
ing.
Eleanor Byrne and Martin McQuillan, 
Deconstructing Disney
Two excellent young British theoreticians, Eleanor Byrne and Martin 
McQuillan, compiled this list1 in their book Deconstructing  Disney 
(1999), in which they draw a rather negative picture of theme parks. 
Why, then? Why are humans unnaturally attracted to Disneyland, to 
kitschy wax museums, enchanted castles, or even re-built eighteenth-
century ϐishing villages? The answer seems complicated, to say the 
least.
In what follows, I wish to interpret the phenomenon of (mainly the 
American type of) theme parks and human reactions to them through 
investigating Julian Barnes’s England,  England2 (1998), in which he 
recreates, refreshes and reconceptualises foggy Albion in the form of a 
theme park on the Isle of Wight. In the novel, the aging business mogul 
Sir Jack Pittman wishes to create, as a ϐinal project, a masterpiece, his 
“Ninth Symphony” (43), a completely “authentic,” condensed theme 
park incorporating everything which is stereotypically “English.”
1. Qtd. in Sean Cubitt, Simulation and Social Theory (London: SAGE, 2001), p. 99.
2. All parenthesized references are to this edition: Julian Barnes, England, England
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1998).
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Critics often characterise this novel of Barnes as a “utopia or merry 
dystopia,”3 while the writer himself considers it primarily a “political 
novel.”4 Indeed, the political aspect is markedly present in the book; 
however, I wish to analyse it in a slightly more complex way. On the 
one hand, I will focus on the philosophical and socio-anthropological 
theories of Guy Debord and Jean Baudrillard concerning the “simu-
lacrum phenomenon” and hyperreality. On the other hand, my analy-
sis will rely on examinations in evolutionary biology, psychology and 
neurology, principally concerning the so-called “supernormal stimuli,” 
examined as early as the 1930s (including the experiments of Nikolaas 
Tinbergen) and described more recently in the experiments of V.S. 
Ramachandran and Deirdre Barrett. I would like to connect simulation 
theory with the concept of supernormal stimuli and prove that when 
we examine the theme park phenomenon, we basically witness the in-
teraction of two aspects of its effect: a sociological and a psychological 
aspect.
In what follows, I would like to prove that England, England is one 
of Barnes’s most complex novels, even though it is also considered by 
some to be the least typical of his books. What may be stated safely is 
that this novel has great theoretical potential and may be interpreted 
based on a wide spectrum of theories or entire ϐields of discipline such 
as anthropology, semiotics, sociology or even evolutionary psychology 
and addiction studies.
Simulacra  and  Simulation by Jean Baudrillard, French post-
structuralist philosopher and sociologist, certainly had a great inϐlu-
ence on Barnes’s novel. Baudrillard’s ϐigure and the theories from his 
1981 book actually appear in England, England in the character of the 
French intellectual, who appraises the project in his short but concise 
presentation. Although Baudrillard is surely not the ϐirst theoretician 
to discuss the concept of simulation, probably he is the one whose ve-
hemence and persuasive style are the most memorable. Baudrillard 
adopts and improves the ideas of his contemporary French fellow the-
orists such as the Marxist Guy Debord, whose book The Society of the 
Spectacle (1967) precedes Baudrillard’s Simulacra and Simulation by 
a good ϐifteen years. However, if we would like to ϐind the origins of 
simulacrum theory, we must go further back in history, as Sean Cubitt 
explains in his work Simulation and Social Theory:
3.  Vanessa Guignery, The  Fiction  of  Julian  Barnes:  A  Reader’s  Guide  to  Essential  
Criticism, Readers’ Guides to Essential Criticism (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006), p. 108.
4.  Guignery, p. 104.
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reality has been a profound challenge to human thought since its 
ϐirst recorded stirrings. The very earliest writings we have, from 
Ur, in the Vedas and Egyptian papyri, already lament the ephem-
erality of life’s pleasures. […] we hear […] how our forebears fell 
to cursing reality’s cruelty. By the time Socrates drained his cup 
of hemlock, 399 years before the birth of Christ, the idea that 
the familiar world we see about us is doomed to disappear had 
spawn a new belief: that there exists some realm beyond the vis-
ible, a world of permanence, home either to immortals or to im-
mortal ideas.5
Actually, Plato, the famous disciple of Socrates, would also be a good 
point of departure, as he writes about the concept “eidolon which is 
frequently translated in the Latin style as simulacrum.”6 This idea, 
however, is brushed aside by Barnes himself in an interview where he 
claims that “there is indeed a reference to Plato in England, England 
but it’s a schoolroom reference, it’s what we all remember of being 
told about Plato, rather than tipping off the reader that Plato is the 
palimpsest behind this particular novel.”7
The most beneϐicial strategy would probably be to pick up the 
line at Guy Debord and look at how he describes the “spectacle” in 
Society of the Spectacle, and then consider how, almost twenty years 
later, Baudrillard imports and develops the concept of spectacle into 
his theory of “simulacrum” and how he coins the term “hyperreality” 
at the same time. What Debord says is basically that the material ob-
ject gives way to its representation as sign and that reality itself has 
been turned into an imitation of itself. Reality rises up with the spec-
tacle, and the spectacle is real. Debord says that to be represented at 
all is to become spectacular; the whole of human life is spectacular-
ised, including lived reality.8 What is markedly different in Debord’s 
early work and Baudrillard’s simulacrum theory (as well as Debord’s 
late works such as Comments on the Society of the Spectacle, published 
in 1988) is that Debord still presupposes some kind of reality behind 
or before the spectacle; he still claims that there is “a residual real-
ity, against which the perversion of the spectacle could be measured.”9 
5.  Cubitt, pp. 1–2.
6.  Cubitt, p. 2.
7.  Vanessa Guignery and Ryan Roberts, eds. Conversations  with  Julian  Barnes 
(Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 2009), p. 49.
8.  Cubitt, pp. 29–37.
9.  Cubitt, p. 42.
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Baudrillard, however, radically denies the importance of the “real” 
behind the simulation, claiming the primacy of the simulacra and the 
perishing of the real. In Simulacra and Simulation, with its tripartite 
signiϐication system of simulation, he claims that “today abstraction 
[…] is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a 
hyperreal.”10 He radically denies the existence of reality and afϐirms 
that what we are talking about is the “substitution of the signs of the 
real for the real.”11 In his system, image or sign takes the place of the 
real; what happens is basically the disappearance of the signiϐied from 
behind the signiϐier. This theory more or less coincides with what 
Sir Jack declares in a quite cynical remark right at the beginning of 
England, England, when he muses on his project:
‘What is real? This is sometimes how I put the question to my-
self. Are you real for instance – you and you?’ […] ‘My answer 
would be No. Regrettably. And you will forgive me for my can-
dour, but I could have you replaced with substitutes, with … 
simulacra, more quickly than I could sell my beloved Brancusi. 
Is money real? It is, in a sense, more real than you. Is God real? 
That is a question I prefer to postpone until the day I meet my 
Maker.’ (31)
Mark Poster, an editor and enthusiast of Baudrillard’s works, com-
mented in his introduction to Baudrillard’s Selected  Writings on the 
phenomenon of the simulacrum as follows: “a simulation does not 
only represent absence as a presence, it also undermines any contrast 
to the real, absorbing the real within itself […] hyperreality, a world of 
self-referential signs.”12
In Barnes’s England,  England, we may observe something very 
similar in the project of Sir Jack, in the building of a new, improved 
England for tourists. In the novel everything eventuates what 
Baudrillard describes: the real falls out from behind the simulacrum, 
England, England takes over the place of “old” England, and in the form 
of a dystopia we see ϐirst the decline, then, ϐinally, the total annihilation 
of the original, the real. “Umberto Eco employs the term hyperreality 
to invoke what he understands as those culturally speciϐic situations 
in which the copy comes ϐirst, whereas for Baudrillard it corresponds 
10.  Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra  and  Simulation, trans. Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), p. 3.
11.  Baudrillard, Simulacra, p. 4.
12.  Baudrillard, Simulacra, p. 6.
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to that altogether more general contemporary condition in which both 
representation and reality have been replaced by simulacra.”13 This 
is what happens to England, England: as the “real” England slips out 
from behind it, the Isle becomes a sheer copy, a signiϐier without a ref-
erent, a simulacrum in itself.
This idea is ironic in itself, and if we look closer, we see that the 
process is ironic as well. What we usually understand as irony is the 
abyss between the intended and the pronounced meaning, which mean-
ings may be replaced by the signiϐier and the signiϐied. Signiϐication in 
itself is always already an ironic phenomenon because of the arbitrary 
relationship between the signiϐier and the signiϐied. What appears in 
the novel, however, is more complicated than this. The abyss in irony, 
the abyss between the signiϐier and the signiϐied, is the same abyss 
that is generated between England, England and “old” England. Yet, in 
this case the process goes even further in that the signiϐied disappears 
from behind the signiϐier.
From this line of thought an obvious reference might arise to 
Jacques Derrida, Baudrillard’s contemporary and one of the most im-
portant thinkers of the post-structuralist era. The concept of the sup-
plement that he expands in his work Of Grammatology (1967) argues 
for the lack of authenticity and the lack of the originary. In England, 
England Dr Max denies the possibility of pointing out the authentic 
being and beginning of something, just like Derrida claims that we 
merely have “the impression of the thing itself, of immediate presence, 
or originary perception. Immediacy is derived. Everything begins with 
the intermediary.”14 The phenomenon that Derrida describes when 
he is elaborating on the concept of the supplement is precisely what 
Baudrillard and what England,  England claim: when “one wishes to 
go back from the supplement to the source: one must recognise that 
there is a supplement at the source.”15 This idea is highlighted in the 
novel again by Dr Max when he says: “What we are looking at is almost 
always a replica […] There is no prime moment” (132). If we compare 
this to what Baudrillard says, the similarity is undeniable: “The very 
deϐinition of the real is that of which it is possible to give an equivalent 
reproduction. At the end of this process of reproducibility, the real is 
13.  Nick Perry, Hyperreality and Global Culture (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 1.
14.  Qtd. in Jonathan D. Culler, On  Deconstruction:  Theory  and  Criticism  after  
Structuralism (London: Routledge, 1983), p. 105.
15.  Qtd. in Nicholas Royle, Jacques Derrida, Routledge Critical Thinkers (London: 
Routledge, 2003), p. 51.
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not only that which can be reproduced, but that which is always repro-
duced: the hyperreal.”16
What happens to England, England, however, is not simply simula-
tion. It is the simulation, abstraction and concentration of everything 
that is generally considered to be English, according to an international 
marketing research analysis conducted at the beginning of the project. 
The density of the stimuli is extreme; Buckingham Palace, Big Ben, 
Tower Bridge, and even Robin Hood and his Merrie Men, that is, the 
theme park created by Sir Jack, accommodate the demands of modern 
consumers: they perfectly serve the increased stimulus-threshold of 
contemporary society. Even “warm-hearted [English] hospitality” is 
re-learned, claiming that “by being learned, it will be the more authen-
tic” (108). Gerda Reith in her book The Age of Chance (1999) quotes de 
Jong when she writes that
the problem of boredom is intrinsic to modern society, and has 
its roots in the nineteenth century when the breakdown of the 
sense of a metaphysical order gave birth to the distinctive fea-
ture of the modern age – the syndrome of intensity. The desire 
to experience intense sensation replaced the pursuit of mean-
ingful activity and had its converse the existence of apathy and 
boredom.17
This is what all theme parks aim to achieve: they wish to satisfy the 
need for intensity and even wish to exceed visitors’ expectations.
The root of all these phenomena lies in consumerism and mass 
production. As Cubitt also notes, “in the twentieth century, a new phe-
nomenon emerged: consume, or be damned.”18 Debord already con-
nects the concept of the spectacle to consumerism when he claims that 
“the initial task of the spectacle is to encourage consumption.”19 Walter 
Benjamin describes this problem of the modern age as follows: “Now 
things press too closely on human society. […] the sheer proximity of 
things, and especially commodities, debars us from taking the neces-
sary step back.”20
16.  Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic  Exchange  and  Death, trans. Iain Hamilton Grant 
(London: SAGE, 1993), p. 73.
17.  Gerda Reith, The  Age  of  Chance:  Gambling  in  Western  Culture (London: 
Routledge, 1999), pp. 130–1.
18.  Cubitt, p. 5.
19.  Cubitt, p. 39.
20.  Walter Benjamin, One-Way Street and Other Writings, trans. Edmund Jephcott 
and Kingsley Shorter (London: NLB, 1979), p. 89.
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The need for exaggeration has always been present in society. With 
the building of capitalism and the rise of intense consumerism and 
consumer society, exaggeration has reached astounding proportions. 
We experience a straining and pushing of the stimuli-threshold: what 
we want is always more, sooner (if not immediately), and we want it 
to be as astonishing as possible, with the least amount of energy in-
vested, of course. This refusal of energy investment is something that 
Barnes refers to in an interview, while also incorporating it in the book 
verbatim, when he claims that “the point is not quite that we prefer 
the replica to the original, but that we prefer the convenient replica 
to the inconvenient original.”21 This is what Gerda Reith describes in 
the aforementioned quotation: we need denser, more stimulating and 
more intense impact in order to have our attention grabbed. This is 
also what Baudrillard speaks about at the very beginning of Simulacra 
and Simulation, when he describes the map as a compression and min-
imalisation of reality: the map is merely abstraction, and there is no 
real ϐlavour in it; it is rather an empty concept, not an intensive experi-
ence. It is empty and intensive at the same time, and this density is also 
what is achieved in the creation of England, England. 
The stimulating, intense environment, however, is not exclusively 
the result of consumer society, fast technological development and 
mass production. To the intense stimuli of the fast-changing Western 
world another factor is needed, since the external impact would be 
pointless without the proper substrate. This is the point where the sus-
ceptible brain and the biological and psychological coding of humans 
enter the equation because, according to Cubitt, “culture is based in 
the biology of the human organism.”22 This thought is one of the key 
concepts underlying my paper: it will shed light on the behavioural 
patterns of humans concerning mass production, the increase in the 
stimuli-threshold and the extreme attraction to theme parks. To ϐind 
some answers, we have to go back to the 1930s, to the experiments 
of the Dutch Nobel laureate ethologist Nikolaas Tinbergen. Tinbergen 
found that “song birds abandoned their pale blue eggs dappled with 
gray to hop on black polka-dot Day-Glo blue dummies so large that the 
birds constantly slid off and had to climb back on.”23 While conducting 
his experiments, Tinbergen coined the term “supernormal stimulus” 
in order to explain this ethological phenomenon.
21.  Guignery and Roberts, p. 61.
22.  Cubitt, p. 19.
23.  Deirdre Barrett, Supernormal  Stimuli:  How  Primal  Figures  Overran  their  
Evolutionary Purpose (New York: Norton, 2010), p. 13.
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While Tinbergen conducted experiments with animals only, for 
Vilayanur S. Ramachandran, an Indian neurologist, nestling birds and 
sticklebacks were not enough. He extended the experiments by ex-
amining the behaviour of herring gulls feeding their chicks in parallel 
with the reaction of the human brain to various representations of the 
human body throughout the history of art. However surprising it may 
seem, Ramachandran ϐirmly states that “people rarely create images 
of the body that are realistic.”24 He proceeds by examining a twenty-
ϐive thousand-year-old statue, the Venus of Willendorf, explaining the 
need of the early humans to exaggerate some of the features of the 
woman for the statue while completely ignoring some others. He says 
“the brains of the hunter-gatherers who made the Venuses were pre-
programmed to exaggerate what mattered most. […] When it comes to 
the images of the body, we are driven not just by culture but also some-
thing we thought existed only in the earliest humans. It is the primeval 
instinct to exaggerate.”25 What he does is basically connecting animal 
behaviour to human instincts and points out something that is crucial 
in my analysis: the instinct to exaggerate is “hard-wired into the brains 
of humans, even if in some cultures it was suppressed.”26 Just like in 
England, England or in simulation theory, people twenty-ϐive thousand 
years ago “were hankering after something more human than human, 
more real than real.”27 Although in his experiments Ramachandran 
only dealt with the reaction of the brain to the various representa-
tions of the human body, this is the line which the psychologist Deirdre 
Barrett picks up and develops further in her 2010 book Supernormal 
Stimuli: How Primal Urges Overran the World. Barrett takes the previ-
ous experiments to an even higher level: she examines supernormal 
stimuli in a twenty-ϐirst-century context through characteristically 
contemporary social problems such as obesity or pornography. From 
her research it seems that not only do we insist on exaggeration in arts, 
especially body representations, but we are looking for it and strive to 
ϐind it basically in all other ϐields of life as well. In her investigations 
we ϐinally get a combination of simulation theories, consumerism and 
mass production, from which we can extrapolate towards the various 
kinds of theme parks and, of course, to the phenomenon of England, 
England. Barrett highlights a crucial distinction between animals and 
24.  “More Human than Human,” How Art Made the World, BBC (United Kingdom: 
2005), television.
25.  “More Human than Human.”
26.  “More Human than Human.”
27.  “More Human than Human.”
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humans in terms of supernormal stimuli. She says that while “animals 
encounter supernormal stimuli mostly when experimenters build 
them, we humans can produce our own.”28 In an interview on her book 
she explains: “now that humans become so technologised, we are able 
to create our own supernormal stimuli to cater for our instincts, and 
our instincts pull toward exaggeration.”29 And this is exactly what hap-
pens in England, England.
To avoid misunderstanding, we must state that the concept of su-
pernormal stimuli and simulacrum theory are not merely in my dis-
cussion of the theme park because we see exaggerated, distorted re-
ality or because what we see are copies of the original buildings and 
sights. The theories are connected because of the density of the stimuli 
that the simulacrum of the theme park offers. If we consider, however, 
Sir Jack’s little hobby that he pursues once a month in the house of his 
Auntie May, we ϐind that it is something that can be classiϐied as an 
eminent example of the human creation of objects to answer the need 
for supernormal stimulus, in this case for pornography. For Barrett, 
pornography is a key element among supernormal stimuli. She says 
that some people, in fact, even favour “porn when a real-life partner 
is available,”30 and indeed we only see Sir Jack venerating his habit: 
there is no sign of a healthy relationship. It seems that he devotes his 
whole life to fulϐilling his need for supernormal stimuli, which he car-
ries out by generating and living among ϐlawlessly produced simu-
lacra. The giant doll’s house is just as constructed and absurd as his 
project England, England, just as perverted and pathological. We may 
laugh at the goose who tries to roll a volleyball back to its nest or at the 
bird which tries to sit on a huge, fake, polka-dotted egg, but what we 
do in our modern consumer society is not actually any more advanced 
than what these animals do. Probably, it is even worse, as we produce 
supernormal simulacra for ourselves.
In fact, what Barrett also notes in her book is that supernormal 
stimuli used to be immensely useful to human beings, well, at least a 
couple of thousand years ago. Today, however, these instincts dominate 
us and we gladly venerate them, especially now that we can actualise 
almost all fantasies, nearly anything that the need for supernormal 
stimuli generates in us. Barrett says that the concept of supernor-
mal stimuli “is the single most valuable way that ethology can help us 
28.  Barrett, p. 4.
29.  “Supernormal Stimuli,” For Good Reason, accessed 25 April 2010 <http://www.
forgoodreason.org/deirdre_barrett_supernormal_stimuli>, podcast.
30.  Barrett, p. 32.
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understand the problem of modern civilisation.”31 She quotes evolu-
tionary psychologists Leda Cosmides and John Tooby when she utters 
a key sentence: “Our modern skulls house a stone-age mind.”32 This 
is also probably the explanation why England, England as a system, a 
perfect heap of simulations, starts to devour itself at the end. The build-
ings and habits in England, England are carefully selected in a way that 
visitors can react to them in a pre-planned manner so that their need 
for supernormal stimuli may be satisϐied in the most efϐicient manner. 
All the adventures and sights are adapted to the stimuli-threshold of 
the modern visitor; in England, England we experience England with 
over-exaggeration and gross simpliϐications. As Dr Max highlights, “pa-
triotism’s most eager bedfellow was ignorance, not knowledge” (82). 
Alternatively, we may also quote Jeff, the Concept Developer: “‘So we 
don’t threaten people. We don’t insult their ignorance. We deal in what 
they already understand […] people won’t be shelling out to learn 
things […] They’ll come to us to enjoy what they already know’” (71). 
The visitor is presented a world which indeed lines up the most fa-
miliar sights of England, but in a reinterpreted way, due to the human 
need for supernormal stimuli. From this we see that in this novel, and I 
think I can extrapolate and claim that in every theme park, simulation 
and supernormal stimuli are inseparable.
I would like to quote Barrett again, citing a sentence, or rather 
instruction, which she also quotes, this time from the American phi-
losopher and psychologist William James. The instruction is “to make 
the ordinary seem strange.”33 Barrett interprets this as an impera-
tive for modern society to stop and think, but I would rather relate 
it to the third part of England, England. In the ending part we see the 
re-construction of an old England under the Medieval Latin name of 
Anglia. This pre-industrial, agricultural endeavour brings to mind a 
nineteenth-century organisation, the anti-technological Luddites. This 
group derived the corruption of people from the Industrial Revolution, 
and the birth of Anglia in England, England may also be considered as a 
sort of neo-Luddite action. The creation of multiple items in a produc-
tion line indeed started with the Industrial Revolution, and this is also 
the era when the concept of copies came to the fore. The theoretician 
Kirkpatrick Sale, a defender of the Luddites, claims in an interview 
that “the Luddites did not want to turn the clock back. They said: ‘We 
want to cling to this way of life, we don’t want a life in which we’re 
31.  Barrett, p. 28.
32.  Barrett, p. 27.
33.  Barrett, p. 26.
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forced into factories, forced onto machines we can’t control, and forced 
from village self-sufϐiciency into urban dependency and servitude.’”34 
Similarly, although the characters who create Anglia in the book are 
not necessarily anti-technological, they create their old-new land in 
opposition to something which heavily relies on technological inno-
vation and, indirectly, of course, on the Industrial Revolution. Yet, the 
new Anglia is no less artiϐicial than England, England, against which 
it wishes to revolt. Consider the following quotation from the novel 
describing one of the dwellers of Anglia:
Jez Harris, formerly Jack Oshinsky, junior legal expert with an 
American electronics ϐirm obliged to leave the country during 
the emergency. He’d preferred to stay, and backdate both his 
name and his technology: nowadays he shoed horses, made bar-
rel hoops, sharpened knives and sickles, cut keys, tended the 
verges, and brewed a noxious form of scrumpy into which he 
would plunge a red-hot poker just before serving. Marriage to 
Wendy Temple had softened and localized his Milwaukee accent; 
and his inextinguishable pleasure was to play the yokel when-
ever some anthropologist, travel writer or linguistic theoreti-
cian would turn up inadequately disguised as a tourist. (242–3)
This anti-globalisation initiative strives to achieve a state of natu-
rality and originality. But how natural and original is it exactly if we 
want to hinder or go directly against the progress of technology? 
Jean Baudrillard presents a relevant line of thought in Simulacra and 
Simulation, describing the moving of the Cloisters in New York. He 
says that “if the exportation of the cornices was in effect an arbitrary 
act, if the Cloisters in New York are an artiϐicial mosaic of all cultures 
[...], their reimportation to the original site is even more artiϐicial: it 
is a total simulacrum that links up with ‘reality’ through a complete 
circumvolution.”35 The dwellers of Anglia also achieve exactly the op-
posite of what they wish to achieve: their self-conscious and forceful 
counter-reaction to the overϐlow of artiϐicial simulacra turns out to be 
just as artiϐicial as the tendency they wish to take a stand against:
34.  Kirkpatrick Sale and David Kupfe, “Rebel Against the Future: An Interview with 
Kirkpatrick Sale,” Culture Change, accessed 27 September 2014 <http://www.cultu-
rechange.org/issue9/kirkpatricksale.html>.
35.  Baudrillard, Simulacra, p. 9.
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Old England banned all tourism except for groups numbering 
two or less, and introduced a Byzantine visa system. The old 
administrative division into counties was terminated, and new 
provinces were created, based upon the kingdoms of the Anglo-
Saxon heptarchy. Finally, the country declared its separateness 
from the rest of the globe and from the Third Millennium by 
changing its name to Anglia. (253)
The original idea is presented as similar to what Steven E. Jones says 
about the Luddites in his book, Against Technology: “Some assume that 
Luddism is just another form of Romanticism, a version of the transcen-
dental philosophy that would rise above its own times and reject ‘the 
future,’ projecting an alternative, utopian possibility, that […] involves 
a nostalgic return to an older way of life, one reconciling humanity and 
nature in voluntary simplicity.”36 Barnes takes this Romantic notion 
to its extreme: the creators of Anglia even invent their own folklore. 
As a prominent dweller of Anglia explains, invented folklore seems 
more popular than the authentic originals: “If you want some local leg-
ends I’ve got lots of books I can lend you. Folk collections, that sort 
of thing. […] I’ve tried’em on that stuff and it don’t go down so well. 
They prefer Jez’s stories, that’s the truth” (244). However, this artiϐicial 
Romanticism that they decide to pursue is practically impossible to 
implement. Yet, the underlying urge seems to be to create something, 
anything that goes counter to the present system, anything that goes 
against radical consumerism.
It seems that every mode and way of being in England, England is 
equally constructed. We see no way of life which would be authentic, 
as “individuals in the spectacular society cannot recognise others or 
their own reality.”37 Martha Cochrane is the only character who strives 
for an originary state, or at least she does not approve of the simulated 
one. As “Appointed Cynic,” her job is to doubt everything but, ϐinally, 
and ironically, she is the one who seizes the governing position of the 
England, England theme park, although only for a short period. It is 
a pleasantly morbid idea that the only person who does not believe 
whole-heartedly in the project may get the directorial position of it. 
In this world of supernormal simulation it is only the cynic who may 
approach authenticity, or at least take a rather indifferent position, yet 
this is a lonesome and bitter superiority.
36.  Steven E. Jones, Against Technology: From the Luddites to Neo-Luddism (New 
York: Routledge, 2006), p. 7.
37.  Cubitt, p. 41.
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The other character who has a special connection to authenticity 
is the actor playing Samuel Johnson: “his pain was authentic because 
it came from authentic contact with the world. […] she saw a creature 
alone with itself, wincing at naked contact with the world” (218). He 
decides to completely yield to simulation, which is probably the only 
way in this society to have an originary mode of being: he ϐinds origi-
nality in simulation. The narrator’s words about Martha also underpin 
how the characters ϐind originality in simulation: “she had made little 
impression on him, and he had behaved as if she were less real than 
he was” (212).
There is also a third character who seems to represent an external 
perspective in spite of being part of the project team, and this is the 
historian Dr Max. He is surely someone who, in a paradoxical way, is 
able to appreciate the greatness of the project, but he is also disgusted 
with it in its entirety. This is clear from his answer to Martha’s ques-
tion when she asks his opinion about the project. He gives the follow-
ing answer:
Bo-gus? No, I wouldn’t say that. I wouldn’t say that at all. Vulgar, 
yes, certainly, in that it is based on a coarsening simpliϐication of 
pretty well everything. Staggeringly commercial […] Horrible in 
many of its incidental manifestations. Manipulative in its central 
philosophy. All these, but not, I think, bogus. (131)
These three characters in the novel, Martha, Samuel Johnson and Dr 
Max, appear as counterpoints to show markedly different, eccentric 
attitudes in contrast to the masses; they are the only ones to represent 
something genuine precisely through their outsider attitudes.
The whole novel is a huge ironic ϐlick on everything that it in-
cludes, and even on some things it only indirectly refers to. The simu-
lation theories of Baudrillard (and, indirectly, of Debord, whose name 
is not mentioned in the novel but who is quoted verbatim in the speech 
of the French intellectual), the idea of the theme park, consumerism, 
contemporary social behaviour, art and representation cannot escape 
the cutting irony of Barnes. In a sense, this grossly over-exaggerating, 
simplifying and stereotypical project could also be understood as a 
parody not only of (post)modern man, society or literary theory but 
also as a parody of postmodernism itself. It parodies the striving of 
postmodernism to create something new from already existing ma-
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terial while producing only a collage that ultimately emphasizes the 
inability to create anything original.
The behavioural patterns and the characters’ relationship to 
England, England result in a very complex phenomenon. Everything 
is driven by consumerism and mass production. Hence, besides offer-
ing approaches to the phenomenon of the theme park from evolution-
ary biological and semiotic theories, the novel can also be interpreted 
within the framework of history, sociology, politics and anthropology. 
Everything coheres with everything else. On the one hand, we have the 
capitalist aspect with the Industrial Revolution, the development of 
mass production, the rising of the stimuli-threshold, the “perfection” 
and extreme degree of consumerism; on the other hand, all this is sup-
ported by the biological and psychological coding of humans.
It may seem somewhat unusual, but I would like to conclude my 
examinations with an analysis of the title. What exactly does the title 
England, England refer to besides, of course, the name of the new, im-
proved England? These two words can be pronounced with so many 
different intonations and accentuations that there is probably more 
than one possible answer. The doubling within the title may itself refer 
to simulation, repetition or replica. Repetition of a word can also be 
easily read as some kind of reinforcement, but just as easily as a re-
proach. Finally, we may also interpret the title as a nostalgic sigh: Oh, 
England, England…
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Dóra Vecsernyés
With  His  Watch  on  the  Inside  of  
the Wrist
Time in Julian Barnes’s The Sense of an Ending
Humans are essentially temporal creatures, or “beings in time,”1 as de-
scribed by Martin Heidegger. Accordingly, their existence is to be un-
derstood in relation to, as well as in awareness of, the passing of time 
and the unavoidable approach of death. It is precisely this awareness 
of the distinction between Being and Non-Being that teaches people to 
value each and every moment of their lives. However, being conscious 
of one’s own mortality does not necessarily induce action, especially 
not within the context of postmodernism. Characters of  postmodernist 
ϐiction tend to be restricted to the realm of passivity, notably so when 
it comes to Julian Barnes’s creations. Christopher Lloyd in Metroland 
(1980), Geoffrey Braithwaite in Flaubert’s Parrot (1984) and Gregory 
in Staring  at  the  Sun (1986) are all characterised by a considerable 
degree of passivity, a fundamental tendency towards self-reϐlexivity, 
and a preference for meditating about life instead of living it. A cu-
rious and uniquely Barnesian contrast is generated by the fact that 
despite their mediocre personalities and undistinguished lives, these 
characters theorise about highly philosophical matters such as art ver-
sus life; history versus reality; time, memory and remembering; the 
general progress of human life; death and religion – preoccupations 
which permeate Barnes’s entire oeuvre. Thus, his characters come to 
function as the author’s mouthpiece, providing him with the means of 
voicing his concerns and asking questions about them.
Such is the case with sixty-something pensioner Tony Webster, the 
central ϐigure and narrator of Barnes’s novel The Sense of an Ending2 
(2011). After failing to accomplish his youthful plan to live a life of 
literary intensity, Tony keeps consoling himself with mantras like “Ti-
yi-yi-yime is on my side” (45) and “Every Day is Sunday” (62), and en-
gages in self-reϐlexive and essentially passive contemplations of the 
concepts of memory, history, life and death, and the nature of time. 
1. Qtd. in H. James Birx, Encyclopedia  of  Time:  Science,  Philosophy,  Theology,  &
Culture (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2009), p. 642.
2. All parenthesized references are to this edition: Julian Barnes, The Sense of an
Ending (London: Vintage Books, 2012).
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Despite his passivity, Tony Webster is a Heideggerian being in that he 
keeps reϐlecting on the temporal as well as temporary nature of human 
existence. The present paper is devoted to analysing the various con-
cepts and images of time occurring in The Sense of  an Ending, along 
with the temporal and thematic structure of the novel, as indicators of 
Tony Webster’s attitude to his time-bound existence and, by extension, 
of Julian Barnes’s perception of man as a temporal-narrative being.
Human perception of time is inseparably linked to narrativity: 
it is through storytelling that one establishes cause-and-effect rela-
tionships and conceives of sequentiality; therefore, narratives can be 
looked upon as a primary means of formalising and structuring human 
perception and the products of the mind. Barnes expresses a similar 
opinion when he claims “we are a narrative animal” and “we tell sto-
ries all the time” because “we want our human life on this planet to be 
turned into a narrative.”3 Clearly, narratives are used to create a coher-
ent sense of identity, regarding both the individual self and collective 
identity. Consequently, much of history, culture and literature have 
been discussed as grand narratives providing the basis for self-deϐini-
tion and creating a sense of coherence overarching the passing of time.
As observed by Frank Kermode, the scientiϐic developments of the 
nineteenth century resulted in a turn towards the temporal in every 
ϐield of knowledge.4 While literature, one of the grand narratives, had 
previously been assumed to imitate an existing world order, now it 
was expected to create a structured world. Meanwhile, the widely dis-
cussed modernist and postmodernist – predominantly constructivist 
– view has been that all perception is subjective; factual and absolute 
truth is unavailable to human understanding; and all human knowl-
edge is constructed in a way that it matches the current stage of scien-
tiϐic and cultural development. As a result, the representation of real-
ity has also been seen as problematic. In Kermode’s terms, the “prison 
of modern form” is “a place where we accept the knowledge that our 
inherited ways of echoing the structure of the world have no concord 
with it, but only […] with the desires of our own minds.”5 Clearly, the 
realisation of the artiϐicial and non-objective nature of all attempts at 
grasping the world and reality is of key importance. At the same time, 
3.  “Julian Barnes Interview,” Writers and Company, accessed 15 June 2013 <http://
www.cbc.ca/writersandcompany/episode/2011/11/20/julian-barnes-interview/>, 
radio.
4.  Frank Kermode, The Sense of an Ending (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
p. 167.
5.  Kermode, The Sense, p. 173.
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however, this realisation also results in a state of imprisonment in 
which humanity admits to the limited and limiting nature of the mind, 
human knowledge, language and culture, while also facing the fact that 
there is no way to leave these faculties behind.
Tony Webster in The Sense of an Ending articulates a similar prob-
lem: “We live in time, it bounds us and deϐines us […] But if we can’t 
understand time, can’t grasp its mysteries of pace and progress, what 
chance do we have with history – even our own small, personal, largely 
undocumented piece of it?” (60). That is, what kind of narrative rep-
resentation of reality and the passing of time can be created without a 
proper understanding of time? Though admitting his inability to truly 
grasp the nature of time – “I’ve never felt I understood it very well” (3) 
– and constantly reϐlecting on the imperfections of his memory, Tony 
Webster embarks on a journey of recounting his personal history, at-
tempting to create a coherent autobiography. As will be demonstrated, 
the novel depicts the kind of order Tony’s mind desires as only par-
tially accessible.
The Sense of an Ending presents a dual structure: “Part One” pro-
vides an overview of Tony’s past, emphasising the formative importance 
of his schoolboy years spent with his friends Colin, Alex and Adrian. A 
signiϐicant period is his relationship with Veronica, described in detail, 
including issues like meeting Veronica’s family; virginity and sexual-
ity; and a break-up followed by an affair between Veronica and Tony’s 
friend Adrian. We also hear about his time spent in the USA, an affair 
with a girl named Annie and Adrian’s suicide. “Part One” ends with a 
brief survey of Tony’s adult life, involving jobs, marriage, parenthood, 
divorce and retirement. By “Part Two,” the narrative reaches Tony’s 
present life: a letter received after the death of Veronica’s mother re-
sults in the unsettling of Tony’s life story presented so far, forcing Tony 
to face his past mistakes. This re-evaluation of his life takes the form of 
revisiting and rewriting memories described in the ϐirst section. Along 
the way, Tony arranges meetings with his ex-wife Margaret as well as 
with Veronica. Eventually, his search for the truth brings some success, 
leaving Tony in a state of distress and hopelessness.
While attempting to create a coherent life story out of these 
events, Tony Webster encounters problems like the imperfection of his 
memory and the complicated relationship between past and present, 
which also govern the temporal and thematic structure of the nar-
rative. Interestingly, even though it is only in “Part Two” that Tony’s 
account of the past is undermined by Veronica’s version, Tony keeps 
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commenting on the deϐiciencies of his memory from the very begin-
ning, when he observes “what you end up remembering isn’t always 
the same as what you have witnessed” (3) and sets out to introduce 
“some approximate memories which time has deformed into cer-
tainty” (4). Later on, Tony laments the lack of evidence and witnesses: 
“I wish I’d kept that letter, because it would have been proof” (39) and 
“as the witnesses to your life diminish, there is less corroboration, and 
therefore less certainty” (59). As a result, the past is seen as increas-
ingly inaccessible and disconnected from the present.
It is important to note, however, that the past is beyond reach not 
only due to Tony’s unreliable memory, but also as a result of his self-
editing. As in the case of most life-writing, Tony himself is prone to 
distorting the truth in order to present himself in a way that is pleasing 
for him, especially when it comes to inglorious events. Curiously, he ad-
mits his awareness of the phenomenon: “How often do we tell our life 
story? How often do we adjust, embellish, make sly cuts? […] our life is 
not our life, merely the story we have told about our life. Told to others, 
but – mainly – to ourselves” (95). Thus, regarding his shameful letter 
written to Adrian, disparaging Veronica, Tony demonstrates consid-
erable reluctance to remember, presumably out of guilt and remorse. 
However, when Veronica sends him the letter he wrote decades earlier, 
he is forced to face his own actions: “My younger self had come back to 
shock my older self” (97–8) and “I could scarcely deny its authorship” 
(97). Here, the undeniable continuity of Tony’s identity binds the past 
to the present, and Tony experiences the past as suddenly permeat-
ing the present. Though facing his past self is deeply unsettling, Tony’s 
wish for corroboration quoted above is voiced precisely because of his 
need to have temporal continuity in his narrative identity.
As can be seen, the nature of the past is rather ambiguous: while 
Tony is constantly frustrated with the imperfections of his memory 
and the inaccessibility of the past, he is also forced to acknowledge the 
omnipresence of the past and his past actions as encoded in his per-
sonality. In line with this ambiguity, Tony accommodates two opposing 
urges: a wish to escape what he ϐinds embarrassing or shameful in his 
past and, fuelled by the acceptance of his responsibility and the result-
ing remorse, a wish to turn back time and rewrite his past, correct-
ing his mistakes. Meanwhile, his notions of time and existence in time 
are illustrated with the traditional image of water: still water stands 
for the stagnation in Tony’s relationship with Veronica as well as for 
death in the case of Adrian’s suicide, as in the image of “bathwater long 
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gone cold behind a locked door” (3); whereas the image of the river 
is associated with the passing of time and its unquestionable direc-
tion. When witnessing the Severn Bore,6 “a river rushing nonsensically 
upstream” (3) caused by water incoming with the high tide from the 
sea, the younger Tony complains of a sense of unsettlement “because 
it looked and felt quietly wrong, as if some small lever of the universe 
had been pressed, and here, just for these minutes, nature was re-
versed, and time with it” (36). At this point, Tony considers time to be 
a ϐixed aspect of the universe along which everything can be ordered, 
and he is distressed when the order of nature is disturbed. However, 
even though the high tide causes disorder in the direction of the river, 
it is in itself a regular phenomenon of nature that reoccurs in well-
deϐined and predictable order. Tony’s shock, then, is due to his ϐirst ex-
perience of the phenomenon. As for the image of the sea, it may stand 
for cyclicity and inϐinity, and so the image of seawater coming in and 
disrupting the orderly progress of the river may be read as a reminder 
of the opposition between the inϐinite cyclicity of nature and the ϐinite 
linearity of human existence, further motivating Tony’s distress.
As the story proceeds and Tony meets Veronica by the Thames for 
the ϐirst time in decades, past and present intertwine: “I couldn’t tell 
which way the tide was running, as a whippy crosswind stirred the 
water’s surface” (90). Here, the disguised direction of the ϐlow of the 
river stands for Tony’s confusion regarding past and present, triggered 
by the presence of Veronica, a ϐigure from his distant past. Moreover, 
when previously lost memories come upon Tony, he feels as if “time 
had been placed in reverse. As if […] the river ran upstream” (122) re-
turning to the earlier image of the Severn Bore and indicating that the 
memories left behind by past events can create a sense of going back 
in time and re-experiencing the past.
However, such interconnectedness of past and present is even 
more problematic when it comes to matters of responsibility: the 
“chain of responsibility” (149) mentioned numerous times through-
out the novel is a ϐirm indicator not only of the direction in which time 
passes, but also of the irreversibility of time. As Tony observes, “the 
chief characteristic of remorse is that […] the time has passed for apol-
ogy or amends. But what if […] by some means remorse can be made 
to ϐlow backwards, can be transmuted into simple guilt, then apolo-
gised for, and then forgiven?” (107). Needless to say, Tony is eventually 
6.  “Introduction,” The  Severn  Bore:  A  Natural  Wonder  of  the  World, accessed 11 
November 2012 <http://www.severn-bore.co.uk>.
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compelled to admit defeat: “I knew I couldn’t change, or mend, any-
thing now” (149). Inevitably, the confusing nature of his identity, along 
with the paradox of past and present simultaneously coexisting and 
being separate, result in considerable frustration on Tony’s part.
On one occasion, the image of the river is substituted by blood: 
Tony wishes to change the past by going back in time, or making “the 
blood ϐlow backwards” (130). Here, an even closer identiϐication of 
time and life is suggested by the imagery: time is turned into an in-
tegral part of the human being, thereby echoing Heidegger’s concept 
of man as a being in time. Similarly, Tony and his friends at school 
wear their watches “with the face on the inside of the wrist” because 
it makes “time feel like a personal, even a secret, thing” (6); they rec-
ognise an intimate connection between time and life through blood, 
wearing their watches close to their pulses. They also ϐind a personal-
ised version of time, which Tony describes as follows: “there is objec-
tive time, but also subjective time, the kind you wear on the inside of 
your wrist, next to where the pulse lies. And this personal time, which 
is the true time, is measured in your relationship to memory” (122).
The gesture of wearing their watches on the insides of their wrists 
to make time more personal echoes Henri Bergson’s idea of subjec-
tive time. In Bergsonian terms, pure  duration, or subjective time, is 
related to one’s inner life; it is “uninterrupted transition, multiplicity 
without divisibility and succession without separation.”7 This inner, 
unfolding time is not measurable, as opposed to unfolded time, which 
is measurable “through the intermediary of motion”8 and space. In 
light of Bergson’s deϐinition, Tony’s idea that subjective time is “meas-
ured in your relationship to memory” (122) may mean that one’s per-
sonal time depends on how continuous one’s experience of past and 
present is and whether one’s memory is capable of bridging any gap 
between them. In addition, the closeness of the watch to the pulse in-
dicates that it is the number of heartbeats, prone to being inϐluenced 
by one’s changing emotions, that dictates the rhythm of the otherwise 
immeasurable subjective time, making it truly individualised and non-
mechanical. Thus, Tony’s highly subjective experience of time is not 
only due to his ambiguous relationship with the past, but also to the 
emotional content of his present: “it takes only the smallest pleasure or 
pain to teach us time’s malleability. Some emotions speed it up, others 
7.  Henri Bergson, “Duration and Simultaneity,” in Key Writings, eds. Keith Ansell 
Pearson and John Mullarkey (London; New York: Continuum, 2005), 205–219, p. 205.
8.  Bergson, p. 209.
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slow it down; occasionally, it seems to go missing – until the eventual 
point when it really does go missing, never to return” (3).
As the entire story is ϐiltered through Tony’s perception, and his 
perception is deϐined by the irregularity of time, his narrative is con-
structed in a way that it reϐlects “time’s malleability” (3) described 
above. Thus, The Sense of an Ending offers a non-linear narrative with 
temporal fragmentation and frequent ϐlashbacks and ϐlashforwards. 
Or, to apply Gérard Genette’s terms related to order, they are analepses, 
instances of “evocation after the fact of an event that took place ear-
lier than the point in the story where we are at any given moment” 
and prolepses, instances of “narrating or evoking in advance an event 
that will take place later.”9 “Part One” in The Sense of an Ending covers 
Tony’s past, with comments of the current self, while “Part Two” fo-
cuses on his present, constantly punctuated by analepses and returns 
to memories already narrated in “Part One” as well as introducing new 
memories. Meanwhile, the structure of the narrative is highly repeti-
tive, involving recurring ideas, phrases and events. Every now and then 
certain memories, like the weekend spent with Veronica’s family, re-
surface and therefore have to be re-considered. Similarly, the themes of 
philosophical contemplation discussed above appear again and again. 
Last but not least, “Time is on My Side,” a song by The Rolling Stones, 
keeps returning like a refrain, while Veronica’s constantly reoccurring 
comment “You just don’t get it, do you?” (100) implies cyclicity and a 
lack of development. These repetitions and seemingly randomly re-
surfacing elements follow an associative structure that resembles the 
operation of the human mind, the workings of memory and how the 
brain “throw[s] you scraps from time to time” (112). Thus, the typi-
cally postmodernist fragmentation characterising the novel serves the 
aim of representing the mental process of remembering in a narrative 
format.
The Sense of an Ending presents a considerable degree of thematic 
coherence, despite its fragmentation. Tony Webster occasionally dis-
misses elements of his past as irrelevant in terms of the aspects of 
his life discussed in the novel: “Annie was part of my story, but not 
of this story” (46) and his current female acquaintances are “not part 
of the story either” (55). At the same time, the seemingly randomly 
selected images, themes and memories described in “Part One” gain 
signiϐicance with the beneϐit of hindsight, considered in relation to the 
9.  Gérard Genette, Narrative Discourse:  An Essay in  Method, trans. Jane E. Lewin 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980), p. 40.
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events of “Part Two,” inviting the reader to play an active role in re-
membering. In particular, the suicide incident of Tony’s fellow student 
Robson is necessary to provide a point of reference for Adrian’s later 
suicide. Furthermore, the history classes at the beginning present a va-
riety of ways in which one may deal with the past and the question of 
responsibility, both of which turn out to be key concerns of the novel. 
Thus, The Sense of an Ending is permeated with recurring images and 
overarching themes, thereby presenting a carefully structured narra-
tive.
When read as the ϐictional autobiography created by Barnes for 
the character Tony Webster, the novel invites considerations related to 
autobiographical writing. Frank Kermode’s notions of life-writing can 
be made use of here due to his preoccupation with the temporal em-
beddedness of human life, history and culture. According to Kermode, 
writers of autobiographies wish to “achieve some measure or simu-
lacrum of closure, and thus a substitute timelessness.”10 Indeed, Tony 
Webster is in search of closure by way of trying to ϐind out the truth 
and processing the past, though in vain. One technique highlighted 
by Kermode as central to autobiographical writing is manifested in 
Vladimir Nabokov’s “artful autobiography,” which is constructed along 
the lines of repetition because, as stated by Nabokov, “the following 
of such thematic designs through one’s life should be, I think, the true 
purpose of autobiography.”11 Kermode agrees that thematic coherence 
enables the autobiographer to present a uniϐied, single self in the fo-
cus.12 The technique applied by Barnes in The  Sense  of  an  Ending is 
precisely the creation of such thematic coherence: to aid Tony’s self-
deϐinition, the particular themes and memories to be used are chosen 
during a process of subjective selection, interpretation and attribution 
of signiϐicance. As a result, certain memories are highlighted as self-de-
ϔining memories, whereas others are dismissed as insigniϐicant and are 
not included in the narrative. Self-deϐining memories are described by 
psychologists Singer and Salovey as “vivid, affectively charged, repeti-
tive, linked to other similar memories […] related to an important un-
resolved theme or enduring concern”13 that have a key inϐluence on the 
10.  Frank Kermode, “Memory,” in Pieces  of  My Mind:  Essays  and Criticism 1958–
2002 (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003), 289–306, p. 296.
11.  Qtd. in Frank Kermode, “Memory,” p. 297.
12.  Kermode, “Memory,” p. 297.
13.  Qtd. in Dan P. McAdams, “Identity and the Life Story,” in Autobiographical Memory 
and the Construction of a Narrative Self: Developmental and Cultural Perspectives, eds. 
Robyn Fivush and Catherine A. Haden (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 
2003), 187–224, p. 195.
Book-Barnes2.indb   36 2014.11.23.   21:15:48
37
self. It is such self-deϐining memories that make up the skeleton of The 
Sense of an Ending.
In addition to the temporally disrupted structure of the narrative 
described above, it is revealing to examine the special, subjectively con-
structed time frame that accommodates self-deϐining memories. Such 
a narratological analysis necessitates another concept of duration, 
suggested by Gérard Genette, which can be fruitfully applied alongside 
the Bergsonian notion of pure duration. Genette systematises the rela-
tionship between story time, or the actual time frame occupied by the 
story, and narrative time, or the duration devoted to telling the story 
in the literary text. Accordingly, the two extremes are ellipsis, “where 
a nonexistent section of narrative corresponds to some duration of 
story” and descriptive pause characterised by “absolute slowness […] 
where some section of narrative discourse corresponds to a nonexist-
ent diegetic duration.”14 In between, Genette deϐines scene as featuring 
an “equality of time between narrative and story” and summary as a 
text which “with great ϐlexibility of pace covers the entire range in-
cluded between scene and ellipsis.”15
In accordance with the vivid nature of self-deϐining memories, 
the novel provides extremely detailed accounts of past events, includ-
ing conversations, locations and circumstances, and the recreation of 
then-current moods and impressions. Tony’s self-deϐining memories 
are presented in the form of distinct, Genettian scenes with slide-
like changes between them. Clearly, these scenes are narrated within 
Tony’s subjective experience of time, with the speed of narrative time 
depending on the particular event narrated. A considerable portion of 
the novel is made up of meditative parts inserted into the story which 
deal with time, death, life, history, love, remembering and storytelling. 
As these sections are outside story time, they take the form of descrip-
tive pauses. In contrast, the events and periods of Tony’s life consid-
ered to be unimportant or irrelevant are either presented in the con-
densed form of summaries or subjected to ellipses.
The memory that Tony keeps revisiting throughout the novel and 
that provides one of the fundamental turning points is his reaction to 
Adrian’s letter asking for his permission to date Veronica. When Tony 
ϐirst presents it in “Part One,” he describes himself as “peaceable” 
and not wanting “to get involved,” thus only sending a postcard that 
says “the undersigned begs to present his compliments and wishes to 
14.  Genette, pp. 93–4.
15.  Genette, p. 94.
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record that everything is jolly ϐine by me, old bean” (42). However, his 
account is permeated with irony, irritation and anger: he is annoyed 
by Adrian’s “moral scruples” and “the hypocrisy of the letter,” and 
upset by the fact that Veronica “had traded up: to my cleverest friend” 
(41). Furthermore, the degree of his agitation can be inferred from 
the narrative structure. Having barely mentioned Adrian’s letter, Tony 
switches to theorising about what Adrian’s career might be like, only 
to postpone discussing the letter: “You can probably guess that I’m 
putting off telling you the next bit” (40–1). After sharing the contents 
of the letter and his ϐirst reactions, Tony’s narrative is interrupted by 
a gap and an asterisk indicating Tony’s rage; it is only after the gap 
that he manages to continue telling the story. Eventually, he replies 
to it “properly,” warns Adrian about Veronica’s “damage,” and wishes 
him “good luck” or at least claims to have done so (42). Although Tony 
concludes they “were now out of my life forever,” he devotes consider-
able narrative time to reϐlections on Veronica and Adrian (43). Clearly, 
even though Tony presents this event in retrospect, from a distance of 
decades, he now re-experiences his then-current emotional state. As a 
result, the plotline comes to a halt and the subjective time-experience 
of the present, narrating self of Tony Webster shapes the narrative.
The narrative structure thus affected by Tony’s agitation as well as 
his question for Alex in a conversation – “Did he tell you I wrote him a 
letter telling him where to shove it?” – can be read as hints at the true 
contents of Tony’s letter, which he is initially ashamed to admit (51). 
Indeed, as it turns out when the letter eventually resurfaces, Tony’s 
distress resulted in a hostile, rather vicious letter cursing Veronica, 
Adrian and their prospective child. Upon encountering his own words, 
Tony’s narrative slips off again into his subjective experience of time: “I 
read it through, got to my feet, took my glass of wine, poured it rather 
splashily back into the bottle, and made myself a very large whisky” 
(95). Here, Tony is paralysed with his mind going blank, so that story 
time stops until he is recovered from his shock. In the meantime, the 
reader is provided with the letter itself, followed by further comments 
of Tony’s concerning the beneϐits of drinking whisky. Though post-
poned ϐirst, the revelation of Tony’s state of mind arrives after all: a 
sense of guilt and remorse begins to grow in him the “next day, when 
[he is] sober” (98). At this point, time is turned back for Tony as his 
mind wanders deep into the past to re-evaluate it, and he arrives at the 
conclusion that all the aspects of his life and personality that he previ-
ously considered to be special are actually merely “average” (100).
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A similar process can be observed towards the end of the novel, 
when Tony talks in a pub to Terry, the care worker who looks after 
Adrian’s son, and ϐinally ϐinds out the truth: the mother of Adrian’s 
child is not Veronica, but in fact Veronica’s mother. As a result, Tony 
goes into a state of shock; he is petriϐied: “Automatically, I ate a chip. 
Then another. There wasn’t enough salt on them. That’s the disadvan-
tage of fat chips. They have too much potatoey inside” (148). Here, 
time for him comes to a halt again, while his mind has simultaneously 
too much and too little to perceive. Then, as if in a trance-like state, 
he shakes Terry’s hand and says a few polite words. It is only after a 
break in the narrative, a gap on the page indicating the hours passing, 
that Tony manages to process this crucial piece of information: “And 
later, at home, going over it all, after some time, I understood” (148). 
At this stage, time is put into reverse once more as Tony attempts to 
piece together the story: what Veronica and her mother meant in their 
messages and what Adrian’s equation stood for decades earlier. While 
acknowledging the cyclical recurrence of memories – “I replayed the 
words that would forever haunt me” – Tony also conceives of the 
“chain of responsibility” discussed above that stands for the linear and 
irreversible passing of time, leading to the realisation that “I knew I 
couldn’t change, or mend, anything now” (149).
The inseparability of the linear and the cyclical is what fuels the 
ϐinal section of the novel as well, which is a brief but pointed evaluation 
introduced by “You are allowed a long moment of pause, time enough 
to ask the question: what else have I done wrong?” (149). It is indeed 
a long moment that Tony takes, ϐilling it with fragments of memories 
and images that have already occurred in the novel: “I thought of a 
bunch of kids in Trafalgar Square. I thought of a young woman danc-
ing, for once in her life” (149). To create a framework, Tony also re-
visits the proleptic images listed at the very beginning of the novel, 
at ϐirst seemingly random and unrelated, but by now shown in an en-
tirely different light. The novel presents some degree of development 
in terms of Tony gaining access to information and facts falling into 
their places; nevertheless, induced by regret over the irreversibility of 
time, Tony claims: “You get towards the end of life – no, not life itself, 
but of something else: the end of any likelihood of change in that life” 
(149). Thus, Tony looks upon his life as ϐixed in its present state, with 
no future perspective, which is further illustrated by the abrupt end-
ing of the novel: “There is accumulation. There is responsibility. And 
beyond these, there is unrest. There is great unrest” (150). This ϐinal, 
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desperate state of feeling guilt, remorse and confusion is squeezed 
into the conϐines of the present simple tense, illustrating Tony’s state 
of being locked up in the present without any prospect for future im-
provement or possibility of altering the past. It is important to note, 
though, that this time the lack of change is not engendered by passiv-
ity. Instead, what generates Tony’s hopelessness is the derailment of 
narrativity as a vital mode of comprehending the world and the self, 
as a result of which Tony ends up imprisoned in his now entangled life 
story and the resulting absence of a coherent sense of self.
Julian Barnes’s The Sense of an Ending, then, is a manifestation of 
the temporal-narrative nature of human existence. Amidst the confus-
ing and rather turbulent encounters between his past and present, 
Tony Webster presents himself as a survivor: “I survived. ‘He survived 
to tell the tale’ – that’s what people say, don’t they?” (56). However, tell-
ing the tale proves to be highly problematic. Although some of the truth 
is revealed and corroboration is found, no perfect order is reached, as 
Tony still thinks “of what I couldn’t know or understand now, of all 
that couldn’t ever be known or understood” (149); the tale cannot be 
entirely conceived even by its teller. By quoting his fellow student from 
decades earlier saying “there was great unrest, sir” (5), Tony comes to 
realise that there is only this much that can be said with certainty. In 
fact, Adrian Finn’s very ϐirst observation that “all you can truly say of 
any historical [or, in this case, personal] event […] is that ‘something 
happened’” seems to apply (5). Consequently, any attempt at repre-
senting time, reality or order in the mind or in the universe, history or 
one’s own life story, is eventually depicted by Barnes as unavoidably 
incomplete and unsatisfactory. Ultimately, based on Frank Kermode’s 
concept of the “prison of modern form,” meaning the acceptance of the 
fact that reality can only be echoed by humanity in ϐictional formats 
that reϐlect “the desires of our own minds,”16 I propose the notion of 
the prison of the Barnesian mind: the place where we are conϐined as 
we try to endure the unrest evoked by the realisation that our ways of 
echoing the structure of the world can only and exclusively indicate 
with surety that something is happening outside our own minds, no 
matter what our own desires may be.
16.  Kermode, The Sense, p. 173.




Manacles of Responsibility in Julian Barnes’s Arthur 
& George
1. Arthur & George: A “New Historical Novel”
When asked to identify the prominent themes of Julian Barnes’s ϐic-
tion, the well-versed reader may name a wide variety of topics such 
as the issue of personal identity and memory as well as that of na-
tional identity and cultural memory; the problematic and multifaceted 
concept of success; the steady decline of institutional religion in the 
West and the concurrent loss of faith; the constant search for the unat-
tainable as a substitute for the solid intellectual foundation on which 
knowledge of any sort could rest; the inadequacy and unreliability of 
language and art as a means of representing reality; and the irretriev-
ability of history and the past. In addition to these topics, which are 
inextricably linked together by their fundamentally ontological and 
simultaneously epistemological nature, the essentially moral question 
of responsibility is also a recurrent, albeit less conspicuous, subject 
of Barnes’s ϐiction. Consider, for example, Christopher Lloyd’s contem-
plation in Metroland (1980) of his personal responsibility for eventu-
ally opting for a way of life that goes directly against the philosophy he 
advocated in his early childhood; or the self-accusatory introspection 
of Geoffrey Braithwaite, the narrator of Flaubert’s Parrot (1984), who, 
while desperately seeking to obtain information regarding Flaubert’s 
life, struggles not only with his own existential crisis but also with the 
ethical dimensions of his switching off the respirator of his late wife, 
Ellen; or, ϐinally, the never-ending pursuit of truth by Tony Webster, the 
narrator-protagonist of the Man Booker Prize-winning The Sense of an 
Ending (2011), who attempts to escape the burden of responsibility 
loaded onto him by the power of one single – seemingly insigniϐicant 
1. The main title of my paper is a line borrowed from an ancient Navajo Mountain 
Chant as translated in a Smithsonian Institute ethnographic report and quoted in 
David Michael Kleinberg-Levin, Before the Voice of Reason: Echoes of Responsibility in 
Merleau-Ponty’s Ecology and  Levinas’s  Ethics (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 2008), p. 70.
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– discursive moment. Similarly, the motif of responsibility appears 
in Barnes’s 2005 novel Arthur & George2 as well. As we shall see, the 
question of responsibility manifests itself on several levels in the novel, 
most conspicuously in the strong sense of personal duty the famous 
novelist Sir Arthur Conan Doyle assumes in the exoneration of the so-
licitor George Edalji, the victim of a famous miscarriage of justice.
Arthur  &  George relates the real-life story of George Edalji, a 
Birmingham solicitor of mixed Parsee and Scottish origins, who, in 
1903, after being accused of mutilating cattle and other livestock in 
the area surrounding his native village of Great Wyrley, Staffordshire, 
was convicted on trumped-up evidence and sentenced to seven years’ 
hard labour. Although after serving three years of his sentence George 
was granted a partial pardon and released from prison, he was not 
able to resume his earlier juridical career since his name had not been 
cleared yet. Therefore, in 1906, he appealed for help to the celebrated 
novelist, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, who took on the role of consulting 
detective, a rank he himself had invented for his own ϐictional char-
acter, Sherlock Holmes, and began his own investigations that led to 
the 1907 publication of a pamphlet entitled “The Story of Mr. George 
Edalji” and to George’s eventual resumption of his life as a solicitor 
until his death in 1953.
As many critics have pointed out, this particular book, one of the 
many works by Barnes shortlisted for the Man Booker Prize for ϐic-
tion, signals the transition in Barnes’s oeuvre from his earlier works 
belonging to the tradition of historiographic metaϐiction to a new 
sub-genre of historical novels which, as Christine Berberich puts it, 
“attempts to re-create its historical setting rather than continuing 
postmodern fabulation.”3 According to Richard Bradford, along with 
such contemporary novels as David Lodge’s Author,  Author  (2004) 
and D. J. Taylor’s Kept: A Victorian Mystery (2006), as well as a much 
earlier, but perhaps even more famous example, John Fowles’s The 
French Lieutenant’s  Woman (1969), Arthur & George is to be consid-
ered an example of what he refers to as the “new historical novel.”4 In 
Bradford’s view, works belonging to this genre are written by “more 
2.  All parenthesized references are to this edition: Julian Barnes, Arthur & George 
(London: Vintage, 2005).
3.  Christine Berberich, “‘All Letters Quoted Are Authentic’: The Past After 
Postmodern Fabulation in Julian Barnes’s Arthur  &  George,” in Julian  Barnes, 
Contemporary Critical Perspectives, eds. Sebastian Groes and Peter Childs (London; 
New York: Continuum, 2011), 117–128, p. 119.
4.  See Richard Bradford, “The New Historical Novel,” The Novel Now: Contemporary 
British Fiction (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007), 81–99.
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astute practitioners of historical ϐiction [who] are beginning to tire of 
the assumption that the nineteenth century comprised only a limitless 
trove of recoverable guilty secrets.”5 As Bradford argues, in Arthur & 
George
Barnes adheres scrupulously to the well-documented facts and 
never employs inventive licence to suggest that the prejudices 
that underpinned the case were any less or more severe than 
disclosed in the documentary accounts. Instead he creates a 
modestly elegant novel out of a very real collision of actuality 
and literary mythology. Doyle steps into the ϐiction as a ϐigure 
who closely resembles his own creation, Holmes, and while this 
carries a trace of postmodern whimsy there is the more compel-
ling resonance of a very real character driven by a respect for 
truth and justice.6
As this quotation also indicates, Barnes’s novel dealing with the case 
of George Edalji and The Great Wyrley Outrages strongly relies on ac-
tual historical events and biographical details as well as on legal tran-
scripts of court proceedings. As a result, the ethical issues present in 
the novel, ranging from faithfulness and loyalty to racial prejudice 
and responsibility, are foregrounded in a highly conspicuous way. The 
reader is constantly compelled to pass moral judgement in order to 
make the text signify. In other words, in order to interpret the ethical 
dimension of the novel, the reader needs to enter into a dialogue with 
the actual moral issues presented on the ϐictional level. The reader’s 
dynamic participation in the interpretative process is necessitated 
also by the novel’s fundamentally dialogic nature apparent in its divi-
sion into sections that are preceded by the ϐirst name of the character 
– mostly Arthur or George – from whose perspective the events are 
presented. As Berberich contends,
[a]s readers, we will “see” what Arthur and George respectively 
see. The conclusions from these snippets are up to us and this, 
effectively, changes the reader-writer contract. Barnes provides 
the narrative framework, but the readers can themselves as-
sume the role of investigators – assessing this piece of evidence 
here, or weighing up that newly emerging detail there.7
5.  Bradford, p. 95.
6.  Bradford, pp. 95–6.
7.  Berberich, p. 121.
Book-Barnes2.indb   43 2014.11.23.   21:15:48
44
In addition, the novel’s dialogism is further deepened not only by the 
occasional addition of minor voices but also by the undramatized 
third-person narrator, who, as Frederick M. Holmes observes, “refuses 
to pronounce authoritatively on matters that are in dispute, to offer 
moral judgements, or to clear up all of the novel’s mysteries and 
uncertainties.”8
The dialogic nature of Arthur  &  George manifests itself on the 
structural level as well. As early as in the ϐirst chapter, in which Arthur’s 
childhood confrontation with a corpse is described, the reader is en-
couraged to expect a detective story. This generic expectation is fur-
ther strengthened not only by the reader’s awareness of Barnes’s 
previous novels written in the same genre under the pseudonym Dan 
Kavanagh, but by the indirect evocation of the literary-mythological 
character Sherlock Holmes as well. On the basis of these arguments, it 
can be seen that Arthur & George invites readers to construct their own 
versions of the truth and rely on their own “eyes of faith” (499), much 
like George is required to act when attending the clairvoyant memorial 
of Arthur.
This readerly activity, which involves almost as much effort as a 
professional reading would, is called for primarily in the interpreta-
tion and evaluation of ethical issues presented on the ϐictional level. 
By relying on contemporary theories of ethical criticism, I am going to 
demonstrate how the moral question of responsibility manifests itself 
in the novel. I will argue that Arthur  & George presents two distinct 
yet interrelated layers of responsibility: intrapersonal responsibility 
(i.e., the responsibility one feels towards oneself) and interpersonal 
responsibility (i.e., the responsibility one feels towards one’s fellow 
human beings).
2. Intrapersonal Responsibility
The most fundamental level of responsibility observable in Arthur & 
George can be referred to as intrapersonal responsibility, which de-
notes the responsibility one feels towards one’s own being as a dis-
crete entity. This layer of onus is composed of a multiplicity of smaller 
elements, the most striking of which present in the novel can be re-
lated to success.
8.  Frederick M. Holmes, Julian Barnes, New British Fiction (Basingstoke; New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 59.
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Before discussing how self-responsibility and success are linked 
in Barnes’s novel, the conditions for developing intrapersonal respon-
sibility must be taken into consideration. In order to be responsible 
for ourselves, we have to develop into fully authentic and conscious 
personalities. The ϐirst step in achieving this is to form a stable iden-
tity. The possibility of forming and possessing a stable identity has al-
ways been a much-debated issue. However, as can be noticed in many 
other novels by Barnes,9 a character’s identity is anchored in their ϐirst 
memory. Here, as we have seen, Arthur’s ϐirst memory, which “was 
to become of central importance” (5) to him, can be connected to his 
childhood discovery of his grandmother’s corpse. The narrator’s com-
mentary, according to which “[a] grandchild who, by the acquisition of 
memory, had just stopped being a thing” (4), can be taken as a refer-
ence to the ϐirst step in Arthur’s identity formation.
In addition to the fact that Arthur does have a ϐirst memory or, as 
Barnes formulates it, a “recollection obviously preceding all others” 
(4), the nature of his ϐirst remembered event – the inextricable link 
between life and death – also foreshadows his possible development 
of a responsible self. In his The Gift of Death (1992), Jacques Derrida, 
drawing on Jan Patočka’s Heretical Essays on the Philosophy of History, 
examines the relationship between responsibility and secrecy in the 
European tradition. In accordance with the Czech philosopher, Derrida 
also claims that the concept of responsibility itself has the structure 
of a type of secret, since, as he puts it, “[i]t presents itself neither as 
a theme nor as a thesis, it gives without being seen [sans se donner à 
voir], without presenting itself in person by means of a ‘fact of being 
seen’ that can be phenomenologically intuited.”10 As Derrida argues, 
the abyssal dissymmetry of the gaze that commands me while remain-
ing inaccessible to me is the gift of the “mysterium tremendum”11 of-
fered by God that “only allows me to respond and only rouses me to the 
responsibility it gives me by making a gift of death [en me donnant la 
mort], giving the secret of death, a new experience of death.”12 In other 
words, Derrida states that in order to be fully authentic, conscious 
and responsible subjects, every individual has to be confronted with 
death. As a result of the fact, however, that death is always singular 
9.  Julian Barnes’s England, England is a case in point (London: Vintage, 1998), es-
pecially pp. 3–7.
10.  Jacques Derrida, The Gift  of  Death, trans. David Wills (Chicago; London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 27.
11.  Derrida, p. 27.
12.  Derrida, p. 33.
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and irreplaceable, one can only die one’s own death. Therefore, rely-
ing on Levinas’s theory, which considers responsibility ϐirst not as re-
sponsibility of myself for myself but as responsibility before the other, 
Derrida insists that our responsibility is derived foremost from the 
(representation of the) death of the other. In Levinas’s formulation, 
“I am responsible for the death of the other to the extent of including 
myself in that death. That can be shown in a more acceptable proposi-
tion: ‘I am responsible for the other inasmuch as the other is mortal.’ 
It is the other’s death that is the foremost death.”13 On the basis of the 
Derridean arguments, it can safely be claimed that Arthur’s early con-
frontation with the “‘white, waxen thing’” (3) preϐigures his develop-
ment into an authentic, responsive and responsible subject. This as-
sumption is further strengthened by his essentially teleological view 
of existence, which always already entails a sense of termination.
As can be observed all through the novel, Arthur, being a man of 
letters, deϐines his life in narrative terms and conceives of his own ex-
istence as a novel in the process of being composed: “Arthur could see 
the beginning of the story – where he was now – and its happy end; 
only the middle was for the moment lacking” (7). The detective story 
writer’s inability to ϐind the thin dividing line between reality and ϐic-
tion is most conspicuous from the point when he becomes interested 
in George’s case and starts comparing the process of criminal investi-
gation to the composition of a novel: “It was like starting a book: you 
had the story but not all of it, most of the characters but not all of them, 
some but not all of the causal links. You had your beginning, and you 
had your ending” (332). In this respect, Arthur can be considered as a 
representative of existentialist ethics propagated by Jean-Paul Sartre. 
As Sartre argues,
man ϐirst of all is the being who hurls himself toward a future 
and who is conscious of imagining himself as being in the future. 
Man is at the start a plan which is aware of itself. Thus, existen-
tialism’s ϐirst move is to make every man aware of what he is and 
to make the full responsibility of his existence rest on him.14
Sartre stresses the importance of freedom and personal responsibility, 
which manifest themselves in the stance Arthur takes on life.
13.  Qtd. in Derrida, p. 46.
14.  Jean-Paul Sartre, “The Humanism of Existentialism,” in Classics  of  Western  
Philosophy, ed. Steven M. Cahn (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, 2012), 
1321–1333, p. 1323.
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The most striking manifestation of intrapersonal responsibility 
can be connected to success. Along with his general conception of ex-
istence, Arthur also interprets success within the framework of narra-
tives; more precisely, as the climactic point of chivalric romances:
His success was the deserved result of hard work, but those 
themselves unfamiliar with success imagined it the end of the 
story. Arthur was not yet ready for the end of his own story. If 
life was a chivalric quest, then he had rescued the fair Touie, he 
had conquered the city, and been rewarded with gold. But there 
were years to go before he was prepared to accept a role as wise 
elder to the tribe. What did a knight errant do when he came 
home to a wife and two children in South Norwood? (76–7)
As the last sentence of the quotation suggests, Arthur seems to face an 
existential failure when the events of his life do not fulϐil the criteria of 
the genre of chivalric romance.
As opposed to Arthur, George, the earnest son of the Parsee Vicar 
of Great Wyrley, does not possess a ϐirst memory. Moreover, as opposed 
to Martha Cochrane, the protagonist of England, England, he does not 
even seem to have the imaginative capacity by which he could invent 
himself one:
And while other children might make good the lack – might for-
cibly install a mother’s doting face or a father’s supporting arm 
in their memories – George does not do so. For a start, he lacks 
imagination. […] George is fully capable of following the inven-
tions of others – the stories of Noah’s Ark, David and Goliath, the 
Journey of the Magi – but has little such capacity himself. (4–5)
On the basis of this apparent lack of primal recollection, it can be 
argued that the potential development of George’s stable identity is 
stunted from the very beginning. In addition, his possible identity for-
mation is also hindered by the lack of a personal encounter with death. 
In his case, it is only through metaphoric language that any confronta-
tion with death is possible:
His mother takes him once a week to visit Great-Uncle Compson. 
He lives not far away, behind a low granite kerb which George is 
not allowed to cross. Every week they renew his jug of ϐlowers. 
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Great Wyrley was Uncle Compson’s parish for twenty-six years; 
now his soul is in Heaven while his body remains in the church-
yard. (7–8)
Although based on Derrida’s views it could be argued that the mere 
linguistic representation of death exempliϐied by the quotation is suf-
ϐicient to provide the basis for the formation of a responsible subject, 
George, as the omniscient narrator frequently implies, is completely 
unable to decipher metaphorical language:
Christ taught in Parables, and George ϐinds he does not like 
Parables. Take the Parable of the Wheat and the Tares. George 
understands the part about the enemy planting Tares among the 
Wheat, and how you shouldn’t gather up the Tares in case you 
root out the Wheat at the same time – though he isn’t entirely 
sure about this, because he often sees Mother weeding in the 
Vicarage garden and what is weeding except gathering up the 
Tares before they and the Wheat are fully grown? But even ig-
noring this problem, he can go no further. He knows the story is 
all about something else – that is why it is a Parable – but what 
this something else might be his mind will not reach to. (21–2)
As this quotation also indicates, George is unable to interpret the ϐigu-
rative language that serves as a basis of religious discourse, although 
he seems to be aware of the secondary level of meaning residing be-
hind the actual words of the Bible. The narratorial statement from the 
beginning of the novel, quoted above, preϐigures George’s later inability 
to see Arthur’s spirit with his “eyes of faith” (499) and, on a more gen-
eral level, his lack of belief in God or in religious accounts attempting 
to provide sufϐicient explanation for otherwise inexplicable incidents.
As a result of the fact that George is unable to form a stable iden-
tity in the enclosed world of the Vicarage, the moment he is forced to 
move out of this comforting space with which he is already familiar, he 
ϐinds himself on unstable ground. Therefore, he attempts to identify 
himself in relation to other beings. The ϐirst animate being he is “intro-
duced to” (8) outside the protecting parental home is a cow:
It is not the size of the beast that alarms him, nor the swollen 
udders wobbling in his eye-line, but the sudden hoarse bellow 
the thing utters for no good reason. It can only be in a very bad 
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temper. George bursts into tears, while his father punishes the 
cow by hitting it with a stick. Then the animal turns sideways, 
raises its tail and soils itself. George is transϐixed by this out-
pouring, by the strange splatty noise as it lands on the grass, by 
the way things have suddenly slipped out of control. (8–9)
Although at this stage in the novel the cow’s instinctual behaviour 
seems to provide an adequate point of reference against which George 
can identify himself as the other (i.e., as a rational human being), the 
incident described a few pages later undermines this possibility and 
lowers him to the level of animals: “One afternoon, on his way back to 
the Vicarage, George soils himself. […] George is unable to explain to 
his father why, though he is nearly seven years old, he has behaved like 
a baby in napkins” (12–13). In addition to his regressive behaviour, 
which is deϐined by Freud as an unconscious psychological defense 
mechanism whereby an individual’s personality retreats to an ear-
lier stage of development in order to avoid pain or threat,15 George’s 
sense of his animality is further reinforced by his schoolmates’ verbal 
and non-verbal mockery: “Henshaw makes monkey faces, pulling at 
the sides of his little ϐingers while using his thumbs to ϐlap his ears 
forward” (11). What George is unwilling to recognize here is that, be-
hind the surface, his classmates’ ridicule is targeted primarily at his 
being not so much an animal-like creature but an Oriental, the Other.16 
According to Edward Said,
[t]he Orient is not only adjacent to Europe; it is also the place of 
Europe’s greatest and richest and oldest colonies, the source of 
its civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of 
its deepest and most recurring images of the Other. In addition, 
the Orient has helped to deϐine Europe (or the West) as its con-
trasting image, idea, personality, experience.17
As Said’s argument implies, in Edwardian England the Oriental served 
as a point of reference against which the English could identify them-
selves both on the individual and on the communal level. George’s 
15.  See Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company Inc, 1977).
16.  The representation of black people in animal terms as well as the parallel bet-
ween the situation of black people and animals are recurrent themes in postcolonial 
discourse. See, for example, Marjorie Spiegel, The Dreaded Comparison:  Human and 
Animal Slavery (New York: Mirror Books, 1988).
17.  Edward W. Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 2003), pp. 1–2.
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reluctance to consider himself as the Other is presented several times 
throughout the novel, most conspicuously when he engages in con-
versation with Arthur and, being shocked by the writer’s remark “we 
are … unofϐicial Englishmen” (303), reϐlects: “How is he less than a full 
Englishman? He is one by birth, by citizenship, by education, by reli-
gion, by profession. […] he has no other land. He cannot go back two 
generations. He can hardly return to India, a place he has never visited 
and has little desire to” (303–4). George’s unwillingness and inabil-
ity to assess his existence and situation in accordance with prevail-
ing norms and prejudices can further be demonstrated by his naive 
refusal to consider racial prejudice as the motive for the persecution 
against him:
There has been an occasional slight, but what man does not suf-
fer that, in some form or another? […] There were teasings and 
jokes. I am not so naive as to be unaware that some people look 
at me differently. But I am a lawyer, Sir Arthur. What evidence do 
I have that anyone has acted against me because of race preju-
dice? […] Did the jury ϐind me guilty because of my skin? That is 
too easy an answer. (300–1)
As has been stated above, George seems to have trouble interpreting 
secondary levels of meaning. However, in this case he fails to accept 
the easiest explanation for his persecution because his mind does not 
seem to be affected by racist thinking.
By following the line of argumentation regarding identity and its 
interrelatedness with intrapersonal responsibility, it can be stated 
that in a culture which rejects him as essentially Other, George’s re-
peated attempts at forming a stable identity in relation to his fellow 
pupils and, as I am going to demonstrate later, to his fellow citizens, 
are doomed to failure.
3. Interpersonal Responsibility
The second level of responsibility that appears in Arthur  &  George 
can be referred to as interpersonal responsibility, which signiϐies the 
responsibility one feels towards one’s fellow human beings. As this 
layer inherently involves a relation between two or more people, its 
manifestation in George’s case is clearly apparent, since he constantly 
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tries to deϐine his identity in relation to others. As in his efforts at self-
identiϐication, George also attempts to construct his sense of respon-
sibility and success from his relations with his fellow citizens. This 
argument can best be illustrated by his Railway Law for the “Man in 
the Train” (1901), the title page of which is reproduced in the novel 
and, as Berberich also points out, “brilliantly conveys his pride in his 
achievements and in his seemingly secure position as a pillar of society 
quite literally upholding law and order.”18 However, in the same way 
that George is incapable of forming a stable identity and assessing his 
situation in the community clearly, it can be seen that he is also unable 
to realize the needs of the society he is desperately trying to become 
part of. Instead of sharing the view of passengers who regard the train 
merely as a practical means of public transport, George considers the 
railway service to be a complex network of obligations binding the pas-
sengers and the railway company: “George marvels at how the British, 
who gave railways to the world, treat them as a mere means of conven-
ient transport, rather than as an intense nexus of multiple rights and 
responsibilities” (70). The fallacy of George’s sense of himself as “an 
authority upon an aspect of the law which is of practical help to many 
people” (94) lies in his reluctance to accept railway passengers’ unwill-
ingness to use their rights. According to Werner Hamacher,
[i]t belongs to the very concept of rights […] that they include 
the “right” not to exercise them. Whoever is so disposed may de-
cline to use the right to property and to security, the right to re-
sistance to oppression, and even the right to freedom. But such 
a person neither renounces those rights nor forfeits them, but 
only declines to use them, to appeal to them, and to make them a 
ground for action. This undeclared implication of all rights pro-
pounds – in an equally undeclared manner – that the use of all 
rights and even of the sphere of rights itself may in principle be 
declined.19
On the basis of Hamacher’s views, it can be argued that the impor-
tant distinction between the travelling public’s unawareness of their 
rights and their unwillingness to use their rights seems to be blurred 
18.  Berberich, p. 122.
19.  Werner Hamacher, “The Right Not to Use Rights: Human Rights and the 
Structure of Judgements,” in Political  Theologies:  Public  Religions  in  a  Post-Secular  
World, eds. Hent de Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2006), 671–690, p. 685.
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in George’s mind. As a result of his mistaken assumptions about the so-
ciety he is struggling to become a useful member of, George is unable 
to develop a sufϐicient sense of interpersonal responsibility. Similarly 
to George, his father is also mistaken in his supposition concerning his 
son’s signiϐicance in serving the community. Symbolically, this can be 
demonstrated by the fact that he gives George a sepia print of the Pre-
Raphaelite William Holman Hunt’s The Light  of  the  World when The 
Scapegoat painted by the same artist would have been more reϐlective 
of his son’s place in society (67).
George’s futile attempts to be responsible for others stand in 
sharp contrast with the lack of responsibility directed at him, which 
manifests itself most strikingly in Mrs Greatorex’s response to Arthur’s 
inquiry concerning the reason for her withholding of information that 
resulted in the incrimination of an innocent person: “And if you are 
concerned about your young friend’s wrongful imprisonment, then 
I was concerned about the same thing happening to Royden Sharp” 
(407). The woman’s preference for sacriϐicing George for the sake of 
saving Royden Sharp, the “wild boy” (401) who turns out to be the 
real culprit of the crime that George was wrongfully accused of com-
mitting, can be explained by Derrida’s commentary on Kierkegaard’s 
Fear and Trembling. Derrida argues that we fear and tremble before 
God, who makes us responsible for our own salvation while remaining 
absent, inaccessible, secret and silent. As Derrida puts it,
God doesn’t give his reasons, he acts as he intends, he doesn’t 
have to give his reasons, or share anything with us: neither his 
motivations, if he has any, nor his deliberations, nor his deci-
sions. Otherwise he wouldn’t be God, we wouldn’t be dealing 
with the Other as God or with God as wholly other [tout autre].20
As the next move of his argument, Derrida elaborates on Kierkegaard’s 
views concerning Abraham’s sacriϐice of his son, Isaac. Kierkegaard ar-
gues that by keeping silent about what God commanded him to do, 
Abraham steps outside the ethical order that is formed by society and 
that ties responsibility to accountability within the public, non-secret 
domain. Although Abraham is irresponsible in declining to divulge the 
secret of the sacriϐice, he is responsible in resisting the “irresponsi-
bilization” of an ethical explanation, the temptation of the ethical. In 
Derrida’s words,
20.  Derrida, p. 57.
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[h]e keeps quiet in order to avoid the moral temptation which, 
under the pretext of calling him to responsibility, to self-justiϐi-
cation, would make him lose his ultimate responsibility along 
with his singularity, make him lose his unjustiϐiable, secret, and 
absolute responsibility before God.21
On the basis of Kierkegaard’s views, Derrida goes on to argue that if 
responsibility binds us in our singularity to the absolute singularity 
of the other as other, we are constantly forced to sacriϐice the same 
responsibility to all other others: “Every other (one) is every (bit) other 
[tout autre est tout autre].”22 In other words, as a result of the fact that 
there is a prioritized chain of responsibilities (i.e., people we are re-
sponsible for), responsibility for one single person can only be taken 
at the expense of everyone else. I would argue that Mrs Greatorex’s 
decision to withhold information for the sake of saving Royden Sharp 
even at the price of incriminating George can be considered as a per-
fect instance of this ethically unjustiϐiable sacriϐice.
As opposed to Mrs Greatorex, on the basis of his readiness to help 
George clear his name, Arthur could be regarded as someone who 
feels responsible for the solicitor. However, his essentially self-centred 
nature and his preoccupation with his own success as a writer un-
dermine this possibility. The argument that George’s case excites the 
interest of Arthur as the writer of detective novels rather than as a 
compassionate citizen willing to ϐight for the exoneration of his fel-
low human being out of pure sympathy and an insistence on moral 
principles can be supported by George’s critical remarks on Arthur’s 
incapacity to differentiate between the process of criminal investiga-
tion and the composition of a ϐictional work whereby he rendered the 
evidence against Royden Sharp valueless:
This was where Sir Arthur’s excess of enthusiasm had led him. 
And it was all, George decided, the fault of Sherlock Holmes. Sir 
Arthur had been too inϐluenced by his own creation. Holmes per-
formed his brilliant acts of deduction and then handed villains 
over to the authorities with their unambiguous guilt written all 
over them. But Holmes had never once been obliged to stand 
in the witness box and have his suppositions and intuitions and 
immaculate theories ground to very ϐine dust over a period of 
21.  Derrida, p. 61.
22.  Derrida, p. 68.
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several hours by the likes of Mr Disturnal. What Sir Arthur had 
done was the equivalent of go into a ϐield where the criminal’s 
footprints might be found and trample all over it wearing several 
different pairs of boots. He had, in his eagerness, destroyed the 
legal case against Royden Sharp even as he was trying to make it. 
And it was all the fault of Mr Sherlock Holmes. (426–7)
Arthur’s obsession with his success as a novelist and the resulting 
inability to act in a responsible way can further be supported by his 
self-reproach: “I had eyes, and did not see. I did not spot the accursed 
microbe. I did not pay her enough attention. I was too busy with my 
own … success” (85). However, on the basis of my previous arguments, 
it can be claimed that it is precisely this inability to be fully responsible 
for others that enables Arthur to develop intrapersonal responsibility 
and make his fame on the literary stage.
Conclusion
It can be concluded that the two interrelated levels of responsibility 
– the intrapersonal and interpersonal levels – are represented by the 
two eponymous characters of the novel, Arthur and George, respec-
tively. While Arthur manages to form a stable identity and, thereby, a 
strong sense of self-responsibility as well, George, the hard-working 
solicitor, remains unable to develop an authentic and responsible self 
and to assess his position in society clearly. The two protagonists mu-
tually complement each other from the point of view of responsibility, 
demonstrating one of Barnes’s several attempts at composing a fun-
damentally dialogic novel that aims at creating an equilibrium in the 
critical reader’s mind.
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The  Rupture  Between  Man  and  Animal  in  Julian  
Barnes’s A History of the World in 10½ Chapters
For we shall have to ask ourselves, inevitably, 
what happens to the fraternity of brothers 
when an animal enters the scene.
Jacques Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore 
I Am (More To Follow)”
This paper investigates the various ways in which animals enter 
the scene in Julian Barnes’s A History  of  the  World in  10½ Chapters1 
(1989), and an equally important point of investigation will concern 
the ways humans enter the scene of animals in this book. In A History, 
human-animal encounters can be interpreted as shedding light on 
an unresolved set of questions concerning the nature of the co-exist-
ence of man and animal. The three main areas of study I will refer to 
in this paper are observing animals and being observed by them as 
raised by John Berger; Descartes and Lacan’s perception of animals 
as machines and their contrasting animals and humans along the di-
vision of lacking a soul and having one; and, ϐinally, the problem of 
nakedness as discussed by Derrida. Concentrating on three chapters 
from Barnes’s book, “The Stowaway,” “The Survivor,” and “Shipwreck,” 
my aim is to show how Barnes’s text reϐlects on human-animal en-
counters. Speciϐically, I show that in the chapters “The Survivor” and 
“Shipwreck” the animal-human boundary is dubious and the Cartesian 
idea of the animal-machine receives provocative intertexts; while the 
ϐinal part of my paper examines chapter one, “The Stowaway,” where 
the narrator is an animal and, therefore, traditionally, it could not say 
“I am” – yet it does.
1. All parenthesized references (A  History) are to this edition: Julian Barnes, A 
History of the World in 10½ Chapters (New York: Vintage, 1989).
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Looking at Animals
In his seminal essay “Why Look at Animals?” (1980), John Berger 
writes about a historical process that seems to be culminating in our 
time: the gradual “cultural marginalization of animals.”2 There are no 
animals around us now, they are not our immediate companions the 
way they used to be. We do not rely on them in our daily activities, nor 
are they part of our households any more: they are bred and killed 
in factories behind closed doors. Berger deϐines two ways of survival 
for the marginalized animal: as “human puppets,” the two most wide-
spread subcategories of which are pets and Disney heroes, or as be-
coming spectacle in the zoos or in wildlife documentaries.
When we, Westerners from the twenty-ϐirst century, most proba-
bly in an urban environment, think about animals and our relationship 
with them, we project our notions back onto earlier ages. However, the 
animal-human relationship used to be radically different and used to 
have several contradictory aspects: “to suppose that animals ϐirst en-
tered the human imagination as meat or leather or horn is to project 
a 19th century attitude backwards across the millennia. Animals ϐirst 
entered the imagination as messengers and promises”3: they were 
signs of the supernatural.4 As Berger notes, there is no other species 
that would recognize himself in the look of animals, only the human: 
“Man becomes aware of himself returning the look.”5 In spite of, or 
rather with, this element of recognition, which will be a central point 
of analysis in this paper, animals were killed and eaten. Apart from 
the supernatural level and the aspect of self-recognition, animals were 
also a source of food: a “peasant becomes fond of his pig and is glad to 
salt away its pork.”6 Animals were “subjected and worshipped, bred 
and sacriϐiced.”7 Animals were regarded as simultaneously similar to 
us and different from us.
The loss of this dualism with Descartes is another key point in my 
analysis to come: what is of importance now, at the beginning of this 
paper, is the act of projecting our modern, pet-based or spectacle-based 
relationship with animals back on history. We naively believe that we 
2.  John Berger, “Why Look at Animals?” in About Looking (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1980), 1–26, p. 13.
3.  Berger, p. 2.
4.  The Latin word avis also indicates to us the supernatural perception of animals. 
Avis means bird and omen at the same time.
5.  Berger, p. 3.
6.  Berger, p. 5.
7.  Berger, p. 5.
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can grasp the historicity of animals, yet we cannot. And in A History 
the worms, cats, whales, reindeers, and Amazonian natives all reϐlect 
our projections back at us: they talk back, they are incomprehensible, 
they behave like humans. In this respect it is vital that the only actual 
picture that is shown to the readers, an intruding visual element in the 
text, is of most animal-like people: naked, exposed, devastated, natural 
and unnatural, The Raft of the Medusa. The picture serves as a visual 
ampliϐier of the various hints and plot elements concerning animals 
and humans, suggesting that a clear-cut Cartesian distinction and hi-
erarchy is impossible to make.
Naturally, it is in the case of the ϐirst-person narrator of the ϐirst 
chapter, the woodworm, that we can feel the strongest resistance to 
our own projections. He talks to us and often about us, but never gives 
us, readers, a chance to talk back to agree or disagree. Kath of “The 
Survivor” is also entrapped in her projections on nature: her cats are 
not well-nurtured and healthy, but starving; her utopian island is a 
technically well-equipped hospital, and she gradually identiϐies herself 
with toxically exposed (dead) reindeer. The heroes become victims of 
their own projections on nature in both Ararat chapters.
Being Seen
But why do our projections – projected with the best of intentions, of 
course – go astray? Berger suggests that the main reason is that we 
do not let ourselves be seen by an animal. Animals do not “reserve a 
special look for man [...] [t]he animal scrutinizes [man] across a nar-
row abyss of non-comprehension.”8 In “The Animal that Therefore I 
am (More to Follow)” Derrida highlights the importance of being 
looked at by animals: “the animal looks at us, and we are naked before 
it. Thinking perhaps begins there.”9 He also describes the look of the 
animal as a “bottomless gaze,” and also as “abyssal”: “the gaze called 
animal offers to my sight the abyssal limit of the human: the inhuman 
or the ahuman, the ends of man, that is to say the bordercrossing from 
which vantage man dares to announce himself to himself.”10
According to Berger, this “abyss of non-comprehension” is what is 
similar in man and animal: the non-comprehension through which we, 
8.  Berger, p. 3.
9.  Jacques Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow),” trans. 
David Willis, Critical Inquiry 28.2 (2002), 369–418. p. 397.
10.  Derrida, “The Animal,” p. 381.
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humans, see the world is similar, though not identical with the non-
comprehension of animals: “And so, when [man] is being seen by the 
animal, he is being seen as his surroundings are seen by him.”11 We 
recognize our look in the animal: this is what makes them strangely 
familiar. Yet, the animal is distant because of its silence. This idea of si-
lence, the languagelessness of animals, will be challenged by Derrida, 
but at this point what matters is not the language but the look. The 
look of animals that is no longer taken, as we do not let ourselves be 
seen by animals.
Observing animals in zoos or in ϐilms, and discussing them, is a 
human right. By establishing zoos or shooting nature ϐilms, we elimi-
nate the chance for reciprocity that used to be present in human-an-
imal relationships even two hundred years ago.12 Zoos appeared at a 
time when animals started to disappear from everyday life.13 Zoos are, 
as it is a commonplace by now, essentially connected to the colonial 
enterprise, and, as a result, animals have become involved in a politi-
cal game. Animals have become indexes of human power at the zoo: 
we observe them to maintain our difference.14 Discussing manipulated 
wildlife documentaries, Garrard writes about a phenomenon that I 
consider crucial in the understanding of zoos as well: “the illusion of 
unrestricted access.” 15
In A History, somewhere in the middle of the process of associat-
ing herself with reindeers, Kath, the survivor, also refers to zoos:
‘How are you tonight, Kath?’
‘I thought you always said we. That is, if you’re who you pretend 
you are.’
‘Why should I say we, Kath? I know how I am. I was asking about 
you.’
‘We,’ I said sarcastically, ‘We in the zoo are ϐine, thank you very 
much.’
‘What do you mean, the zoo?’ 
11.  Berger, p. 3.
12.  The time span of two hundred years is Derrida’s suggestion (“The Animal,” p. 
394), and Berger also writes that the change started at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century (p. 9).
13.  Berger, p. 19.
14.  On the other side of this coin of observance we ϐind wildlife documentaries 
with their highly problematic inheritance of manipulative techniques from the 1980s, 
and the still existing issues of framing, selection, isolation of species, and attraction-
seeking attitudes. See Greg Garrard, “Animals,” in Ecocriticism (London; New York: 
Routledge, 2004), 136–159.
15.  Garrard, p. 153.
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‘The bars, stupid.’ I didn’t really think it was a zoo; I wanted to 
ϐind out what they thought it was. Fighting your own mind isn’t 
always an easy business.
[...]
I think I know what my mind is doing. It is a sort of zoo I’m im-
agining, because a zoo is the only place I’ve seen reindeer. Live, I 
mean. So I associate them with bars. My mind knows that for me 
it all started with the reindeer; that’s why it invented this decep-
tion. It’s very plausible, the mind. (101)
A zoo is the place where animals are observed but they “look 
sideways.”16 Kath takes on the position of an animal in the zoo: as a 
patient, she becomes a spectacle for doctors and nurses without ever 
having the possibility of returning their (medical) gaze. We should not 
forget that she has already been cast as an animal: she has constantly 
been referred to as a “silly cow” (e.g., 87). But at that point the position 
was forced on her by Greg, whom she casts as a dinosaur, and she did 
her best to rationalize being a “silly cow”: “maybe women are more 
in touch with the world […] well, everything’s connected isn’t it, and 
women are more closely connected to all the cycles of nature and birth 
and rebirth” (89). As her story progresses, as she spends (or thinks she 
spends, which is eventually the same thing) more time with two cats 
conϐined in a boat, she increasingly identiϐies herself with the position 
of animals and she seems to have less control over her life: “I wish I 
knew how much I was poisoned. Enough to put a blue stripe down 
my back and feed me to the mink?” (104), as they did with toxically 
exposed reindeers. Like zoo animals, she is never looked in the eye. In 
response, she reacts through averting her own gaze: “I’ve started clos-
ing my eyes” (104).
I would like to argue that this gesture is an attempt on Kath’s part 
to challenge our modern relationship with animals, which has already 
incorporated the loss of the act of being seen “in the seeing.” Derrida 
comments on the loss and the necessity of the reciprocity of the act of 
looking with the following words:
What does this bottomless gaze [of Derrida’s cat] offer to my 
sight? What does it “say” to me, demonstrating quite simply the 
naked truth of every gaze, given that that truth allows me to see 
16.  Berger, p. 26.
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and be seen through the eyes of the other, in the seeing and not 
just seen eyes of the other?17
Derrida’s questions address the issue of being open to the gaze of the 
animal other. This openness implies that the look of the animal – in 
Derrida’s example, the look of his cat – is given the status of being able 
to arrest one’s gaze. By allowing a reciprocal look to take place be-
tween man and animal, Derrida aims at restoring a crucial element 
that was lost and at revealing the historical process leading to the hi-
erarchical differentiation between humans and animals, between hu-
mans and the wholly other.
The Wholly Other
Both Berger and Derrida trace the process of separating ourselves 
from animals and of establishing a hierarchical relationship back to 
Descartes. With his cogito  ergo  sum, Descartes radically separated 
body and soul, and deϐined the body in terms of obeying the laws of 
physics. In his logic, “since animals were soulless, the animal was re-
duced to the model of a machine.”18 The animal is a machine in the 
sense of not having or, the way Derrida approaches the topic, in the 
sense of not being given the power of “speech, reason, experience of 
death, […] lie.”19 The position taken up by Kath in “The Survivor” chap-
ter is essentially similar to the deprived state of animals. Her position 
is also linked to the historical and theological debates about the status 
of women, thus highlighting a connection between animals and the 
second sex. As with the attempts to differentiate between humans and 
animals, woman-related debates also addressed the issue whether or 
not women had a soul, or what position they should occupy in the fam-
ily and hence in society.
In the way Derrida interprets Descartes, and also in the twists of 
Barnes’s plot, the animal stands for the “wholly other.”20 Referring to 
the animal as a metaphor for otherness is a widespread cultural phe-
nomenon: “Animals stand for all forms of social otherness: race, class, 
and gender are frequently ϐigured in images of subhuman brutishness, 
17.  Derrida, “The Animal,” p. 381.
18.  Berger, p. 9.
19.  Jacques Derrida, “And Say the Animal Responded,” trans. David Willis, in 
Zoontologies:  The Question of the Animal, ed. Cary Wolfe (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2003), 121–146, p. 137.
20.  Derrida, “The Animal,” p. 380.
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bestial appetite, and mechanical servility.”21 Categorizing the animal 
as “wholly other” is further emphasized by Lacan, who bases his ideas 
about animals on the Cartesian principle that there is a radical differ-
ence between man and animal, and that the animal is the one without 
a soul. Lacan casts the animal in the realm of the imaginary, in a pre-
language, pre-society stage, and, in Derrida’s critical words, Lacan is 
“depriving it [the animal] of any access to the symbolic, that is to say to 
the law, and to whatever is held to be proper to the human.”22
Derrida’s lecture-based essay “And Say the Animal Responded?” 
analyses Lacan’s views on animals and takes a stance against it. Lacan 
states that animals belong to the pre-symbolic order, as they do not re-
spond, only react,23 and they do not possess “a second degree reϐlexive 
power, a power that is conscious of being able to deceive by pretending 
to pretend.”24 Derrida criticizes this categorization of Lacan, as it keeps 
animals in “Cartesian ϐixity.”25 I would like to argue in this paper that 
Derrida’s criticism of the Cartesian/Lacanian notion of the animal as 
the radically other, and what Derrida offers instead, are conϐirmed in 
Barnes’s A History.
It is less a matter of asking whether one has the right to refuse 
the animal such and such a power (speech, reason, experience of 
death, mourning, culture, institution, technics, clothing, lie, pre-
tense of pretense, covering of tracks, gift, laughter, tears, respect, 
and so on – the list is necessarily without limit, and the most 
powerful philosophical tradition within which we live has re-
fused the “animal” all those things) than of asking whether what 
calls itself human has the right to rigorously attribute to man, 
which means therefore to attribute to himself, what he refuses 
the animal, and whether he can ever possess the pure, rigorous, 
indivisible concept, as such, of that attribution.26
It is the act of attribution that Derrida criticizes and that, in my read-
ing, certain chapters of A History also argue against. Derrida imagines 
the man-animal difference as a rupture on the two sides of which it is 
not the general concept of “human” and “animal” that can be found, but 
21.  W. J. T. Mitchell, “Illusion: Looking at Animals Looking,” in Picture  Theory  
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 329–344, p. 333.
22.  Derrida, “And Say,” p. 122 (emphasis added).
23.  Derrida, “And Say,” pp. 124–8.
24.  Derrida, “And Say,” p. 130.
25.  Derrida, “And Say,” p. 124.
26.  Derrida, “And Say,” pp. 137–8.
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what Derrida calls “a heterogeneous multiplicity of the living.”27 This 
multiplicity is characteristic of every organization (or the lack of or-
ganization) and every relation. Hence, distinctions are more and more 
difϐicult to make along a binary division, such as distinguishing ϐigures 
of the organic and inorganic, of life and death.28 This problematic dif-
ferentiation between organic and inorganic is increasingly present in 
post-human and cyborg philosophy, and also in ecocriticism, which ex-
amines the animal-human-technology triangle.
This set of questions also appears in A  History, in chapter four 
“The Survivor,” and chapter ϐive, “Shipwreck.” This latter chapter is (al-
legedly) based in terms of its language on “the 1818 London transla-
tion of Savigny and Corrèard’s Narrative of a Voyage to Senegal” (308). 
Here we can read in great detail about the extreme circumstances and 
ways of how ϐifteen people survived the shipwreck of the Medusa. 
After the description we can see the painting called The  Raft  of  the  
Medusa (1819) by Théodore Géricault, which is followed by a medita-
tion over the nature and tools of the painting. What can be striking for 
us, reading A History along with the quote by Derrida discussed above, 
is that the raft is referred to in the text that allegedly uses early nine-
teenth-century language as a “machine” eleven times (e.g., 117). While 
Derrida is writing against Descartes and Lacan’s notion that the ani-
mal works mechanically, now we have a raft described as a machine, 
and a picture of devastated, cannibalistic humans presented naked, as 
animals. Animals, who are considered machines. The following quotes 
illustrate the ways in which Barnes’s text addresses the issues of the 
animal-human and machine-animal divisions:
But scarcely had ϐifty men got on board this machine – whose ex-
tent was twenty metres in length and seven in breadth – than it 
sank to at least seventy centimetres under water. [...] In the ϐirst 
night, a storm got up and threw the machine with great violence; 
the cries of those on board mingled with the roaring of the bil-
lows. [...] Order was restored, and there was an hour of tranquil-
lity upon that fatal machine. (117–8, emphasis added)
According to the Oxford Dictionary of English, the word “machine” ap-
peared in English in the middle of the sixteenth century, and originally 
27.  Derrida, “The Animal,” p. 399.
28.  Derrida, “The Animal,” p. 399.
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meant “a structure.”29 The word itself is of Doric Greek origin: ma-
khana (Greek mēkhanē, from mēkhos ‘contrivance’). The raft on which 
the survivors sacriϐice the weak “for the common good” (121) is a ma-
chine, and on it the humans become machines, animals. Géricault’s 
painting stops the reading of the chapter and makes us contemplate 
this machinery, this animality, this brutality, this monstrosity, this bes-
tiality. We contemplate the sudden visuality of the twisted postures, 
the devastated stretching, the exposed nakedness. We get a picture 
about the experience that deϐies language and a powerful illustration 
of the instinct to survive. Is the human an animal in this scene?
On counting their numbers, it was found that they were twenty-
seven. Fifteen of these were likely to live for some days; the rest, 
suffering from large wounds and many of them delirious, had 
but the smallest chance of survival. In the time that might elapse 
before their deaths, however, they would surely diminish fur-
ther the limited supply of provisions. It was calculated that they 
could well drink between them as many as thirty or forty bottles 
of wine. To put the sick on half allowance was but to kill them by 
degrees. (120–1, emphasis added)
Taken the rationality of the process of decision making, the behaviour 
of the mechanical and machine-like humans of the raft makes the dis-
tinction between humans and machine-like animals most uncertain 
and blurred.
At the time when the cultural status of animals started to change 
in the direction of marginalization, the philosopher Jeremy Bentham 
took a radical stance and denied any natural difference between man 
and animal.30 In chapter ϐive of An  Introduction  to  the  Principles  of  
Morals and Legislation (1789) he categorized pleasures and pains. It 
is in this section that Bentham raises the idea that animals can suffer 
pain:
X. 8. The pleasures of benevolence are the pleasures resulting 
from the view of any pleasures supposed to be possessed by the 
beings who may be the objects of benevolence; to wit, the sensi-
tive beings we are acquainted with; under which are commonly 
29.  “Machine,” Oxford  English  Dictionary, accessed 28 September 2014 <http://
www.oed.com/view/Entry/111850?rskey=rPSUHc&result=1#eid>.
30.  A similar provocative intent can be seen in Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels.
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included, 1. The Supreme Being. 2. Human beings. 3. Other ani-
mals. These may also be called the pleasures of good-will, the 
pleasures of sympathy, or the pleasures of the benevolent or so-
cial affections.
XI. 9. The pleasures of malevolence are the pleasures resulting 
from the view of any pain supposed to be suffered by the beings 
who may become the objects of malevolence: to wit, 1. Human 
beings. 2. Other animals. These may also be styled the pleasures 
of ill-will, the pleasures of the irascible appetite, the pleasures 
of antipathy, or the pleasures of the malevolent or dissocial af-
fections.31
Bentham also argued against the traditional superiority of man: “a 
full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well 
as more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even 
a month old.”32 Derrida interprets Bentham with the following words, 
and his interpretation is vital for the present reading of “Shipwreck”:
Bentham said something like this: the question is not to know 
whether an animal can think, reason, or talk, something we still 
pretend to be asking ourselves. […] The ϔirst and decisive ques-
tion will rather be to know whether animals can suffer. “Can they 
suffer?” asks Bentham simply yet so profoundly.33
Animals do suffer, and this erases the difference between animals and 
humans. Suffering, as Derrida writes, is not a power, but “a possibil-
ity without power, a possibility of the impossible. Mortality resides 
there.”34 According to Bentham, says Derrida, suffering is the link be-
tween us and them, it eliminates these very categories: “us,” “them.”
What happens in Géricault’s painting and in “Shipwreck,” in the 
story of the “possibility of the impossible”? These humans are like ani-
mals not because of the morally loaded categories of “bestiality” or 
“monstrosity,” nor because of the “sub-human” nature of their deeds 
or their cannibalism, but because of the common ground of suffering. 
31.  Jeremy Bentham, “Pleasures and Pains, Their Kinds,” in An Introduction 
to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Library of Economics and Liberty, 
accessed 21 September 2014 <http://www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/
bnthPML5.html#Chapter%20V,%20Pleasures%20and%20Pains,%20
Their%20Kinds>.
32.  Qtd. in Garrard, pp. 136–7.
33.  Derrida, “The Animal,” pp. 395–6.
34.  Derrida, “The Animal,” p. 396.
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This suffering is narrated to us twice: once verbally, once visually. Man 
and animal are not equal, but they are not different in suffering.
When I write “man” and “animal” I use those very generalizing cat-
egories Derrida calls “general singular”35: “one can never have the right 
to take animals to be the species of a kind that would be named the 
Animal.”36 Against this unifying and simplifying perspective Derrida 
creates a neologism, the word animot: “Neither a species nor a gender 
nor an individual, it is an irreducible living multiplicity of mortals.”37 
In fact, each and every mention of “the animal” in this essay should 
be understood as animot. And so should every mention of animals in 
Barnes’s A History, a text that is very sensitive to this generalization.
The General Singular
One symptom of our generalizing perception of “the animal” is that the 
animal is referred to as “it” in the Neutrum. Traditionally, the sexual-
ity of the animal “is as a matter of principle left undifferentiated.”38 In 
“The Survivor” we can see that, in parallel to Kath’s identiϐication with 
animals, the animals are not thought about as sexually neutral; the dif-
ference of their sexuality is given back to them. Castration is possibly 
the most violent version of this deferral of animal sexuality, and in this 
respect it is symptomatic that Kath does not have her cat “ϐixed.” While 
the name of the cat is also signiϐicant, as it is not a traditional pet name 
(he is called Paul), the very word of “ϐixing” is also telling. What is 
wrong with the sexuality of animals that has to be ϐixed? Why are pets, 
those closest to us, those most dependent on us, and on whom we are 
also most dependent, safe only if “neutralized?”39 As Berger writes, a 
pet is an animal that is part of, who is even a member of, the close fam-
ily; who (yes, who) is “deprived of almost all other animal contact.”40 
The pet completes its owner and “offers its owner a mirror to a part 
that is otherwise never reϐlected.”41 Still, it needs to be ϐixed.
This particular cat in “The Survivor” is called Paul, and is not cas-
trated. Paul is as real for Kath as Greg, her partner. As they are of equal 
35.  Derrida, “The Animal,” p. 408.
36.  Derrida, “The Animal,” p. 399.
37.  Derrida, “The Animal,” p. 409.
38.  Derrida, “The Animal,” p. 408.
39.  Derrida, “The Animal,” p. 408.
40.  Berger, p. 12.
41.  Berger, p. 13.
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status, turning the direction of castration is very plausible for Kath: 
“It’s not a cat’s fault that it’s a cat. [...] Sometimes, when he [Greg] 
slapped me around, I’d think, maybe we ought to get you ϐixed ϐirst, 
that might make you less aggressive” (88). Kath’s stance is, I think, very 
close to Derrida’s. She mentions the idea of evolution (actually the only 
references to Darwinism in the book can be found in this chapter), and 
considers the human-animal distinction an artiϐicial one. Kath revolts 
against the “general singular” of how man thinks about animals by 
identifying herself and her partner with them. She ϐinds refuge in the 
world of animals, as the ϐinal paragraph of the chapter indicates:
The next day, on a small, scrubby island in the Torres Strait, Kath 
Ferris woke up to ϐind that Linda had given birth. Five tortoise-
shell kittens, all huddling together, helpless and blind, yet quite 
without defect. She felt such love. The cat wouldn’t let her touch 
the kittens, of course, but that was all right, that was normal. She 
felt such happiness! Such hope! (111)
The optimism of Darwinism, the idea that the constant progress of the 
species results in better and better specimens as the ϐittest survives, 
the notion that humankind is a species that has evolved more perfectly 
from our ancestors than apes, are all refuted by Kath. There is no hier-
archy. And there is no optimism, either:
‘So you keep saying. Well. So, in your version’ – I stressed the 
word – ‘where did they ϐind me?’
‘About a hundred miles east of Darwin. Going round in circles.’ 
(109)
The “general singular,” the undifferentiated and insensitive approach 
to the other that is revolted against in the character of Kath gets strong 
and explicit criticism in chapter one “The Stowaway.” The narrator, the 
woodworm, says “your species” ϐifteen times (e.g., 19). It is part of our 
(post)modern image of ourselves that we do not think enough about 
ourselves as a species, as a species that is just one among an innu-
merable number of species. A young and weak species, for that matter. 
Ecocriticism – and in my interpretation Barnes supports this view in A 
History – attempts to reinsert this idea into critical thought, and many 
biologists state that we do not have much chance for survival unless 
we start to think about ourselves as a species.
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The expression “your species” also offers a mirror to our “general 
singular”: we prefer sensitive distinctions along racial, cultural, or na-
tional lines. “Your species” is just too large a category, it is much too 
undifferentiated. The term is not situated ϐirmly enough. “Your spe-
cies” is doing to humans what humans are doing to animals: uses gen-
eral categories, and does not allow for a possibility to let the other 
speak. “Your species” makes humans face what Derrida claims in his 
The Animal That Therefore I Am: that there is no one singular “Animal.” 
Animals and humans are part of the “multiplicity” of the living: the du-
alism introduced by humans is, according to Derrida, an artiϐicial and 
reductive one. The ϐirst chapter in Barnes’s A History is an ironic com-
mentary on both the artiϐiciality and the reductive nature of humans’ 
attitude to nature, animals, and themselves.
The character that makes us, readers, face our own projections 
is a woodworm, an anobium domesticum, an almost invisible animal, 
marginal to our perception of the animal kingdom, and marginal to 
our perception in general: we tend not to notice it at all. As an ironic 
answer to those who differentiate humans and animals on the basis of 
the existence or lack of language, our storyteller is a very wordy wood-
worm, as if Barnes’s aim was, along with Derrida, to move our thinking 
about animals out of the Cartesian ϐixity, where it had been cast for 
several centuries. Derrida states that in the state of languagelessness, 
where animals are cast by humans, it is the “passivity of being named, 
this impossibility of reappropriating one’s own name”42 that is the rea-
son of sadness. And precisely this “passivity of being named” is what 
we have to face in the woodworm’s ϐifteen instances of “your species.” 
And there is no way to respond.
Provocatively, this wordy worm narrator speaks about him/herself 
in the ϐirst person singular. He/she says “I,” and disagrees with Lacan’s 
casting him/her in the pre-symbolic order in all his/her wordiness. 
He/she says “I” and narrates the story. He/she is Derrida’s perfect “au-
tobiographical animal,”43 unlike those people of literature who engage 
in their autobiographies. In the concept of the autobiographical animal 
Derrida connects the personal pronoun “I,” which can be said by any-
one, yet denotes the singularity of the speaker,44 to the general singular 
that the expression “the animal” entails: both are self-imposed cate-
gories based on difference and differentiation. “Whosoever says ‘I’ or 
42.  Derrida, “The Animal,” p. 289.
43.  Derrida, “The Animal,” p. 416.
44.  “The ‘I’ is anybody at all; ‘I’ am anybody at all, and anybody at all must be able 
to say ‘I’ to refer to herself, to his own singularity.” Derrida, “The Animal,” p. 417.
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apprehends or poses herself as an ‘I’ is a living animal.”45 Furthermore, 
animality, writes Derrida, “is generally deϐined as sensibility, irritabil-
ity, and auto-motricity, a spontaneity that is capable of movement, of 
organizing itself and affecting itself, marking, tracing, and affecting 
itself with traces of its self.”46 The writer who is an autobiographical 
animal is not only referred to in the general singular, but has similar 
needs to “the animal”: “feeding, food, nursing, breeding, offspring, care 
and keeping of animals, training, upbringing, culture, living and allow-
ing to live by giving to live, be fed, and grown, autobiographically.”47
The nameless wordy worm, the narrator of the ϐirst chapter of 
Barnes’s A History is the ideal autobiographical animal, who is not de-
prived of language, who is aware of the power of both his/her narrative 
skills and the stakes of his/her autobiography: a history of the ‘I’ that 
challenges traditional conceptions of autobiography while playfully 
and ironically taking on the rupture between humans and animals.
“My account you can trust” (4), states the worm at the beginning 
of the story. By this sentence he/she attributes a deeply subjective per-
spective and takes a deliberately questionable position in relation to 
his/her own (hi)story. It is clear that we cannot trust the worm. Yet, 
the narrating worm has a ϐixation on the trustworthiness of birds, the 
avis, the omen to the people of earlier ages, and a natural predator of 
worms. For example, the worm states: “I am reporting what the birds 
said, and the birds could be trusted” (18). Clearly, the trustworthiness 
of a predator in a power position is dubious. Indeed, in a later chap-
ter in Barnes’s A History, the narrator and “autobiographical animal” 
is proven wrong about the birds. Chapter eight, entitled “Upstream,” 
shows that birds are not trustworthy at all: in this chapter the na-
tives, as another step in the questioning of the animal-human divide, 
teach the innocent and curious European actor the names of the birds 
in their own language. It turns out that the words memorized were 
words for genitals, and not birds’ names.
45.  Derrida, “The Animal,” p. 417 (emphasis added).
46.  Derrida, “The Animal,” p. 417.
47.  Derrida, “The Animal,” p. 397.
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 Ágnes Harasztos
Lacanian  Subject  Formation  and  
Liberal Ideology in Julian Barnes’s 
The Porcupine
Introduction
The aim of this essay is to provide an analysis of Julian Barnes’s The 
Porcupine1 (1992) in light of the process of subject formation as de-
scribed by Lacanian psychoanalysis. The plot of the novel can be in-
terpreted as the emergence of Peter Solinsky as a mature politician, 
which is analogous to the emergence of the ego in the psychoanalytic 
system of Jacques Lacan. Solinsky, as the Lacanian subject, is thrown 
into the world of signiϐiers deϐined by Petkanov, a deϐinite father ϐigure 
for the young solicitor. As an early reviewer of the novel suggested, 
the two protagonists, Solinksy and Petkanov, are no more than “mere 
animate arguments with a little ϐlesh on them.”2 Accepting this argu-
ment, I will apply Lacan’s theory of self-formation also on the level of 
ideologies represented by the characters in the novel. In a paradigm 
where Solinksy stands for Liberalism and Petkanov for Communism, 
Lacanian ego-formation can be seen as an allegory for the genesis 
of Liberalism, which is always preceded, or fathered (in an Oedipal 
sense), by an authoritarian ideology, in this case Communism.
1. Petkanov as the Big Other for Solinsky
Jacques Lacan’s theory of the evolution of the human psyche has a 
Freudian basis. In expanding Freud’s basically family- or, rather, soci-
ety-based model, Lacan interpreted ego-formation in accordance with 
Saussure’s linguistic theory. For Lacan, the subject is far from being a 
1. All parenthesized references are to this edition: Julian Barnes, The  Porcupine
(London: Picador, 1993).
2. Anthony Lejeune, “The Character Issue,” National Review 44.24 (1992), 50–52, 
p. 51.
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coherent entity; rather, it is an object of the play of signiϐiers. In the 
following, I will examine Solinsky’s character development towards 
becoming a leading political ϐigure in the new liberal democratic order 
of The Porcupine’s unnamed East-Central European country in light of 
Lacan’s theory of self-formation.
For the sake of simplicity, and because of its relevance to the spe-
ciϐic ϐictional character, Solinsky, I will henceforth use the male pro-
noun in referring to the infant, or developing self. Lacan’s theory grants 
a less biologically determined place for female sexuality than that of 
Freud. In the Lacanian oeuvre, Freud’s sexuality-centred notions such 
as “phallus” or “desire for the (m)other” gain more symbolic and less 
sexual signiϐicance because Lacan used a primarily linguistic model. 
However, the Lacanian attitude to femininity has been subject to con-
troversy among scholars within both feminism and psychoanalytic 
criticism. Some critics, such as Luce Irigaray, hailed his theory as one 
which provides a less biologically ϐixed framework for conceptualizing 
differences of female discourse, while others regarded his thoughts as 
compliant in the myth of male superiority whether biological or lin-
guistic.3 Nevertheless, concrete sexual features do not occupy a central 
position in Lacan’s system, and including these problems would direct 
attention away from the main concern of this paper. Moreover, in most 
cases, Lacan regards male and female character development as iden-
tical in symbolic terms.
1.1 Solinsky in Maternal Harmony with the Community
The ϐirst phase of ego formation in Lacan’s theory is the original unity 
of the baby with its mother. This original stage is constitutive of the 
Lacanian Real, which can sometimes be glimpsed as sparks in the 
darkness of symbolized existence. This Real is devoid of absences, 
lacks and gaps, which will later be installed by the Symbolic order.4
In Solinsky’s process of developing into a politician, this unach-
ievable unity with the maternal other can be arguably seen as analo-
gous to being one with the people. As the infant wishes to unearth the 
3.  Robin Tamblyn, “Oedipus and Electra: Jacques Lacan and the Feminist 
Perspective,” The  Romulus  and  Remus  Complexes:  A  Psychoanalytical  Appraisal  of  
Sibling  Rivalry, accessed 2 July 2014 <http://romuluscomplex.tripod.com/romu-
lus14.htm>.
4.  Adrian Johnston, “Jacques Lacan,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed 
5 June 2013 <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lacan/>.
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desire of the mother to evolve as a true representative subject of their 
common existence, so does the politician strive to know perfectly the 
people’s needs and to be an authentic representative of them. Lacan 
suggests that, at this early stage, the baby is faced with a threat: his 
mother is, compared to the desire of the child, either too withdrawn 
or too close, never fulϐilling his desire entirely. Therefore, the ultimate 
question posed for the child is how to formulate his self so as to be-
come the object of desire for the mother. The determinative question 
of this stage is: “What does the (m)other want?”5 An answer for the 
maternal puzzle is given by the father at the Oedipal stage, when the 
child realizes that to be the object of the mother’s desire, Lacan’s “ob-
ject petit a,”6 he should accept the “paternal metaphor,” and strive to 
be in the position of his father. It seems that for Solinsky as a Lacanian 
subject, it is the desire of the people that occupies the place of the ma-
ternal puzzle.
It is imperative to clarify at this point that for Lacan, “maternal” 
and “paternal” are never reiϐied, in a pseudo-Freudian manner, solely 
as characters of the bourgeois nuclear family.7 They take their origins 
from there, but the Lacanian other and Other, in the words of Adrian 
Johnston, are “psychical-subjective positions, namely, socio-cultural 
(i.e., non-natural, non-biological) roles.”8 Thus, the people can be 
placed in the position of the maternal other for Solinsky in Barnes’s 
novel. The infant wishing to constitute his selϐhood so as to fulϐil the 
desires of his mother can be paralleled to Solinsky, who desperately 
seeks to ascertain what the people want. Indeed, the desire of the na-
tion is at the centre of his discussions with Petkanov, who ϐirmly de-
clares himself an expert on the issue. Moreover, Solinsky reϐlects on his 
youth when he naively thought he knew what his people needed and 
what the meaning of politics and its relation to the personal was. This 
was his political pre-Oedipal stage, when he was in full possession of 
the answers and dwelt in the secure lap of his being one with the peo-
ple: “A plump and serious boy in his starched Red Pioneer’s uniform” 
(8), who was convinced that the only true political ideology governs 
his life and his country.
5.  Johnston.
6.  Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 59.
7.  Johnston.
8.  Johnston.
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1.2  The  Lacanian  Mirror  Stage  and  Solinsky’s  
Imaginary Ego(s)
In Lacan’s system, the Mirror Stage occurs roughly when the baby is 
about half a year old, and, by (mis)recognizing his reϐlection in the mir-
ror, he realizes with the jubilant “Aha” experience that it is himself in 
the mirror he can see, and readily identiϐies with this external image. 
By the imaginary picture of oneself, the ego of the child is constructed 
as a ϐictional selϐhood, and it will continue to exist in a number of im-
ages the person conjures about himself in his fantasies throughout his 
life. The Mirror Stage is thus not only a stage in the process of self-
formation, but is also constitutive of the Lacanian Imaginary Order.9
The Imaginary of Lacan is mostly the territory of quotidian real-
ity, where the ego, a series of self-objectiϐied images, interacts with 
what he imagines other people to be and communicates with what 
he imagines they mean.10 The “mirror” in Lacan’s system is not exclu-
sively meant in the literal sense. Other people’s opinions, speeches or 
gestures “mirror” back an “image” of oneself in the Imaginary Order.11 
Solinsky’s images of his ego are a case in point. They are, strikingly, 
narrowed down to two, namely those of the “loyal party member and 
good husband” (36). These two images effectively collapse into one 
in this highly politicized novel, where private life is only another area 
of the political. As the narrator muses further: “or was it a good party 
member and loyal husband? Sometimes the two conditions seemed 
muddlingly close in his mind” (36). Solinsky is thus a homo politicus, 
whose political image is deϐined by the public in terms of being the an-
tagonist of the former President, Stoyo Petkanov: “he represented the 
new order against the old, the future against the past, virtue against 
vice” (37).
Lacan writes about the Imaginary Order that it is chieϐly the ter-
ritory of dualistic mental representations.12 It is the stage before the 
paternal symbolic intermission, where the image of the self and the 
(m)other will be expanded into a triadic structure with the entrance of 
the father, the big Other. Lacan’s Imaginary characterizes the surface 
9.  Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function,” in Écrits: The 




12.  Fink, p. 98.
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level of the political discourse in The Porcupine. On this level, Petkanov 
and Solinsky are deeply antagonistic politicians, and the two of them 
can be described by binary oppositions, the elements of which mutu-
ally exclude each other.
1.3 Solinksy in the Symbolic Order
Following the Mirror Stage, the child has to cope with the well-known 
Oedipal phase. For Lacan, this entails not only a socialization proc-
ess, but also an intromission into the Symbolic Order characterized 
by the system of signiϐiers, most tangibly present in Language. This 
entails the father’s eirenicon; namely the end of the rivalry for the love 
of the mother. This is the time when the child gets integrated into the 
symbolic order of the father’s society and occupies the place of the 
father, a place which is signiϐied by his name, by his Nom du père in 
Lacan’s terminology.13 A third party, the father enters into the duality 
of the self and the (m)other as the big Other, at once barring the access 
of the self to the maternal other, and offering his own solution to the 
question of “What does the (m)other want?” The desire for the mother 
gets substituted by the paternal metaphor and becomes the forever 
barred and inaccessible signiϐied, or “unconscious.” The self becomes 
part of the signifying chain consciously symbolizing what he originally 
was.14 Thus stepping into the world of signiϐiers, the self as a new sig-
niϐier appears in place of the Other in the Symbolic Order. It is permit-
ted to enter into the process of signiϐication only on the condition of 
being ϐixed in the Symbolic Order (in law, language or social rules): 
he speaks from the position of the Other. The original self disappears 
from his original place and appears in the Other’s place, which is the 
place from which he speaks.15
Peter Solinsky’s approach to Stoyo Petkanov throughout the 
novel clearly follows the dynamics of a son-and-father relationship. 
On Solinsky’s part, it starts off from the tempestuous teenage fury; 
it continues with the still hopeful wish for understanding and being 
understood; and, ϐinally, it ends in the sheer, apathetic and desperate 
disgust of irreconcilable standpoints. In addition, Petkanov displays 
thoroughly vulgar features, such as his language and the suggestion 
13.  Fink, p. 51.
14.  Johnston.
15.  Jacques Lacan, “Position of the Unconscious,” in Écrits:  The  First  Complete  
Edition in English, 703–721, p. 713.
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that he raped all the women in the country (16), which makes him 
appear much like the Freudian Urvater.16 He is the ϐirst signiϐier, who, 
in Lacan’s theory, is external to the system because he is the person to 
guarantee the symbolic order17 in being the enigmatic President and 
“Father of the People” for the whole Communist era. Petkanov is rep-
resentative of the collective symbolic order named by Lacan the big 
Other. He is the one who seems deϐinitely to know what the people 
want (69), which is the answer to the ultimate desire, and enigma, of 
Solinsky’s political evolution.
As was demonstrated, it is Petkanov who occupies the place of 
the paternal big Other in Solinksy’s evolution into a mature politician. 
As a next step, the desire for the signiϐied, that is, for the maternal 
other, should also be pinned down. Lacan suggests that in the Oedipal 
phase, the child, after renouncing the mother, substitutes his desire 
for her with the Name of the Father. By this, he enters into the realm 
of signiϐications and becomes a split subject, symbolized by Lacan by 
a barred .18 This means that with this gesture an inner split occurs in 
the self, due to which the unconscious, together with consciousness, 
is born. The very ϐirst element in the unconscious is the desire for the 
mother substituted by the paternal metaphor.19 A signiϐicant diver-
sion of Lacan from Freud is that the big Other does not remain out-
side the newly formed subject, but retains its power gained through 
the Oedipal stage and becomes an introject for the subject. The big 
Other is an inner place, an internalized paternal gaze.20 Therefore, as 
Lacan states, we all have the big Other inside ourselves watching us, 
creating us and forming our desires from within. Lacan’s well-known 
maxim also conveys this meaning: “The man’s desire is the desire of 
the Other.”21
Based on the analogy established between Lacan’s theory and 
The Porcupine, it seems clear that both Solinsky and Petkanov strive 
to ϐind “true ideology.” In their devious ways, both desire to ϐind what 
the people need and to be a good politician to represent this need 
16.  Sigmund Freud, Totem  and  Taboo:  Some  Points  of  Agreement  between  the  
Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics (London; New York: Routledge, 2001).
17.  Jacques Lacan, “Seminar on ‘The Purloined Letter,’” in Écrits: The First Complete 
Edition in English, 6–50.
18.  Fink, p. 45.
19.  Jacques Lacan, “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in 
the Freudian Unconscious,” in Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English, 671–702.
20.  Jacques Lacan, “Kant with Sade,” in Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English, 
645–670.
21.  Jacques Lacan, “The Function and Field of Speech in Psychoanalysis,” in Écrits: 
The First Complete Edition in English, 196–269, p. 222.
Book-Barnes2.indb   76 2014.11.23.   21:15:50
77
authentically. It seems neither could achieve this goal in its entirety, 
however. This is the lack which causes their desire never to be ful-
ϐilled. Each claims that he knows the answer and has direct access to 
the signiϐied whereas the other does not. This is what Petkanov refers 
to when denying Solinsky’s maintaining that he is the object of overall 
hatred by the people: “Lying about me, saying I was only hated and 
feared, not loved, that will make no difference. You can’t get rid of me” 
(136).
Although Solinsky imagines himself to be radically different from 
Petkanov, the young man’s desires are the same as those of the old man. 
This is chieϐly because Petkanov, mysteriously and rather uncannily, 
desires in place of Solinsky. It is from the old ex-leader that Solinsky’s 
desires emanate. The mystery of this phenomenon may be explained 
using Lacanian theory, where Petkanov serves as a paternal metaphor 
for the value system Solinsky was integrated into. In his ϐinal address 
to the court, the President ironically pleads guilty of sacriϐicing his life 
to the nation (122). This holds equally true to Solinsky, whose family, 
marriage and relationship with his daughter were all destroyed in his 
desperate attempt to “help expunge that fear” (74) of his nation by 
carrying out the trial against the Communist leader of the totalitarian 
era. Petkanov’s self-deϐinition seems to match that of Solinksy, as if the 
young man could not avoid complying with the old leader’s expecta-
tions about the idea of a good politician. This is what Lacan may refer 
to in asserting that the ego is the projection of the desire of the Other.22
The big Other of Lacan is not conϐined solely to the paternal Other. 
Its main function is conveying the language and rules of the Symbolic 
Order, in which the new subject will formulate its discourse, or, rather, 
which will discursively formulate the new subject. The Other, in Lacan’s 
system, is ultimately Language.23 When the self enters the symbolic 
world of the signiϐiers, namely Language, he also takes part in the 
process of signiϐication, and he will hence exist in representations.24
When the subject enters into the Symbolic and he expresses him-
self by way of using its signiϐications, every word he utters has to go 
through the place (locus) of the Other. In Lacan’s view, all speech origi-
nates in the unconscious, which came into being right with the ges-
ture of accepting the Symbolic Order of the Other, and the very ϐirst 
22.  Johnston.
23.  Jacques Lacan, “The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason Since 
Freud,” in Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English, 412–444.
24.  Anika Lemaire, Jacques Lacan, trans. David Macey (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul Ltd, 1977), p. 68.
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content of which is the Name of the Father itself.25 In accordance with 
this, Lacan states that the “unconscious is the discourse of the Other.”26 
When we speak, it is in fact the Other who does so in our place. The 
Other is our Language.
The subject, as a child, has to accept Language, has to internal-
ize its rules and has to speak the discourse of the Other. This is the 
condition of our integration into the world of signiϐiers deϐined by the 
Other. Starting his political career, Solinsky also accepted Communism 
as the system under the aegis of which he could become a politician, 
and subjected to the rules of which he can signify. The discourse of 
the system was determined by Stoyo Petkanov, whose speech formed 
the discourse of the Other for him. Although the whole novel is about 
Solinsky’s desperate ϐight to disentangle his discourse from that of the 
ex-President, he ϐinds himself, on the most unexpected occasions, fall-
ing into the trap of being unable to avoid speaking the discourse of 
the Other. These occasions are, strikingly, those when he strives most 
to set the boundaries between his speech and that of Petkanov. For 
instance, when defending himself against accusations that, under this 
new democracy, there is no food in the shops, he refers to the “difϐicul-
ties inherent in the changeover from a controlled economy to a market 
economy” (16). In response, Petkanov ironically offers him to re-join 
the Communist Party because he displayed such excellent command of 
the old Socialist ways of speaking.
According to Lacan, every signiϐier originates in the symbolic 
place of the Other, and, therefore, it disappears from his original place 
and occupies the locus of the Other.27 This, again, holds characteris-
tically true for Solinsky, whose “political parricide” (26), that is, his 
aggressive way towards political power, and the personal transforma-
tion that it entails are the central themes of The Porcupine. Even in his 
accusations of Petkanov, Solinsky repeats the ex-leader’s discourse. 
The charges of corruption, a bourgeois lifestyle, favouritism or holding 
Swiss bank accounts (60) represent resentment of those deeds that 
are typically considered objectionable from a Socialist point of view.
Although Solinsky does not seem to be an exception in speaking the 
Language of the Other as embodied in the ϐigure of Petkanov, he is des-
perate in his efforts to disentangle himself from Petkanov’s discourse. 
He repeatedly expresses his nausea at having to listen to what he calls 
Petkanov’s “cheap analogies” (68), and at the way Petkanov corrupted 
25.  Johnston.
26.  Lacan, “The Function,” p. 232.
27.  Lacan, “Position,” p. 713.
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even the words people are left to use after him (133). Consequently, he 
is determined to change what he ϐinds deeply corrupted, mendacious 
and tyrannical in the newly subverted Communist system. Therefore, 
he proposes a new “true ideology,” that of Liberalism, with its new val-
ues of freedom, democracy and capitalist economy. However, through-
out the novel we are witnesses to the process of Solinsky slowly but 
inevitably occupying the Lacanian locus of the Other in every respect.
The famous Lacanian paraphrase of Descartes illustrates how the 
Other unconsciously leaks through the deeds, speech and thoughts of 
the self: “I think where I am not, therefore I am where I think not.”28 
Thinking, thus, happens in the unconscious, at the locus of the Other, 
because the Other thinks and speaks in place of the subject. Moreover, 
as the Lacanian philosopher Slavoy Žižek suggested, “the unconscious 
is outside, crystallized in institutionalized practices,”29 which means 
that the Other’s operations are so banal, and we are so deeply social-
ized in its rules, that we do not even recognize its effects.
Solinsky faces the most crucial choice in his life concerning his 
emergence as a politician when he is to decide whether to utilize in the 
trial the hazy, half-constructed evidence of the President’s supposed 
permission to assassinate his own daughter. On this momentous oc-
casion, his lapsing into a new version of a show trial prosecutor who 
acts according to his strong political conviction instead of independ-
ent evidence is rather unconscious. Immediately, he starts using the 
style of Petkanov. He himself muses about a so-called cheap analogy he 
unconsciously utters (51) as he decodes the Socialist discourse of the 
text of the memorandum without difϐiculty: “The Prosecutor General 
read it slowly, discarding the jargon automatically as he went” (91). 
What is more, although he entered the novel as a devoted sceptic, at 
this moment he turns into a Petkanov-style believer for the sake of 
some ideological purpose: “The document is true, even if it is a forgery. 
Even if it isn’t true, it is necessary” (113).
Finally, the fact that there are only the initials S. P. on the docu-
ment Solinsky is using as evidence that Petkanov murdered the 
Minister of Culture may be considered as a visual representation of 
Solinsky’s development turning Petkanov inside out. Solinsky himself 
is slowly becoming what he so desperately fought against but what is 
as deeply rooted in his political genesis as the Father in that of a child, 
or the Lacanian Other in that of the subject. This is aptly worded by the 
28.  Lacan, “The Instance of the Letter,” p. 430.
29.  Christopher Hanlon, “Psychoanalysis and the Post-Political: An Interview with 
Slavoj Žižek,” New Literary History 32.1 (2001), 1–21, p. 6.
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ex-president himself on their last meeting: “Either I am a monster, or I 
am not. Yes? If I am not, then I must be someone like you, or someone 
you might be capable of becoming” (135).
The Other is an inexhaustible source of mystery to the self.30 For 
Solinsky, this Other is deϐinitely Petkanov: he “reϐlected that his plan 
of getting to know Petkanov, the better to predict his moves, had so far 
made little progress. Would he ever come to grasp the man’s charac-
ter?” (66) In the novel, the Prosecutor does not provide any answer to 
Petkanov’s double-ended question. However, were there any answer 
to it in Lacan’s oeuvre, it would be that Petkanov is both a monster and 
an ordinary person. On the one hand, he is the monster of the mys-
terious and inscrutable Other, whose presence in the institution and 
Language Solinsky relies on is external, while on the other hand he 
is also the monster whom Solinsky recognizes inside himself, never 
fully to be dislodged. Thus, following from the logic of the Lacanian 
Symbolic Order, if Solinsky wishes to maintain his narcissistic ideal 
image in the Lacanian Imaginary Order, he either has to consider him-
self a Monster, along with Petkanov, or accept Petkanov as an ordinary 
man similar to himself.
2. The Genesis of Liberalism
If interpreted within the Symbolic Order posited by Lacan, the pro-
tagonist of The  Porcupine is revealed to be entangled in a relation-
ship with what he perceives in the realm of the Imaginary as the 
great, antagonistic evil whom he ϐights. Petkanov, his speech and his 
desire seem to inϐiltrate Solinsky’s formation as a mature politician: 
Petkanov emerges as Solinsky’s Lacanian Other. In search of a further 
possible implication of this ϐinding, we might move one step back from 
the narrative level and adopt Anthony Lejeune’s suggestion that The 
Porcupine has a facet similar to morality plays, in which Petkanov and 
Solinsky are ideologies “with a little ϐlesh on them.”31 Vanessa Guignery 
also argues that The  Porcupine refers to universal meta-narratives 
such as Communism and Liberalism.32 Barnes creates this effect of the 
30.  Slavoy Žižek, “From Che vuoi? to Fantasy: Lacan with Eyes Wide Shut,” How to 
Read Lacan, accessed 28 September 2014 <http://www.lacan.com/essays/?p=146>.
31.  Lejeune, p. 51.
32.  Vanessa Guignery, “Untangling the Intertwined Threads of Fiction and Reality 
in The Porcupine (1992),” in Pre- and Post-Publication Itineraries of the Contemporary 
Novel in English (Paris: Éditions Publibook Université, 2007), 49–67, p. 57.
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morality play by utilizing the two main characters as mouthpieces. 
Consequently, the question arises whether the relationship of Solinsky 
and Petkanov outlined under the aegis of Lacanian psychoanalysis 
could have more general implications regarding authoritarian ideolo-
gies such as Communism versus Liberalism.
Along the suggested analogy, it might be presumed that Liberalism 
is related to authoritarian ideologies such as Communism in the fashion 
that the subject is related to the Lacanian Other of the Symbolic Order. 
Within Lacanian theory, this idea entails ϐirstly that Liberalism has to face 
an authoritarian unconscious, an authoritarian gaze inside its realm of 
self-deϐinition. Secondly, the suggestion arises that authoritarian ways 
of thinking always precede, father, and often deϐine liberal discourses as 
the Other’s desire deϐines the subject. Moreover, liberal ideology speaks 
in the Language of authoritarian ideology, supposing that the assump-
tion has some relevance. To prove that such a more general interpreta-
tion is possible, at ϐirst the dichotomy represented by Peter Solinsky and 
Stoyo Petkanov in Barnes’s novel should be explored in detail.
The dichotomy of the two protagonists can be deϐined in terms of 
various interrelated notions which characterize the ideologies of au-
thoritarian and liberal systems of thinking. Their relation as that of son 
and father has already been discussed. Another dimension is the con-
trast between the intellectual and the peasant. The basis of Solinsky’s 
more pondering and hesitating attitude is the acceptance of the pos-
sibility that different interpretations may be of equal validity, that 
there may be more than one side to any issue. In contrast, Petkanov is 
never bothered by doubt about his own ϐirmly represented thoughts; 
he considers them the only acceptable side to the issue in question. 
Petkanov, the old leader himself strengthens this aspect of their con-
trast when grumbling at the overly intellectual, emphatically uncer-
tain demeanour of Solinsky, and also that of his father: “That was just 
like old Solinsky, always trying to play the fucking intellectual” (131). 
Yet, Petkanov is a typical peasant ϐigure, who made a cult of strength, 
who “despised illness” (78), and who never faltered in his decisions. 
Strength and weakness serve as another signiϐicant binary opposition, 
adding a further dimension to the contrast of authoritative thinking 
and Liberalism. As Julian Barnes asserted, in this novel he wanted to 
show “the weakness of Liberalism confronted by the certainty of a sys-
tem that believes it has all the answers.”33 Accordingly, the dichotomy 
33.  Vanessa Guignery and Ryan Roberts, eds. Conversations  with  Julian  Barnes 
(Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi, 2009), p. 46.
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of belief and scepticism is also characteristic of the contrast between 
Petkanov and Solinsky. Solinsky started his political career by trying 
to restore his nation’s “capacity for scepticism, for useful doubt” (27), 
while Petkanov is a “true believer in Socialism and Communism,” who 
“never wavered from the path” (130).
In the course of Barnes’s novel, Solinsky, the representative of 
liberal values, gradually ϐinds himself in the position of speaking the 
discourse and fulϐilling the desire of Petkanov, the representative of 
authoritarian thinking. Petkanov’s attitude ϐilters through Solinsky’s 
mind when he decides that “[i]t is equally important that the accused 
be found guilty” (93), or when he suggests that “[h]e must practise 
saying Yes and No and That’s  stupid and Go away” (51), namely that 
he must cease deliberation. In short, Petkanov is the unavoidable 
inner gaze of the Other for Solinsky, whose signiϐications are satu-
rated with those of the Communist leader. “Petkanov is embedded in 
the soul of Solinsky and his generation,”34 as one of the reviewers of 
the book wrote, leading to the assumption that the same holds true 
for the ideologies of which they serve as mouthpieces. Liberalism in 
general cannot exist without the shadow of authoritarian ideology if 
it aims at pinning down unquestionable truths, declaring ϐirm stands, 
sentencing behaviours or views. Unshakeable belief in one’s own truth 
while discarding those of the other can also be added to the list of the 
authoritarian Other’s manifestation in Liberalism.
Lacan states that everything said by the self necessarily passes 
through the locus of the Other.35 Liberal discourse might also be ar-
gued to speak the language of authoritarian ideologies. Liberal ideas 
such as freedom of thought can only be understood against the back-
ground of constrained thought, the idea of independence only makes 
sense if there is something to be independent from. By tolerating many 
approaches to an issue, the liberal thinker cannot avoid assigning pri-
ority to his own. Otherwise, by accepting many sides, Liberalism, para-
doxically, would annihilate its own point which is, after all, one steady 
viewpoint, it cannot be many in itself. By excluding all but its own view, 
Liberalism gives way to the germ of authoritarianism. Therefore, it is 
possible to conclude that at the genesis of Liberalism there stands 
some sort of authoritarian ideology fulϐilling the role of the Lacanian 
big Other. In historical terms, the authoritarian “fathers” of liberal sys-
tems could have appeared in the forms of Feudalism, Absolutism, or 
34.  Francis Maier, “The Porcupine,” America 168.21 (1993), 22–23, p. 23.
35.  Johnston.
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Communism. No matter which, authoritarian signiϐication is embed-
ded in Liberalism in general. However, it is imperative to establish that 
the idea outlined above is far from “suggesting nearly moral equiva-
lence between Bolshevism and Liberalism,”36 as it was ascribed to the 
novel by Merritt Moseley. I argue that the novel suggests an unavoid-
able authoritarian presence in Liberalism, but it never posits them on 
the same moral level. Moreover, the basis of the argumentation in this 
paper is Lacanian psychoanalysis, which never equates the subject 
(Liberalism) with its big Other (authoritarianism).
Conclusion
The ϐirst conclusion to be drawn refers to the narrative level of Julian 
Barnes’s The  Porcupine. The protagonist Peter Solinsky’s travel to-
wards becoming a politician is claimed to be analogous to the jour-
ney of the self into the world of symbolic signiϐications as described 
in Jacques Lacan’s theory of self-formation. The pre-linguistic, pre-
Oedipal maternal unity for him proved to be his naive youthful cer-
tainty concerning the truth of Communist ideology and his own sense 
of being one with what was claimed to be the People in Communist 
discourse.
On the level of Lacan’s Imaginary Order, Solinsky is perceived as 
the antagonist of Petkanov, representing the new order as opposed to 
the old one. However, on close investigation, it turns out that instead 
of being Solinsky’s antagonist, Petkanov rather symbolizes a system 
of signiϐiers, or, in Lacanian terms, the “paternal metaphor.” The novel 
is about the Prosecutor General’s desperate but hopeless struggle to 
be disentangled from the paternal Other embodied in the old ex-pres-
ident. Finally, Solinsky turns out to be unable to avoid speaking the 
discourse of Petkanov or formulating his own self as an object petit a of 
the desire of the Other. As a result, he unconsciously surrenders in the 
ϐight and submits himself to Petkanov’s speech and symbolic order. As 
a mature subject, who is a politican, Solinsky occupies the place of the 
Other, with all the consequences this entails.
A broader interpretation of Solinsky’s evolution might be that 
Liberalism, the ideology he represents in the world of the novel, is 
related to authoritarian ideologies such as Communism the way the 
36.  Merritt Moseley, Understanding  Julian  Barnes (Columbia, SC: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1997), p. 150.
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Lacanian subject is related to the all-embracing inner outsider, the 
Lacanian Other. In order to investigate Liberalism in its relation to au-
thoritarianism, The  Porcupine relocates the genesis of Western-type 
democracy in the laboratory of the historical time of the 1989 changes 
in Eastern Europe, where it was fathered by Communism. However, 
the relevance of Barnes’s novel cannot be restricted to a fable about 
the fate of Liberalism in Eastern-Europe. Although The  Porcupine is 
also about Eastern-Europe, I believe it carries relevance to more glo-
bal issues.
Authoritarian discourse seems to determine the validity of lib-
eral discourse; intermittently, it seems to leak through the dams of 
Liberalism revealing the authoritarian unconscious of Liberalism it-
self. As Petkanov says to Solinsky at the end of the novel: “You can-
not get rid of me” (136). To apply Lacan’s famous aphorism for the 
relation of Liberalism and authoritarianism: Liberalism thinks at the 
place deϐined by an authoritarian system. By positing these two funda-
mental ideological attitudes vested in dichotomies arranged along the 
axes of father-son, peasant-intellectual, and believer-sceptic (which 
correspond to the Lacanian Imaginary oppositions), Barnes’s novel 
suggests that authoritarianism bears ancestral, even atavistic charac-
teristics, in contrast to Liberalism, which represents the more modern 
and more derivative side. What Lacanian theory adds to this duality is 
the system of signiϐications provided by the big Other (Petkanov and 
Communism) for the ever ϐilial subject (Solinsky and Liberalism). This 
subject cannot help speaking the discourse of the Other, thinking in 
the locus of the Other, and possibly ϐinally occupying the place of the 
Other, as rebellious sons become fathers, and young liberals revert to 
power positions, which, in a certain sense, inevitably involve authori-
tarian practices. What Barnes’s novel reveals, with the aid of Jacques 
Lacan’s thoughts, is as much a recurring generational cycle as a spe-
ciϐic socio-historical issue concerning Europe in the 1990s, and also a 
symbolic structure of patterns of thinking.
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Péter Tamás
“If I Were a Dictator of Fiction”
Readerly and Writerly Anxiety of Inϐluence in Julian 
Barnes's Flaubert’s Parrot
“Like criticism, which is either part of literature or nothing at all, great 
writing is always at work strongly (or weakly) misreading previous 
writing.”1 This quotation, taken from Harold Bloom’s preface to the sec-
ond edition of The Anxiety of Inϔluence, could provide a useful frame-
work to an analysis of the most highly acclaimed work of Julian Barnes, 
Flaubert’s Parrot2 (1984). This quasi-biographical novel,3 as has been 
noted numerous times, blends ϐiction and criticism to an extent which 
might justify the ϐirst part of Bloom’s statement, that criticism is part 
of literature. Due to Barnes’s witty style, however, the book has rarely 
been mentioned in relation to misreading Flaubert. And since there 
is no doubt that Barnes appreciates Flaubert – he has shown deep re-
spect for him both in his interviews and in his essays – interpretations 
tend to take little notice of the resistant forces working in the text. It 
seems to me, however, that the novel’s protagonist-narrator recounts 
a wrestling with Flaubert’s legacy in order to establish his authority 
as a writer – a task which demands a misprision of Flaubert’s life and 
works, a rethinking of the connection between ϐiction and reality, and 
a speciϐic way of constructing the reader.
Although Bloom based his theory on poetry and states that 
Shakespeare is left out of the ϐirst (original) version of his text due 
to “the contrast between dramatic and lyric form,”4 there is no reason 
why we should not apply his notions to novels as well. After all, the 
preface to the second edition seems to redeϐine its focus more per-
missively: “inϐluence-anxiety […] is an anxiety achieved in and by the 
story, novel, play, poem or essay.”5 Indeed, there are some prominent 
1. Harold Bloom, “Preface,” in The Anxiety of Inϔluence, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), xi–xlvii, p. xix.
2. All parenthesized references are to this edition: Julian Barnes, Flaubert’s Parrot
(London: Picador, 1985).
3. I will refer to the text as a novel despite the obvious problems of its classiϐi-
cation. For an overview of this question, see Vanessa Guignery, The Fiction of  Julian 
Barnes: A Reader’s Guide to Essential Criticism, Readers’ Guides to Essential Criticism 
(Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006),  pp. 37–40.
4. Bloom, p. 11.
5. Bloom, p. xxiii.
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parallels between Bloom’s and Barnes’s works: Flaubert’s  Parrot is 
“obsessed with the problem of loss”6 in the same way that literature is 
in the Bloomian concept. According to The Anxiety of Inϔluence, poetry, 
since Milton, takes “as its obsessive theme the power of the mind over 
the universe of death.”7 This universe of death threatens both in the 
form of mortality, the poet’s own physical vulnerability, and in the form 
of the posthumous inϐluence of a literary predecessor. The two levels 
of Barnes’s novel embody these very forms: Geoffrey Braithwaite, the 
narrator of the novel, mixes the estimation of Flaubert’s literary legacy 
with the story of his dead wife, Ellen. The interpretations of Flaubert’s 
life and works are motivated by a desire to ϐind an explanation for 
Ellen’s suicide, but even Flaubert cannot provide the answer to that 
question. This, in a sense, proves that the oeuvre of Geoffrey’s admired 
literary master is deϐicient, which gives Braithwaite8 the possibility to 
create an authentic, artistic text of his own.
As he is striving to achieve an authorial status, Braithwaite’s work 
starts to use some of those rhetorical strategies to overcome inϐluence-
anxiety that Bloom enumerates. This can be witnessed on the macro 
levels of the novel as a gradual change in the narrator’s style, but also 
on its micro levels, insofar as Flaubert’s Parrot borrows certain motifs 
from Madame Bovary,9 only to elaborate on them more profoundly than 
its predecessor has done. By using these motifs, Braithwaite acknowl-
edges their appropriateness, but by providing additional “meanings” 
to them, he suggests that his “precursor had failed to go far enough,”10 
which is how Bloom describes Tessera, an anxious device.
The ϐirst of the two motifs I wish to mention is the club foot, taken 
from the scene when, in the hope that it would gain fame for him, 
Charles Bovary operates on the club-footed Hippolyte, who eventu-
ally loses his leg because of the doctor’s unprofessionalism. One piece 
of criticism Madame Bovary has received, sharp if not necessarily de-
served, is that the scene in question is not integrated tightly enough 
into the texture of the novel.11 Considering this, it is of special impor-
tance that Flaubert’s Parrot evokes this very scene and uses the image 
6.  Frederick M. Holmes, Julian Barnes, New British Fiction (Basingstoke; New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 72.
7.  Bloom, p. 34.
8.  Rather than Barnes. See footnote 22.
9.  All parenthesized references (MB) are to this edition: Gustave Flaubert, Madame 
Bovary: A Story of Provincial Life, trans. Alan Russell (London: Penguin Books, 1950).
10.  Bloom, p. 14.
11.  “In the larger aspects of form he was not, in fact, consistently successful; he 
relied on ‘style’ to neutralize certain faults of construction he knew to be present, such 
as the shift of emphasis from Charles to Emma or the obtrusion of the club-foot inci-
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of the club-foot in a context which is similar but not identical to the 
original:
The age he [Flaubert] lived in was stupid; the new age, brought 
in by the Franco-Prussian war, would be even stupider. Of course 
some things would change: the spirit of Homais was winning. 
Soon everybody with a club foot would be entitled to a miscon-
ceived operation which would lead to an amputated leg. (93–4)
In Madame  Bovary, the sight of Hippolyte is a memento of Charles 
Bovary’s lack of professional skills and his mediocrity; Braithwaite 
takes this metaphor and extends it to a whole age. This is not much 
of an alteration, but further variations on the club-foot image appear 
elsewhere in the text, with greatly modiϐied “meaning.” If he were “a 
dictator of ϐiction,” Geoffrey explains, he would permit coincidences 
only in the picaresque: “let the virtuous pauper with the gangrenous 
foot discover the buried treasure – it’s all right, it doesn’t really matter” 
(71). He reports that in the penultimate year of his life, Flaubert “had 
rheumatism and a swollen foot” (65) – which has resonances in later 
parts of the text, one instance depicting a dying “Rimbaud, his right leg 
amputated” (200), the other describing that the left leg of Flaubert’s 
statue at Barentin “is beginning to split” (227).
The remaining two evocations of the unfortunate Hippolyte’s club 
foot refer to Flaubert and art, which may help ϐind the reason for this 
obsession with the motif: “Do you want art to tell the truth? Send for 
the ĆĒćĚđĆēĈĊ ċđĆĚćĊėę: though don’t be surprised, when it arrives, 
if it runs over your leg” (160–1). In accordance with the metaphor, not 
only does the literary master possess the truth, he also lames “you.” 
This has strong resonances to the Oedipus complex, or, more precisely, 
to its Bloomian version, in which a poet’s predecessors have always 
already expressed “poetic wisdom,”12 crippling the later poet with a 
desire to somehow usurp this wisdom. The use of the motif, then, pro-
vides meaning to a part of Madame Bovary over which even Flaubert 
lost control. This new meaning is a subconscious one, a trace or a 
symptom of Braithwaite’s desire to assume the place and authority of 
Flaubert. Accordingly, towards the end of the novel, the Oedipal club 
foot appears as a direct quotation from one of Flaubert’s letters: “Even 
what art is escapes them. They ϐind the annotations more interesting 
dent.” Alan Russell, “Introduction,” in Gustave Flaubert, Madame  Bovary:  A  Story  of  
Provincial Life, 5–12, p. 8.
12.  Bloom, p. 13.
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than the text. They set more store by the crutches than the legs” (208). 
The lame annotator, Braithwaite himself, has to lean on the crutches of 
his commentary, but succeeds in stealing the sentence of his precursor 
and in transforming it. Flaubert’s conϐident scorn is turned into am-
biguous irony, as in this new context the primary work’s replacement 
by the annotations can be regarded both as the narrator’s self-ironic 
remark and as an example of Tessera.
The other motif borrowed from Madame Bovary, and even more 
elaborately rewritten in Braithwaite’s text, is imagination. By imagina-
tion I mean a sort of lazy daydreaming, closely associated with ϐiction, 
which serves as a substitute for the life that the characters have failed 
to live. Emma, stuck in a marriage which is only the shadow of what she 
longs for, constructs an imaginary, narcissistic world by reading litera-
ture. Though at ϐirst she did not know “exactly what was meant in life 
by the words ‘bliss’, ‘passion’, ‘ecstasy’, which had looked so beautiful 
in books” (MB 47), she soon begins to seek in poems, women’s papers, 
Balzac “and Georges Sand a vicarious gratiϐication of her own desires” 
(MB 71). This ϐictional world is where her seducers enter, linking adul-
tery to reading: “She invented relations between him [the Viscount] 
and the ϐictional characters” (MB 71), comments the narrator as Emma 
yields to passion. The “kind bond” (MB 112) between Emma and Léon 
is also formed with the aid of literature: “Often she asked him to recite 
some poetry” (MB 111). This theatricality saturates the romance to 
the extent that the couple perceive each other as literary ϐigures; early 
in the novel, Léon manages to attract Emma’s attention by sharing his 
reading experiences: “You travel in your chair through countries you 
seem to see before you, your thoughts are caught up in the story, dal-
lying with the details or following the course of plot, you enter into 
the characters, so that it seems as if it were your own heart beating 
beneath their costumes” (MB 96). This description proves to be pro-
phetic, for during their romance Léon will think of her as a ϐictional 
entity, as a literary character, who hides Emma’s heart beneath its cos-
tume:
In the variety of her moods, by turns gay and otherworldly, garru-
lous and taciturn, ϐiery and indifferent, she provoked a thousand 
desires in him, appealed both to his instincts and his memories. 
She was the “woman of love” of all the novels, the heroine of all 
drama, the shadowy “she” of all the poetry-books. (MB 276)
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Whereas Madame Bovary makes a clear distinction between the 
realm of ϐiction and that of actual life, and punishes, so to speak, the 
transgression of these borders with a fate which is either tragic (in 
the case of Emma) or squalid (in the case of Léon), Flaubert’s Parrot 
re-examines this separation. In Barnes’s novel, “[m]ade-up charac-
ters are treated as though they were real, and, conversely, real people 
are rendered ϐictional.”13 The latter category would include Flaubert, 
Louise Colet, prof. Enid Starkie and prof. Christopher Ricks, while 
Geoffrey Braithwaite would fall into the former category, as Barnes 
refers to him as a real person: “The translations in this book are by 
Geoffrey Braithwaite” (viii), reads the note before the table of con-
tents. Braithwaite even quotes a sentence from his creator’s ϐirst novel, 
Metroland and, as has been noted by many critics, corrects a factual 
mistake,14 which emphasizes a passage through ontological levels. 
Flaubert’s Parrot signals how important these border crossings are for 
Geoffrey as early as in the ϐirst paragraph:
Six North Africans were playing boule beneath Flaubert’s statue. 
[…] With a ϐinal, ironic caress from the ϐingertips, a brown hand 
dispatched a silver globe. […] The thrower remained a stylish, 
temporary statue: knees not quite unbent, and the right hand 
ecstatically spread. (1)
The North Africans, real persons in the ϐictitious world of the novel, 
are turned into statues by the (Bloomian) presence of the dead writ-
er’s statue, but their status as real or ϐictional can be reversed: these 
six boule players are ϐictional in the sense that they exist only in this 
very novel, whereas Flaubert is a historical ϐigure.
The narrator’s struggle for an authoritative voice and his anxiety 
of inϐluence are not only initiators of speculations on the borders of 
reality and ϐiction, they also shape the conclusions Geoffrey comes to. 
Although certain statements of the novel seem to recreate Madame 
Bovary’s strict distinction between the two worlds – “Books are not 
life, however much we might prefer if they were” (5) – their reliability 
13.  Alison Lee, Realism and Power: Postmodern British Fiction (London: Routledge, 
1990), p. 46.
14.  “I read the other day a well-praised ϐirst novel in which the narrator […] comi-
cally rehearses to himself the best way to kiss a girl without being rebuffed: ‘With a 
slow, sensual, irresistible strength, draw her gradually towards you while gazing into 
her eyes as if you had just been given a copy of the ϐirst, suppressed edition of Madame 
Bovary.’ I thought this was quite neatly put […] The only trouble is, there’s no such 
thing as a ‘ϐirst, suppressed edition of Madame Bovary’.” (85)
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is questioned by the intrusion of the fear to replicate the predecessor’s 
views. Braithwaite has to manage the contradiction that while he is 
reading Flaubert’s ϐiction in order to ϐind answers to some of the great-
est questions of life, his own interest as an author is to conclude that 
Flaubert’s oeuvre does not contain any answers, otherwise he would 
have to acknowledge being a faint echo of his precursor, parroting the 
truth(s) discovered by Flaubert. This conϐlict between Braithwaite’s 
readerly and writerly roles ϐinds an accurate description in Bloom’s 
statement that the “poet in every reader does not experience the same 
disjunction from what he reads that the critic in every reader neces-
sarily feels. What gives pleasure to the critic in a reader may give anxi-
ety to the poet in him.”15 However, the work of the inϐluence-anxiety is 
not conϐined to this single paradox. Both the devout and the iconoclas-
tic approaches to Flaubert, reading, respectively, a successful and an 
unsuccessful quest for truth into the precursor’s novels, presuppose a 
crossing from literature to life. Yet Braithwaite is in no situation to con-
ϐirm this crossing, for in that case he would become a twentieth-cen-
tury counterpart of Emma Bovary – another person who mistakenly 
believes that reality and books are related, and who is a bad reader: she 
is “of a sentimental rather than an artistic temperament,” as Flaubert’s 
narrator makes it clear (MB 49). Still, in a sense, his partial identiϐica-
tion with Emma comes in handy for Geoffrey, since it creates a distance 
between him and Charles Bovary. Both being doctors and cuckolds, 
they are easily associated, and this equivalence causes another form 
of inϐluence-anxiety: Geoffrey’s whole life can be seen as the work of 
Flaubert. Braithwaite’s fear of resembling a ϐictitious character can be 
connected to Bloom’s description of Thomas Mann’s real relation to 
“mythical identiϐication.”16 In his essay “Freud and the Future,” Mann 
embraces Goethe’s version of the “ego of antiquity” for its allowing life 
to become “imitation,” a “reanimation of the hero under very differ-
ent temporal and personal conditions.”17 For Bloom, this appraisal is 
highly suspicious; he concludes that the cheerful tone is a deceit and 
that Mann reads “precisely his own parodistic genius, his own kind 
of loving irony, into his precursor.”18 It could be claimed that Geoffrey 
conceals a similar fear of “mythical identiϐication” and also tries to 
overcome it by seemingly embracing it. His unique treatment of this 
15.  Bloom, p. 25.
16.  Bloom, pp. 53–4.
17.  Thomas Mann, “Freud and the Future,” Daedalus 88.2 (1959), 374–378, pp. 
375, 377.
18.  Bloom, pp. 53–4.
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fear is, on the one hand, to exaggerate the identiϐication by embodying 
not only one but two characters (Emma and Charles Bovary), and, on 
the other hand, to only partially identify with them: he never endorses 
crossing the channel between reality and ϐiction in as unreϐlected a 
fashion as Emma does, and as to Emma’s husband, knowing that “[i]n 
any case Charles was not one to go to the root of things” and that he 
“shrank” from any proof of Emma’s inϐidelity (MB 353), Braithwaite 
distinguishes himself from the character by emphasising that he is not 
afraid of seeking those proofs – if only after Ellen’s suicide: “I loved 
Ellen, and I wanted to know the worst” (147). Presenting himself as 
a more profound version of Flaubert’s characters, he corrects their 
ϐlaws, and, to use Bloom’s term, completes them antithetically.
However, there is one aspect of crossing the borders of ϐiction and 
reality which Geoffrey does not discuss and which, consequently, is all 
the more signiϐicant: he is repeatedly addressing the reader. As a pos-
sible explanation for this covert strategy, I take up Bloom’s notion that 
a strong poet needs his own ephebe for cementing his position in the 
canon; in Bloom’s words, the strong poet “must wait for his Son, who 
will deϐine him even as he has deϐined his own Poetic Father.”19 My ar-
gument is that Geoffrey chooses the reader as his heir, and the rest of 
my paper will try to track the way he gradually constructs an audience 
of his own in an effort to establish his writerly authority.
In the ϐirst chapter, Braithwaite might seem to be a potential writer 
when he mentions that “I thought of writing books myself once,” but he 
proceeds to explain why he is not worried about his unwritten books 
by reviewing some of Flaubert’s ideas, relying on what “Flaubert im-
plies” and what “Flaubert knew” (3–4). Because of that, the narrator 
appears rather as an admirer of the French writer, as someone who 
has to quote his idol to express his own thoughts. This impression is 
intensiϐied when the reader learns that Geoffrey went on a mission 
to ϐind the authentic model of Loulou, the parrot in “Un coeur sim-
ple,” after he had come across two stuffed parrots in different muse-
ums, both of which were exhibited as the real model. The search for 
Loulou’s real-life counterpart initiates Braithwaite’s biography on 
Flaubert. This chapter is followed by a section containing three chro-
nologies, one – and this might be surprising – focusing on Flaubert’s 
failures. But the ϐirst real withdrawal from the admirer status occurs 
in the third chapter. Here, Geoffrey meets a comparably enthusiastic 
fellow scholar, Ed Winterton, who serves as a mirror for him. Seeing 
19.  Bloom, p. 37.
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a tiresome man, who he feels is too much concerned about how much 
“we owe these fellers […] in return” of their literary output (41), 
Braithwaite is forced to redeϐine his relationship to his own master. 
Compared to Ed’s motives for pursuing a writer, Geoffrey’s motives are 
not transcendental but personal, almost narcissistic. What forces him 
to write Flaubert’s biography is not an ethical demand but an obses-
sion, some kind of urge to discover the unknown. Although there are 
moments in the book when Geoffrey talks about what Flaubert would 
(supposedly) have wished to happen after his death,20 his account of 
the phenomenon which prompts the investigation of the writer’s life 
points only to curiosity: “After I got home the duplicate parrots contin-
ued to ϐlutter in my mind” (15).
When Ed (inadvertently?) misleads Geoffrey into believing that he 
will have the opportunity to publish evidence that Flaubert indeed had 
an affair with Juliet Herbert, the mysterious governess, Braithwaite in-
terrupts their dialogue with this reϐlection: “Dear old Gustave, I mur-
mured to myself; I felt quite tender towards him” (44). When he learns, 
however, that Ed has burnt the entire correspondence, this tender at-
titude towards the writer is quickly changed. Upon asking Ed – whom 
he now sees as “this criminal, this sham, this failure, this murderer, this 
bald pyromaniac” (46) – why he destroyed the letters, he gets the an-
swer that this was what Flaubert had wanted. Braithwaite has doubts 
about it, but reminds himself that “Gustave did burn much of his cor-
respondence with Du Camp” (46–7), too. Disappointed that he will not 
be known as the one who solved the case of Juliet Herbert, Geoffrey 
continues his train of thought: “Or perhaps he [Flaubert] didn’t want us 
to know that his famous devotion to solitude and art had nearly been 
overthrown. But the world would know. I would tell it, one way or an-
other” (47). Having identiϐied with Flaubert two pages earlier, now the 
narrator consciously ignores the writer’s will. Ed claims he “was sure” 
(45) that Geoffrey would understand, and if Ed is sincere, he mistakes 
Braithwaite’s zeal, which is a combination of curiosity and ambition, 
for the admiration and responsibility he himself feels towards his own 
beloved author, Gosse. It is also worth noting that Geoffrey narrates the 
scene without warning the reader where it leads to, which means that 
we have to go through the same experience that he did. This is the ϐirst 
moment of the book when readers ϐind themselves openly manipulated.
20.  “He died little more than a hundred years ago, and all that remains of him is 
paper. […] This, as it happens, is precisely what he would have wanted” (2). “And what 
do people think of him now? […] Flaubert would hardly have been surprised at the 
lazy rush to understand” (95–6).
Book-Barnes2.indb   92 2014.11.23.   21:15:51
93
The next turning point comes in the seventh chapter. Erica Hateley 
notes that this chapter, titled “Cross Channel,” “represents a movement 
or transition both literally and metaphorically” and that “[f]rom this 
point on, Braithwaite is much more interested in the ‘unspoken’ or ‘po-
tential’ elements of Flaubert than the known or familiar”21; in other 
words, in the gaps he can “ϐill” as a writer. In the remaining chapters, 
he will ϐind many gaps – as is only fair for somebody who said that one 
could “deϐine a net […] with no great injury to logic” as “a collection of 
holes tied together with string” (35) – but there is another important 
indicator that Geoffrey is developing an authorial voice: he starts to 
construct his readers. Evidently, he has addressed his readers before 
numerous times in the book, but only with passing remarks. Here, he 
creates roles for them:
As for the hesitating narrator – look, I’m afraid you’ve run into 
one right now. It might be because I’m English. You’d guessed 
that, at least – that I’m English? I… I… Look at that seagull up 
there. […] Why don’t we meet on the boat back instead? The 
two o’ clock ferry, Thursday? I’m sure I’ll feel more like it then. 
All right? What? No, you can’t come on deck with me. For God’s 
sake. Besides, I’m going to the lavatory ϐirst. I can’t have you fol-
lowing me in there, peering round from the next stall. (100)
Naturally, this interaction is one-sided: the reader has no choice but to 
become a voyeur, peering round from the next stall. This ϐirst example 
also shows that Geoffrey constructs his reader as an act of self-defense: 
it is to conceal his embarrassment that he ϐirst uses this device. To en-
sure he has a true writer’s control over his text, he will prove to be 
more of a manipulative narrator than a hesitating one – although there 
is an irony to this part of the text, for Braithwaite starts to hesitate 
right after he refers to himself as a hesitating narrator, which could 
exemplify the performative aspect of language. As Geoffrey continues 
his narration, however, his attempts to distance himself from Flaubert 
and thus achieve an authorial status become more determined. He 
writes “Louise Colet’s Version” of the French master’s life, which gives 
him an opportunity to claim – with the voice of Flaubert’s lover, a rea-
sonably trustworthy source22 – that Gustave did not understand the 
21.  Erica Hateley, “Flaubert’s Parrot as Modernist Quest,” Q/W/E/R/T/Y:  Arts,  
Litteratures & Civilisations du Monde Anglophone 11 (2001), 177–181, pp. 179–80.
22.  Since Barnes himself took a more careful and reϐlective approach to the cred-
ibility of Louise Colet than Braithwaite did (reminding us that both Flaubert’s and 
Book-Barnes2.indb   93 2014.11.23.   21:15:51
94
human heart. The Louise Colet whose words Geoffrey mediates in this 
chapter (more precisely, the Louise Colet he himself performs or cre-
ates) demands the readers’ attention (“Now hear my story. I insist”), 
addresses them as if they were “frightened of” what she “might have 
to say” about Flaubert, and ensures the audience that “it’s too late 
now. You have taken my arm; you cannot drop it. After all, I am older 
than you. It is your job to protect me” (162). The last sentence of the 
quotation not only creates a new role for the reader (as the knightly 
protector of Louise Colet), it also suggests that the reader should help 
her in representing her case, clearing her from the accusations of a 
posterity partial to Flaubert. In this task, Geoffrey gets the active role, 
the reader the passive one: Colet’s feelings are voiced by Geoffrey, and 
Louise needs the reader only to listen, just as Geoffrey needs a passive, 
gullible listener/reader so that he can become an absolute authority.
Braithwaite, having impersonated a female character (much like 
Flaubert had done with Emma – “Madame Bovary, c’est moi”), tries to 
outdo his master once more by completing “Braithwaite’s Dictionary 
of Accepted Ideas,” a work he has been writing at least since the ninth 
chapter, where he ϐirst mentions his “pocket guide to Flaubert” (138). 
Eventually, swerving away from Flaubert completely, he proceeds to 
tell the story of his wife’s adultery and suicide. This chapter, titled 
“Pure Story,” has been analyzed numerous times, and I wish to com-
ment only on its title. Taking the risk of being seen as a manipulative 
author, however, I will wait with those comments, and ϐirst discuss 
the last two chapters, which complete the iconoclastic misprision of 
Flaubert’s legacy and the placement of Braithwaite over the reader as 
an authoritative ϐigure.
The fourteenth chapter imitates an examination paper and offers a 
new reading contract. The mere fact that the book’s narrator composes 
an examination paper suggests that he is an authority on Flaubert, 
holding answers to questions not only about Flaubert (Section A), 
but also about phenomena like “Logic (with Medicine)” or Geography 
(Section B), to which Flaubert is presented as the key or, rather, as just 
an example which can facilitate understanding these issues. Flaubert 
is no longer treated as a source of secret knowledge: the scientiϐic 
background of one of his bon mots is shown to be outdated by today’s 
standards (“spleen […] is as indispensable to our bodily organism as 
Colet’s accounts are highly biased, he contrasts them with each other), I do not think 
of the novel as an imprint of Barnes’s own anxiety of inϐluence but as an illustration 
of the phenomenon which Harold Bloom discusses. See Julian Barnes, Something to 
Declare: Essays on France and French Culture (London: Picador, 2002), p. 188.
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poetry is to our mental organism,” claimed Flaubert, but “the spleen is 
no longer regarded as an essential organ” (209–10), which ruins the 
simile), and we see him being inϐluenced by, not holding answers to, 
nonliterary aspects of life (i.e., he is affected by geography: the “sopo-
riϐic atmosphere” of the region “contributed greatly to the slowness 
and difϐiculty with which Flaubert worked” (209)).
The reader’s presentation has been changed as well. S/he is con-
structed as an examined student: an unequal person, having no pos-
sibility to express personal views since “[a]ll marks will be awarded 
for the correctness of answers; none for presentation,” and since “fa-
cetious or conceitedly brief answers” (204) will be punished – even 
if Geoffrey’s interpretations could be appropriately described by the 
word “facetious.” Of course, we can suppose that Braithwaite ironically 
attaches this mock examination paper to demonstrate the impossibil-
ity of answering questions concerning literary criticism (Section A) or 
anything else (Section B). But even in that case, this chapter signals 
that the narrator has ϐinished his portrait of Flaubert, and the inherent 
irony of the examination paper is used as a defense against the accusa-
tion that the portrait is imperfect. After laughing at this text, the reader 
cannot ask for a more truthful version of Flaubert’s life and art without 
becoming as ridiculous as a self-important teacher.
The ϐinal chapter draws the same conclusion the reader is ex-
pected to have drawn by this time; namely, that truth is not a term we 
can use when we pose questions about history and historical persons, 
or even about our own lives. But this does not bring about a balance of 
power between the narrator and the reader. Geoffrey exercises his au-
thority and his control over the story at the expense of the reader; by 
manipulating the reader’s expectations. At the moment of beginning 
the ϐirst chapter, Braithwaite is already aware that he can never solve 
what he ironically refers to as “the Case of the Stuffed Parrot” (216), 
yet he introduces the reader to his quest for the authentic parrot. In 
the subsequent chapters the quest itself is not mentioned, but the fre-
quent metaphorization of Flaubert’s parrot(s) preserves suspense. 
The ϐinal chapter (“And the Parrot…”), instead of settling the question, 
reveals that even more parrots have been found, all of which could 
have very well been Flaubert’s model. The reader has to go through 
the same quest – has to echo, has to parrot the narrator – and thus s/
he is caught in the same position as Geoffrey, which makes it difϐicult to 
hold him answerable for his failure to provide ultimate explanations.
I now return to the chapter “Pure Story,” in which ‘pureness,’ 
as Vanessa Guignery notes, could have at least three meanings: that 
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Braithwaite’s story is not corrupted, as opposed to Emma’s corrupted 
one; that it is purely imaginary; or that it is ‘true,’ as the novel’s French 
translator interpreted it.23 Yet another layer of this expression can be 
discovered if one recalls that the ϐirst time the parrot is made the sym-
bol of language in the text, the narrator calls Loulou “Pure Word” (10). 
The fact that Ellen’s story is pure, then, may point to it being recon-
structed in language, and to its ϐictional status. By including it in his 
novel, Braithwaite transforms the “true” story of his wife into ϐiction, 
where truth does not necessarily equate to factual truth (as testiϐied by 
Christopher Ricks’ lecture, titled “Mistakes in Literature and Whether 
They Matter,” described in the sixth chapter), and where he can freely 
misread it for his own purposes. Injecting Ellen’s story in the investiga-
tion of Flaubert’s life and works is also a misprision of the predecessor, 
since Flaubert’s artistic endeavour during the composition of Madame 
Bovary was, as he explains in a letter to Louise Colet, “to write a book 
about nothing, a book without exterior attachments, which would be 
held together by the inner force of its style.”24 Braithwaite substitutes 
his precursor’s credo of pure style for “Pure Story,” and creates himself 
as an artist by misreading both Flaubert’s and his own life.
Since the authority Geoffrey achieves is not as ϐirm as that of the 
dethroned Flaubert’s, he cements it by constructing the reader as his 
heir, relying on the logic that if the reader is subjected to him, he him-
self will gain relative authority. In this hope, Braithwaite invites the 
readers to a quest for truth, which ends in a multiplication of truths, 
or maybe in a denial of the existence of any truth. Stunned into uncer-
tainty, the readers inherit an anxiety, which, if they are strong readers, 
they will be able to use to serve their own interests. One way of dealing 
with the anxiety of the novel, and to gain distance from Braithwaite, 
who has an unsettling power over the reader, is to track how Geoffrey’s 
authority is created. And although The Anxiety  of  Inϔluence imagines 
critics with more independence from the sorrows of the writers than 
Braithwaite allows them to have, Harold Bloom’s theory is an excellent 
tool for the analysis of Geoffrey’s authority – an analysis, which might 
fulϐill Bloom’s promise that if we “remember the Siren’s own sorrows,” 
the singing will not “castrate us.”25
23.  Guignery, p. 42.
24.  Letter to Louise Colet, 16 January 1852. See Gustave Flaubert, Madame Bovary, 
ed. Margaret Cohen, Norton Critical Editions, 2nd ed. (New York; London: W. W. Norton 
& Company, 2005), p. 300.
25.  Bloom, p. 65.
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Wojciech Drąg
Thwarted Quests for Meaning
Religion,  Art  and  Love  in  the  Early  Novels  of  Julian  
Barnes1
… we worried about large things in those
days. And why not? When else can you get to 
worry about them? […] But stuff like the pu-
rity of the language, the perfectibility of self, 
the function of art, plus a clutch of capitalised 
intangibles like Love, Truth, Authenticity.
Julian Barnes, Metroland
Julian Barnes’s early novels are all structured around the notion of a 
quest, or a search, for what Chris, the narrator of his debut novel, calls 
“capitalised intangibles.” Those “intangibles” are, admittedly, difϐicult 
to deϐine, which accounts for the rather hazy nature of the pursuits. In 
my article, I will examine the searches undertaken by the ϐirst-person 
narrators of four of Barnes’s novels and argue that the most important 
objects of those quests are the consolations and reassurances of art, 
love and religion. I shall ϐirst discuss Metroland2 (1980), which could 
be interpreted as a prelude to Barnes’s sustained interest in the notion 
of a search as well as in questions about the capacity of art, love and 
religion to offer a stable point of reference and a ϐirm foundation, or, 
in other words, to generate meaning. Then, in the following sections, 
I will consider the pursuits of art in Flaubert’s  Parrot3 (1984), reli-
gion in Staring at the Sun4 (1986) and love in A History of the World in 
10½ Chapters5 (1989). Stating that Barnes’s novels enact a search for 
1. Parts of this article are based on my unpublished dissertation entitled “‘The 
Search Is All?’: The Pursuit of Meaning in Julian Barnes’s Flaubert’s Parrot, Staring at 
the Sun and A History of the World in 10½ Chapters.”
2. All parenthesized references are to this edition: Julian Barnes, Metroland 
(London: Robin Clark, 1981).
3. All parenthesized references are to this edition: Julian Barnes, Flaubert’s Parrot
(London: Picador, 2002).
4. All parenthesized references are to this edition: Julian Barnes, Staring at the Sun
(London: Picador, 1987).
5. All parenthesized references (A  History) are to this edition: Julian Barnes,  A
History of the World in 10½ Chapters (New York: Vintage International, 1990).
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the meaning of life would sound embarrassingly grandiose or, at the 
very least, banal. However, I will argue, they do engage with, in Chris’s 
words, “large things” (Metroland 15). They may do so with a dose of 
irony and postmodernist playfulness, but they remain seriously com-
mitted to tackling existential questions.
Metroland
Barnes’s debut may be read today as a novel that introduces most of 
the major themes with which the writer grapples in his later works. 
The chapter entitled “The Big D” describes the adolescent narrator’s 
réveil mortel (translated by Barnes two and a half decades later as “a 
wake-up call to mortality”6) and thus inaugurates Barnes’s enduring 
engagement with death and transience, which comes to prominence 
in his more recent books, such as The Lemon Table (2004), Nothing to 
be Frightened of (2008), The Sense of an Ending (2011) and Levels of 
Life (2013). The last part of the novel raises the questions of ϐidelity 
and cuckoldry, which Barnes will explore further in Before She Met Me 
(1982), Flaubert’s Parrot, Talking It Over (1991) and its sequel, Love, 
etc (2000). More importantly, Metroland also addresses the issues of 
art, religion and love, which will be discussed with reference to three 
of his other early novels.
The structure of Metroland is based on a quest or journey which 
ends in the place where it begins. The eponymous Metroland, the sub-
urban area situated along the Metropolitan Line north west of London, 
is the setting of the opening and closing parts of the novel, which de-
scribe the life of Chris in 1963 and 1977, respectively. The middle part 
is set in Paris in 1968. The novel follows Chris from his adolescent 
rebellion against the suburbia and bourgeois values, through his ϐirst 
love affair while on an academic scholarship in Paris, to the comfort of 
his middle-class life with a wife and daughter back in the once despised 
but now appreciated Metroland. The circularity of Chris’s journey 
testiϐies to his acceptance of the model of life that he so passionately 
opposed as a boy. This radical change in Chris’s character is accentu-
ated by the epigraphs which open each part. The ϐirst one, a passage 
from Rimbaud’s “Voyelles,” points to the young narrator’s inclina-
tion towards metaphor and his determination to seek hidden mean-
ings. The second epigraph, Verlaine’s comment calling into question 
6.  Julian Barnes, Nothing to be Frightened of (London: Jonathan Cape, 2008), p. 23.
Book-Barnes2.indb   100 2014.11.23.   21:15:52
101
the seriousness of Rimbaud’s exercise in synaesthesia, encapsulates 
the beginnings of Chris’s skepticism about his youthful idealism. The 
last section is preceded by a quotation from Bishop Butler, which ex-
presses a very straightforward view on reality, unconcerned with hid-
den depths. Matthew Pateman reads the epigraphs as an indication of 
Chris’s “becoming less and less interested in searching, in striving for 
truth, in uncovering symbols” and of his passage “from the desire to 
search to the desire to accept.”7 The novel concludes with Chris’s late-
night meditation, in which he quite explicitly distances himself from 
the need to look for symbolic meanings:
I follow a half-factitious line about the nature of the light: how 
the sodium with its strength and nearness blots out the effect of 
even the fullest moon […] and how this is symbolic of … well, of 
something, no doubt. But I don’t pursue this too seriously: there’s 
no point in trying to thrust false signiϐicances on to things. (176)
The objects of Chris’s pursuit throughout the novel are art and 
love. Religion does not feature as a serious proposition; it is rejected 
deϐinitively very early on. The loss of religious sensibility is expressed 
in a single paragraph, which links it with the dawning of the fear of 
death. “God,” explains Chris,
got the boot for a number of reasons, none of which, I suspect, 
will seem wholly sufϐicient: the boringness of Sundays, the creeps 
who took it all seriously at school, Baudelaire and Rimbaud, the 
pleasure of blasphemy (dangerous, this one), hymn-singing and 
organ music and the language of prayer, inability any longer to 
think of wanking as a sin, and – as a clincher – an unwillingness 
to believe that dead relatives were watching what I was doing. 
(53)
Frederick Holmes argues that this departure of God is accompanied 
by the boost of Chris’s conϐidence in art, which becomes effectively “a 
surrogate religion for him.”8 In “Metroland (1963)” the narrator ad-
mits that for him and his friends “[a]rt was the most important thing in 
life, the constant to which one could be unfailingly devoted and which 
7.  Matthew Pateman, Julian Barnes, Writers and Their Work (Tavistock: Northcote 
House, 2002), pp. 4–5.
8.  Frederick Holmes, Julian Barnes, New British Fiction (Basingstoke; New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 57.
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would never cease to reward” (29). It was also a means of making peo-
ple “better – kinder, wiser, nicer, more peaceful, more active, more sen-
sitive,” as well as being the only possible guarantee of immortality (29, 
55). In “Paris (1968)” Chris expresses his doubts about art’s capacity 
for transcendence: “Was art merely posh entertainment, on to which 
a fake spiritual side had been foisted by the non-religious? Life ended; 
but didn’t art end too?” (128). In the ϐinal part, Chris visits the National 
Gallery as he used to in the early sixties but ϐinds it a disheartening ex-
perience. He describes his puzzled feelings to his old schoolmate Toni:
I like it all; I always did; I just don’t know whether there’s any 
sort of direct link between it and me – whether the connection 
we force ourselves to believe in is really there. […] ‘I mean, I 
don’t deny that it’s all …’ I looked up again, nervously ‘… fun, and 
you know, moving and all that stuff as well, and interesting too. 
But in terms of what it actually does, what can you say? (165–6)
Whereas young Chris would subscribe to the statement “[s]ome peo-
ple say that life is the thing, but I prefer reading” (128), as an adult he 
admits to privileging life over art. What he used to see as a substitute 
for religion has become at most a hobby.
Chris’s pursuit of love is undoubtedly more successful at reaching 
its aim. After the failure of his ϐirst relationship with Annick, reported 
in “Paris (1968),” he falls in love with Marion, to whom he is married 
in the ϐinal part. Chris appears to be very happy about their relation-
ship – he even composes a long list of reasons why he loves his wife 
– although the prospect of marital inϐidelity is mentioned in one of the 
closing chapters. One of the qualities which he values most in Marion is 
her honesty, which Pateman interprets as a foreshadowing of “a quest 
for a link between love and truth that ϐinds its zenith in ‘Parenthesis.’”9 
However, it remains highly debatable whether the qualiϐied success of 
Chris’s pursuit of love could be interpreted as proof of a favourable 
outcome of his search for meaning. The narrator himself admits in 
the ϐinal part that “[m]arriage moves you further away from the ex-
amination of truth, not nearer to it” (141). Chris’s decision to settle in 
Metroland could be seen as testimony to this resignation.
9.  Pateman, p. 10.
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Art
Flaubert’s  Parrot, Barnes’s third and arguably still most acclaimed 
novel, enacts a search for the reassurance and consolation of art. Its 
narrator, Geoffrey Braithwaite, is an elderly doctor and a devoted 
admirer of Gustave Flaubert. Interestingly, Chris from Metroland is 
also a keen fan of Flaubert and makes frequent allusions to Madame 
Bovary, Dictionnaire  des  idées  reçues and L’Éducation  sentimentale. 
Throughout the novel Braithwaite collects facts about the life and 
works of Flaubert, tells stories and anecdotes about him, quotes his 
novels, letters and diaries and defends him against the accusations of 
literary critics and historians. However, Braithwaite remains unsatis-
ϐied with the essential dryness of his knowledge about Flaubert. At the 
very beginning of the novel, he complains that “all that remains of him 
[i.e., Flaubert] is paper. Paper, ideas, phrases, metaphors, structured 
prose which turns into sound” (2). He desires to know him intimately, 
to gain a more profound insight into his genius. What comes to serve as 
an intimate link between Braithwaite and Flaubert is a stuffed parrot, 
which Braithwaite discovers one day at the Hotel-Dieu in Rouen. The 
parrot is reputedly the one that Flaubert once borrowed from the mu-
seum to serve him as inspiration when he was working on his novella 
Un coeur simple, which features a parrot named Loulou. Braithwaite 
admits that looking at the stuffed bird he feels “ardently in touch” with 
Flaubert and imagines it to be the “emblem of the writer’s voice” (7, 
12). His epiphany compels him to establish whether the exhibit at the 
Hotel-Dieu is indeed the parrot that Flaubert had in front of him when 
writing Un  coeur  simple or whether the parrot on display in nearby 
Croisset is the authentic one.
The novel takes the form of a very loosely structured account of 
the quest for the genuine parrot, intertwined with numerous digres-
sions about Flaubert. As the plot unfolds, however, it becomes increas-
ingly clear that Braithwaite’s story about Flaubert and the parrot is, 
to a large extent, a mere pretext for telling (or withholding) the tragic 
story of the protagonist’s late wife Ellen. The text is peppered with 
aposiopeses (moments of sudden breaking off in speech), which occur 
whenever Braithwaite attempts to overcome his embarrassment and 
begin his own painful story: “I remember… But I’ll keep that for an-
other time” (82); “My wife… Not now, not now” (120). At one point, in 
the middle of his discussion of Madame Bovary, he suddenly confesses:
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Three stories contend within me. One about Flaubert, one about 
Ellen, one about myself. My own is the simplest of the three […] 
and yet I ϐind it the hardest to begin. My wife’s is more com-
plicated, and more urgent; yet I resist that too. […] Ellen’s is a 
true story; perhaps it is even the reason why I am telling you 
Flaubert’s story instead. (94–5)
The reasons why Braithwaite chooses to tell Flaubert’s story 
rather than his own are far from straightforward. On the one hand, 
he is afraid of confronting the pain of his own tragic story and, there-
fore, defers it until he can summon the courage to share it with the 
reader. On the other hand, however, he writes about Flaubert because 
he hopes to ϐind consolation in telling Flaubert’s story. In one of the 
last chapters of the novel, Braithwaite ϐinally confronts the tragic 
events of his past. He talks about his long-time marriage with Ellen, 
which he describes as “happy […] unhappy […] happy enough” (197). 
Embarrassed, he confesses that Ellen used to have numerous affairs 
with other men, which he pretended not to notice. Eventually, he ad-
mits that his wife probably committed suicide and that he was the one 
to switch off her respirator. The reason for Ellen’s decision to take her 
life was never clear to Braithwaite and that ignorance has haunted him 
ever since. Years later it remains an unhealed wound and constitutes 
“the crux of his life.”10
Lacking any consolatory narrative to explain Ellen’s suicide, 
Braithwaite turns to art. One of the reasons for choosing Flaubert is 
Madame Bovary, whose eponymous character is unfaithful to her hus-
band and ultimately commits suicide. She thus becomes a counterpart 
to Ellen: the plot of Madame Bovary becomes for Braithwaite a context 
of interpretation, which enables him to identify with Charles Bovary, 
the betrayed and abandoned widower, and to understand Ellen through 
the ϐigure of Emma. The parallels that the narrator draws between 
his story and the life and works of Flaubert, as Georgia Johnston ar-
gues, “become sources of meaning for Braithwaite’s life, an ideological 
structure through which he understands himself.”11 The idea that what 
Braithwaite desperately seeks in art is the ability to understand his 
personal tragedy is shared by Pateman, who argues that Braithwaite’s 
pursuit of the parrot springs from the same desire: “In trying to under-
stand his loss, Braithwaite needs to understand Flaubert; in order to 
10.  Georgia Johnston, “Textualizing Ellen: The Patriarchal ‘I’ of Flaubert’s Parrot,” 
Philological Papers 46 (2000), 64–69, p. 65.
11.  Johnston, p. 69.
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understand Flaubert, he feels he needs to understand the parrot.”12 If 
one adopts this hypothesis, then the whole quest on which Braithwaite 
embarks becomes a means to an end: that of coming to terms with a 
personal tragedy.
The novel addresses the question of art’s therapeutic capacity to 
help the process of mourning past losses and of gaining insight into 
personal predicaments. For the most part, Braithwaite seems to be 
content with the comfort offered by his engagement with Flaubert’s 
literature. By clinging to the belief that art has the capacity to teach, 
explain and guarantee meaning, Braithwaite endorses the concept of 
art as a metanarrative. His pursuit of the consolations of art is seen 
by Neil Brooks as a result of his “modernist approach” to art, mani-
fest in his desire to discover in art “stable hierarchies and master-
narratives” that would restore “order and intelligibility to his life.”13 
However, the novel repeatedly calls this concept into question. Most 
notably, the outcome of the quest for the parrot is far from conclu-
sive. In the last chapter, Braithwaite pays another visit to the two mu-
seums which claim to own the genuine model for Loulou and closely 
examines the two exhibits. Afterwards, he arranges to meet Monsieur 
Andrieu, an elderly expert on Flaubert, and asks to be told the story 
of the two parrots. He learns that it is possible that neither parrot is 
authentic, since they were, to a degree, arbitrarily selected from about 
ϐifty parrots that were stored in the reserve collection of the Museum 
of Natural History in Rouen. “[P]leased and disappointed at the same 
time” (227), Braithwaite decides to visit the Museum and examine 
what was left of the collection of stuffed parrots. In the last paragraph 
of the novel, he describes the sight of the three last Amazonian parrots 
that have survived. After a careful investigation he remarks pensively: 
“Perhaps it was one of them” (229).
These last words are a testimony to the ultimate inconclusiveness 
of the novel. The authentic parrot, the only living link between Flaubert 
and Braithwaite, is not (and probably cannot ever be) identiϐied, sug-
gesting perhaps that art’s consolations are, likewise, inaccessible. 
Erica Hateley argues, however, that despite the failure of Braithwaite’s 
project, he has learnt to cope with Ellen’s death and is now ready to 
“move forward.”14 Nevertheless, most critics read the ending of the 
12.  Pateman, p. 28.
13.  Vanessa Guignery, The Fiction  of  Julian  Barnes:  A  Reader’s  Guide  to  Essential  
Criticism, Reader’s Guides to Essential Criticism (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006), p. 45.
14.  Guignery, p. 47.
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novel as a testimony to the failure of Braithwaite’s quest. James Scott 
argues that the protagonist’s immersion in Flaubert’s life and litera-
ture culminates in “a sense of purposelessness.”15 Guignery, in turn, 
argues that Braithwaite’s “synecdochal journey from the part to the 
whole” proves “impossible.”16 The narrator himself comes to realise 
that his attempts to understand life through literature are doomed 
to failure. In a much-quoted passage, he admits that he understands 
Flaubert better than his late wife. He goes on to reϐlect (almost echo-
ing Chris):
Books say: she did this because. Life says: she did this. Books are 
where things are explained to you; life is where things aren’t. 
I’m not surprised some people prefer books. Books make sense 
of life. The only problem is that the lives they make sense of are 
other people’s lives, never your own. (201)
In the long run, implies Braithwaite, literature – or, more generally, art 
– is incapable of imposing meaning on life or helping anyone to under-
stand it.
Religion
Barnes’s next novel, Staring at the Sun, examines the search for reli-
gious belief in an age when belief seems no longer possible and reli-
gion is seen as a consolatory fable invented to mitigate the deϐinitive-
ness of death. In this “conϐidently postmetaphysical”17 world, Gregory, 
an insurance salesman and a conϐirmed bachelor, begins, at the age of 
sixty, to reϐlect on questions about life and death. He suddenly ϐinds 
himself seized by a sense of the purposelessness of his life and realises 
that he has paid too little attention to life’s “big issues.” Although in the 
past years Gregory was not particularly interested in any religion, now 
the questions of God’s existence and the afterlife assume overriding 
importance. He discovers that religion answers his need for a pattern, 
a coherent narrative that would account for his existence, and an il-
lusion of order and harmony: “The old story, the ϐirst story: Gregory 
15.  James Scott, “Parrots as Paradigms: Inϐinite Deferral of Meaning in Flaubert’s 
Parrot,” ARIEL 21.3 (1990), 57–68, p. 59.
16.  Guignery, p. 41.
17.  Terry Eagleton’s phrase, qtd. in Linda Hutcheon, Poetics  of  Postmodernism:  
History, Theory, Fiction (London, Routledge, 1988), p. 19.
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eased himself into it. A comfortable jacket, an armchair ϐitted to your 
shape by long use, the wooden handle of an old saw, a jazz tune with all 
its parts, a footprint in the sand which ϐits your shoe” (165). Gregory 
appears to accept religion because of the consolation it offers rather 
than the answers it provides. It is suggested that his need for belief 
also springs from a growing fear of death. The novel owes its title to 
the following maxim by La Rochefoucauld: “Neither the sun nor death 
can be stared at steadily.”18 To stare at death directly and without blink-
ing is what Gregory ϐinds himself incapable of doing. He needs religion 
because he cannot confront mortality. “God,” as Merritt Moseley points 
out in his discussion of the novel, “is a defence men turn to because 
they are afraid.”19
Gregory epitomises not only the intangible longing for religious 
reassurance but also the dramatic intellectual pursuit of the answers 
to questions about the existence of God, the validity of religion and 
the ϐinality of death. He approaches religion intellectually and is dis-
satisϐied with the crude choice between subscribing to the belief in 
either the existence or non-existence of God. Therefore, he creates his 
own set of ϐifteen possible permutations about God. The long list, com-
posed of both serious and facetious entries, includes the hypotheses 
that God once existed but does not any longer; that God “exists only 
as long as belief in him exists”; that he has abandoned his creation 
or is simply “taking a divine sabbatical” (162–6). In his questioning 
of the simple dualism between belief and non-belief and of the draw-
ing of absolute distinctions, Gregory adopts a postmodern theological 
stance. Exasperated by the inconclusiveness of his intellectual pursuit, 
Gregory turns to The Absolute Truth computer, ironically referred to 
as TAT, and asks it questions about the current state of world religions 
and the number of their followers. In place of satisfactory answers, he 
receives dry statistics. He eventually asks: “Do you believe in God?” to 
which the computer replies, “NOT REAL QUESTION” (175–6). The ses-
sion with TAT increases Gregory’s frustration.
Gregory comes to realise that the underlying question he pursues 
is about eternal life. “Eternal life – that was always the great bargain-
ing counter, wasn’t it?” suggests the narrating voice later in the novel 
(188). When Gregory goes on to consider whether it is braver to be-
lieve or not to believe in God, these are his reϐlections about the impli-
cations of rejecting belief:
18.  Qtd. in Guignery, p. 59.
19.  Merritt Moseley, Understanding  Julian  Barnes (Columbia, SC: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1997), p. 98.
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you are declaring the certainty of your own non-existence. I end. 
I do not go on. [...] You are complacent in the face of extinction 
[...] You stretch out on your deathbed conϐident that you have 
understood the question of life; you boldly declare for the void. 
Imagine that moment. Imagine the fear. (166)
Although he is far from complacent in the face of his death, Gregory 
ultimately renounces his religious explorations. He realises that he has 
not been seeking the answer to the question about whether God ex-
ists but rather the certainty that he does. When faced with pessimistic 
ϐindings, he refuses to continue his search and stops at a point that 
gives him neither reassurance nor consolation.
Whereas Gregory is portrayed as fearful and weak, his mother, 
Jean Serjeant, emerges as an embodiment of courage. Boldness marks 
most of the crucial decisions of her life, including the dramatic move to 
leave her husband and begin a new life away from home, with Gregory 
to provide for. Jean did not use to study much in her life but was al-
ways very curious about the world. From the earliest years she would 
ask herself serious questions about life. When she retires, her curios-
ity pushes her to travel. During one of her trips she visits the Grand 
Canyon, which she expects to shake her religious indifference and 
amaze her with its majesty. Jean’s reaction, however, is the opposite: 
“the Canyon stunned her into uncertainty” (98). The mystical experi-
ence of seeing this natural wonder helps her realise that she is devoid 
of any religious sense. Towards the end of the novel, when asked by 
Gregory about God, she cryptically remarks: “God’s on a motor-bike 
off the west coast of Ireland” (183). To Jean, God is an abstraction and 
religion is a belief system invented by people to deceive themselves 
that death is not ϐinal. The playful image of God riding a motor-bike 
suggests the futility of pursuing religion. God, if he exists, is beyond 
human reach.
In the last part of the novel, Jean – old, disillusioned but serene – 
witnesses Gregory’s struggle with eschatological questions and tries 
to allay his fears. In an attempt to save him the pain and disappoint-
ment of the (in her view) inevitable failure of his search for religious 
reassurance, she tells him that religion is “nonsense” and that death is 
“absolute” (185). She calls his pursuit “screaming at the sky” (157) and 
perceives his search as a desperate and, in a sense, heroic attempt to 
divine a meaning beyond himself, which, although doomed to ultimate 
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failure, is a necessary stage in a journey to a deeper understanding of 
the human condition:
Putting your head back and roaring at the empty heavens, know-
ing that however much noise you made, nobody up there would 
hear you. And then you ϐlopped down on your back, exhausted, 
self-conscious and a little pleased: even if no one was listening, 
you had somehow made your point. That was what Gregory was 
doing. He was making his point. (157)
In Jean’s view, the purposefulness of the search is not undermined by 
its ultimate frustration. Seeking God and failing to ϐind him is shown 
in the novel as inscribed in the experience of a searching human indi-
vidual. Even though, as Jean describes it, the outcome of the pursuit 
entails a painful disappointment and “exhaustion,” it also makes one 
“a little pleased” that one has made their point (157). The search may 
not reach its hopeful end but attains a different one: it frees one from 
illusions and allows one to stare directly at the sun.
The failure of the religious pursuit dramatised in Staring at the Sun 
brings the reader back to the title of the novel and hints at its signiϐi-
cance. To stare at the sun is to have the courage to discard consolatory 
narratives. A belief in God emerges as a master narrative that provides 
people with an illusion of a pattern and order. And if, according to the 
theoreticians of postmodernism, all totalising accounts of ultimate re-
ality may be doomed to failure, so is religion. Seeking the reassurance 
of religious belief is presented in the novel as an attempt to hide the 
dazzling truth about the ϐinality of death. “God,” Moseley concludes, “is 
the hand we put before our eyes because we cannot stare directly at 
the sun.”20
Love
A History of the World in 10½ Chapters, Barnes’s next novel, takes the 
form of a loosely connected text made up of eleven sections, where 
the constituent parts challenge the certainties of received, canonised 
history. Echoes of a search for love as a potential guarantee of mean-
ing could be traced to several chapters but I shall concentrate on the 
titular half-chapter. “Parenthesis” comes after chapter eight, which 
20.  Moseley, p. 98.
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positions it in the midst of other texts, neither at the beginning of the 
novel nor at the end. On the other hand, however, its title singles it out, 
suggesting that it is not an integral part of the rest of the text but, in 
a sense, stands on the side. What further emphasises the uniqueness 
of “Parenthesis” is the voice of the narrator, which is suggested to be 
the voice of the implied author. At the very beginning of the section, 
the narrator describes El Greco’s Burial of the Count of Orgaz, in which 
the painter is believed to look directly at the viewer. The narrator then 
goes on to hint that he himself assumes now the position of El Greco 
in his picture. Guignery argues that at this moment Barnes chooses to 
discard “the mask of pseudonyms or narrators” and “assumes respon-
sibility for his reϐlections about love and history.”21 Moseley, likewise, 
argues that in the half-chapter “Barnes comes as close as possible, for 
a novelist, to speaking as himself,” but concedes that this identiϐication 
may be interpreted as a mere literary device – that “the ‘Julian Barnes’ 
speaking here is a mask behind which the ‘real’ Julian Barnes is smirk-
ing at the sentimentality of these ideas.”22
One of the motifs that run through the entire novel is the notion 
of survival. The ϐirst chapter tells the story of Noah’s ark; chapter two 
describes a historian who survives a terrorist attack; “Shipwreck” 
depicts the tragic story of the castaways from the raft of the Medusa 
and, ϐinally, one of the later chapters is straightforwardly entitled “The 
Survivor.” Survival is frequently examined in relation to love. In the 
opening part of “Parenthesis,” the narrator quotes the last line of Philip 
Larkin’s “An Arundel Tomb”: “What will survive of us is love” (226). 
He then asks if this famous line is true or if it should only be read as 
a pretty “poetic ϐlourish.” He wonders if love “glows after our deaths” 
for a while like outdated television sets after being switched off. This 
image of love, however appealing, is ultimately discarded. The death 
of lovers puts an end to their love, too – love cannot survive outside of 
them. “If anything survives of us it will probably be something else,” 
remarks the narrator. In the case of Larkin, it will be his poetry, not his 
love (227).
The link between love and survival, although called into question 
at the very beginning, keeps recurring further in the text. During his 
polyglot analysis of the words “I love you” the narrator asks, “Are there 
tribes whose lexicon lacks the words I love you? Or have they all died 
out?” He then declares that love should be spoken about with restraint, 
21.  Guignery, p. 64.
22.  Moseley, pp. 121–3.
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honesty and precision. “If it is to save us,” he points out, “we must look 
at it as clearly as we should look at death.” The question arises about 
what kind of salvation the narrator has in mind. He soon clariϐies that 
he does not mean “happiness”: “Let’s start at the beginning. Love 
makes you happy? No. […] Love makes everything all right? Indeed no. 
I used to believe all this, of course” (229). The narrator then refers to 
his own failed relationship and confesses: “Mutual love did not add up 
to happiness. Stubbornly, we insisted that it did.” He then disputes the 
idea that love is capable of “making” anybody happy: love is no “trans-
forming wand” (230).
“We must love one another or die,” wrote W. H. Auden in “September 
1, 1939” and later changed it to “We must love one another and die,” 
notes the narrator of “Parenthesis” and praises Auden’s correction: “If 
a line sounds ringingly good but isn’t true, out with it” (230–1, empha-
sis added). The change of “or” to “and” is crucial, as it implies that love 
cannot guarantee any kind of immortality. Further on, however, the 
narrator pauses to reϐlect on the ϐirst version of the quote and suggests 
an alternative way of reading it: “We must love one another because if 
we don’t, if love doesn’t fuel our lives, then we might as well be dead.” 
This appears to be the kind of survival that love may be capable of se-
curing, by injecting scraps of meaning into an otherwise meaningless 
existence. It may not be a lasting survival, but it is the only available 
one. Love cannot work miracles but it can give one “spine-stretching 
conϐidence” and “clarity of vision” (232). A moment later, however, the 
narrator undermines the idea that love could guarantee survival: “Our 
love doesn’t help us survive […] Yet it gives us our individuality, our 
purpose” (234). It is to those qualities that love owes its ultimate su-
periority over religion and art:
Religion has become either wimpishly workaday, or terminally 
crazy, or merely businesslike […] Art, picking up conϐidence from 
the decline of religion, announces its transcendence of the world 
(and it lasts, it lasts! art beats death!), but this announcement 
isn’t accessible to all, or where accessible isn’t always inspiring 
or welcome. So religion and art must yield to love. It gives us our 
humanity, and also our mysticism. There is more to us than us. 
(242–3)
An examination of love’s capacity to grant meaning in A History  
could not be complete without considering its relationship with 
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history itself. Love is put forward by the narrator as the only way to 
resist history and defy its dictatorship. Without love, history becomes 
“ridiculous” and “brutally self-important” (238). Love perhaps “won’t 
change the history of the world,” points out the narrator, “but it will 
do something much more important: teach us to stand up to history, 
to ignore its chin-out strut. I don’t accept your terms, love says; sorry, 
you don’t impress” (238). The conϐidence gained through love could 
enable one to look at history without awe and see its absurdity.
Another reason why love should have the capacity to resist the 
terror of history is its connection with truth. Whereas history is dis-
missed in “Parenthesis” as fabulation, love is the closest one can get 
to truth. “Love and truth,” states the narrator, “yes, that’s the prime 
connection” (243). This declaration sounds surprising in a novel that 
has been consistently undermining the notion of objective truth, with 
several consecutive chapters (“The Stowaway” in particular) illustrat-
ing the mechanisms of transforming stories into the “truths” of history. 
The narrator, however, is not naïve about truth:
We all know objective truth is not obtainable, that when some 
event occurs we shall have a multiplicity of subjective truths 
which we assess and then fabulate into history, into some God-
eyed version of what ‘really’ happened. This God-eyed version is 
a fake – a charming, impossible fake.” (243)
Still, if one wants love to defy history, one has to put aside our scepti-
cism about truth.
The belief in love as truth, however ϐirm, does not guarantee love’s 
ultimate victory. The narrator repeats that love is by deϐinition prone 
to failure: “It will go wrong, this love; it probably will. […] But when 
love fails us, we must still go on believing in it. Is it encoded in every 
molecule that things fuck up, that love will fail? Perhaps it is. Still we 
must believe in love, just as we must believe in free will and objective 
truth” (244).23 The narrator declares that to act against the grain of 
the world, in which love will almost certainly fail, is the only chance to 
survive. If one’s efforts fail, the history of the world is to blame. “But 
that’s still to come. Perhaps it will never come. In the night the world 
can be deϐied” (244). After all, the narrator wonders, love’s defeat may 
not be inevitable. He is lying next to his love and feels like waking her 
23.  The inevitability of love’s failure is exempliϐied in two other chapters of the 
novel, “The Visitors” and “Upstream!”
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up to tell her this “grand truth,” but eventually decides against it: “in 
the morning it may not seem worth disturbing her for” (244). On that 
playful and inconclusive note, “Parenthesis” ends and leaves open the 
question about love’s capacity to stand up to history.
Conclusion
As has been argued, the pursuit of religious belief enacted in Staring at 
the Sun and, to a lesser extent, in Metroland deϐinitively fails to reach 
its desired end. Neither Gregory nor his mother Jean is able to ϐind 
consolation in religion. Although thwarted, the search is not altogether 
futile: it enables Jean to see through illusory reassurance and sum-
mon the courage to “stare at the sun.” In Flaubert’s Parrot the notion 
of pursuit itself and its purposefulness are presented as problematic. 
On the one hand, the object of the quest, the authentic parrot, is not 
found. But the overriding aim of Braithwaite’s search is not so much 
to identify the authentic exhibit as to come to terms with his wife’s 
suicide. Whether the protagonist achieves that goal is debatable. What 
makes the search worthwhile is not its closure (which is denied) but 
the very fact that, as Scott points out, it keeps the protagonist in mo-
tion.24 Where stable meaning is not accessible, movement may guar-
antee survival; hence Ellen’s refusal to search for meaning leads to her 
suicide. According to Scott, since there are no answers to Braithwaite’s 
questions, the fact that he asks them allows him to survive.
In comparison to religion and art, love emerges as a more acces-
sible source of transcendence. The narrator of “Parenthesis,” hinting 
that he speaks as “Julian Barnes,” declares that, where religion fails 
because of its mundane practicality and art because of its essentially 
elitist character, love transcends the everyday, offers us mysticism and 
announces that “there is more to us than us.” The search for love, how-
ever, is also prone (if not doomed) to failure. “But when love fails us, 
we must still go on believing in it,” he adds. The search becomes an act 
of deϐiance, a refusal to submit to the entropy of the world of “beguil-
ing relativity” (A History 244), in which there are no unimpeachable 
foundations. The narrator insists that one has to believe heroically in 
love even if the ultimate failure of any human endeavour is “encoded 
in every molecule.” That enduring conϐidence in love appears to be 
shared and preϐigured by Chris, who, in the last part of Metroland, 
24.  Scott, p. 70.
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refuses to yield to cynicism about love, even though he has renounced 
his once unshakeable belief in art.
These implications, however, are merely some of a variety of ways 
to conclude the discussion of the novels’ exploration of the notion of the 
pursuit of meaning. The desire to draw a ϐinal conclusion runs counter 
to the poetics of Barnes’s novels, which appear to follow the guideline 
given by Braithwaite: “Discuss without concluding” (Flaubert’s Parrot 
189). Perhaps the main reason Barnes’s texts refuse to yield straight-
forward conclusions is their postmodernist playfulness. Although they 
address such “capitalised intangibles” as Art, Religion and Love, they 
tackle them with a degree of ironic detachment, of which the quintes-
sential example is Barnes’s idea of making a book-length discussion 
about art’s capacity to connect with life hinge on the success or failure 
of a quest for a stuffed parrot that Flaubert named Loulou.
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 Eszter Tory
The Courage to Believe
Mediocrity and Faith in Julian Barnes’s Staring at the Sun
“Is it brave to believe in God?” is one of many questions discussed by 
Julian Barnes in his fourth novel, Staring at the Sun1 (1986). Although 
Barnes is notorious for using, even abusing, biblical references and 
religious motifs in his ϐiction as well as for explicitly addressing is-
sues of faith in works of non-ϐiction such as Nothing to be Frightened 
of (2008), the spiritual undercurrent of his writings is a dimension 
less examined by literary scholars. Staring at the Sun presents lyrical 
meditations on love, war, courage, the fear of death, and God in a strik-
ingly simple language. At the time of publication, reviewers were quite 
disconcerted by this novel, as it conspicuously differed in theme, form 
and style from the preceding experimental novel Flaubert’s  Parrot  
(1984). Some called the book a “crippling disappointment”2 due to its 
poor narrative action and lack of a unifying theme. Moreover, Lawson 
criticized the voice of the author which permeates all his characters 
so that they are not granted a speciϐic voice of their own. Like Lawson, 
David Lodge also deemed Gregory’s character colourless and “a mere 
mouthpiece for philosophical speculations”3 which seem to be rem-
nants of Barnes’s preceding novel. In contrast to these strong voices of 
criticism, Vanessa Guignery claims that the book offers “a series of or-
dinary miracles and invites to probe beneath the apparent simplicity 
of the prose.”4 In agreement with Guignery, I wish to shed some light 
on the spiritual undercurrent of this novel, as the slow disenchant-
ment of the protagonist triggers an inverse process in the narrative 
itself. Moreover, the deceptive simplicity of the characters and the me-
diocrity of the two protagonists in particular will be explored, empha-
sizing the role of these two features in the characters’ poor relation to 
the spiritual domain.
1. All parenthesized references are to this edition: Julian Barnes, Staring at the Sun
(London: Picador, 1987).
2. Mark Lawson, “The Genre-Bender Gets it Wrong,” Sunday  Times 8460 (28 
September 1986), p. 53.
3. Qtd. in Meritt Moseley, Understanding Julian Barnes (Columbia, SC: University of 
Carolina Press, 1997), p. 92.
4. Vanessa Guignery, The  Fiction  of  Julian  Barnes:  A  Reader’s  Guide  to  Essential
Criticism, Readers’ Guides to Essential Criticism (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006), p. 52.
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Earlier interpretations of the novel, which claimed that Barnes 
constructed this work on the protagonist’s, Jean Serjeant’s, denial of 
the transcendental, can be challenged if the two protagonists’ atti-
tudes to both existential and religious questions are subjected to scru-
tiny. According to Wojciech Drąg, the pursuit of religious belief drama-
tised in Staring  at  the  Sun fails to reach its desired goal, as Gregory 
fails to ϐind consolation in religion. Still, the search does not appear 
to be futile as it enables Jean Serjeant to see through the illusory reas-
surances offered by religion and to gain the courage to stare death in 
the face. Drąg concludes his comparative analysis of Flaubert’s Parrot, 
Staring at the Sun and A History of the World in 10½ Chapters (1989) 
by stating that “in comparison to religion and art, love […] emerges 
[…] as the most solid foundation for a meaningful existence. It is said 
in the  text to be the only accessible source of transcendence and the 
quintessence of our humanity.”5 Thus, Jean’s ϐinal act of staring at the 
sun is read as Barnes’s decision to abandon religion in his search for 
meaning. This reading of the novel is valid insofar as the subsequent 
books are considered, as those books, A History of  the World in 10½ 
Chapters and Talking  it  Over  (1991), primarily focus on the unreli-
ability of history and the multifaceted nature of love. Nevertheless, 
interpreting Staring at the Sun as Barnes’s abandonment of religious 
inquiries denies the novel’s inherent mystical domain, which is as sig-
niϐicant as Jean’s disenchantment. As the novel proceeds, the narrative 
becomes more indirect and thus the genre of the book less distinct, 
both of which seem to counterbalance Jean’s growing rationalism and 
strengthen the sense of uncertainty regarding Jean’s perspective of the 
world as a spiritually barren place. The second part of the essay argues 
that the pivotal characters, Jean and Gregory, stagnate on the level of 
mediocrity because they are unable to summon the courage to believe 
in an enchanted world where faith is possible or in past notions like 
God, religion and afterlife, and rise to a spiritual mode of existence.
The Four Wills
In the light of an interdisciplinary approach, the unique character con-
struction of not only the main characters but also the minor characters 
comes into focus. The characters of Staring at the Sun can be analysed as 
5.  Wojciech Drąg, “‘The Search Is All?’: The Pursuit of Meaning in Julian Barnes’s 
Flaubert’s Parrot, Staring at the Sun and A History of the World in 10½ Chapters,” MA 
thesis (University of Glamorgan, 2007), pp. 61–2, accessed 23 February 2013 <http://
www.julianbarnes.com/docs/drag.pdf>.
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literary manifestations of what modern psychology calls major drives 
in the human psyche. Scholars of contemporary psychology still gener-
ally agree that the primary motivational forces of humans can be placed 
in the following categories: the will to live, the will to pleasure, the will 
to superiority and the will to meaning. The characters can be sorted 
into certain groups according to their most prominent attributes that 
signiϐicantly determine their personalities and their roles in the novel. 
However, the two leading characters, Jean and Gregory, prove to be more 
complex and, therefore, their characters will be regularly revisited.
The ϐirst category is “the will to live,” which originates from 
Schopenhauer, who ϐirst used the term in The  World  as  Will  and  
Representation (1818). In this work he claims that everything that hap-
pens in the world is the expression and the manifestation of the will to 
live and depends solely on the desires of the individuals. In contrast to 
Hegel, who advocated the concept of Zeitgeist, Schopenhauer believed 
that people were motivated by their own personal desires, will to live, 
which is a mindless, futile, non-rational urge at the foundation of our 
instinctual drives. In Staring at the Sun, Gregory’s obsession with death 
leads towards despair and self-centeredness; he even fails to ϐind ten-
der joys in the everyday: “Enjoy himself? Yes, he wanted to enjoy him-
self. Or rather, he wanted to want to enjoy himself” (107). His character 
lacks any kind of deep interest in people and, therefore, the fact that he 
is more preoccupied with death than living life to its fullest provokes 
the question of why hold on to life so vehemently if one has failed to 
ϐind anything valuable besides living itself. From this it follows that 
Gregory’s will to live is the most fundamental force of his existence.
The second category derives from Sigmund Freud’s essay enti-
tled “Two Principles of Mental Functioning” (1911). In this essay he 
introduces “the pleasure principle,” mostly referred to as “the will to 
pleasure”: “It is described as the pleasure-unpleasure [Lust-Unlust] 
principle, or more shortly the pleasure principle. These processes 
strive towards gaining pleasure; psychical activity draws back from 
any event which might arouse unpleasure.”6 Freud stresses that, as op-
posed to the pleasure principle, the reality principle is the ability of 
the mind to assess the happenings of the external world and to act ac-
cordingly. However, it is primarily the pleasure principle which draws 
up the programme of life’s purpose, even if it goes against rational-
ity as dictated by external reality. In Staring at the Sun, Uncle Leslie’s 
ϐigure exempliϐies the will to pleasure with his regular drinking, his 
6.  Qtd. in Simon Boag, The Freudian Repression, the Unconscious, and the Dynamics 
of Inhibition (London: Karnac Books, 2012), p. 29.
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devotion to golf, but most prominently with his escape to America at 
the start of the war, a move attributed by his family to his cowardice. 
On the basis of Freud’s work, bravery and acting on moral grounds go 
against gaining pleasure and, instead, involve selϐless acts of sacriϐice 
and compassion; therefore, both courage and acting on moral ideals 
belong under the unpleasure principle, as they fail to prioritize the self 
over others. Leslie’s cowardly behaviour, his commitment to pursuing 
worldly pleasures and his eventual ϐlight from the country give proof 
of the dominant role the will to pleasure plays in his character.
Even though “the will to power” is only the third category on the 
present list, it is one of the most widely-known drives. The will to 
power is a central concept in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, 
according to whom where there is some sort of life, there is will to 
power, due to which even the strongest living beings will risk their 
lives for more power: “And as the lesser surrenders itself to the greater, 
to have pleasure and power over the least: so too the greatest surren-
ders itself and for the sake of power stakes – life thereon.”7 In the battle 
for power, the stronger becomes the master of the weaker, insofar as 
the latter becomes unable to assert its independence. While explor-
ing the desire for power, Nietzsche connects man’s desire for cruelty 
with the pleasure of feeling power. The lines “[w]ar, of course, was 
men’s business. Men conducted it, and men – tapping out their pipes 
like headmasters – explained it” (17) ascribe exclusively male char-
acters to modern warfare. Moreover, this citation conveys the idea of 
men being the privileged ϐigures of authority and the providers of cer-
tainty regarding worldly matters. Along the same lines, Jean’s father is 
described as an authoritative ϐigure, who reads and explains the war 
proceedings and political crises to his wife and daughter. Michael’s, 
Jean’s husband’s, inability to understand Jean, his failure to restrain 
his temper and, eventually, his regular verbal and occasional physical 
abuse of his wife lead to Jean’s disappointment in men in general and 
to her dismissal of the potentiality of the male domain: “Men should 
be pitied, Jean thought; pitied, and left. Women were brought up to 
believe that men were the answer. They weren’t. They weren’t even 
one of the questions” (78). Furthermore, Sergeant Prosser is appar-
ently also driven by the will to power, as his speech primarily evokes 
the inhumane ruthlessness of war, while his person represents the 
perpetrator: “What I miss […] is killing Germans. I used to enjoy that. 
7.  Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, The Electronic Classics, 
trans. Thomas Common, p. 87, accessed 4 May 2013 <http://www2.hn.psu.edu/fa-
culty/jmanis/nietsche/tszarath.pdf>.
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Chasing them down until they were too low to bale out and then letting 
them have it. That gave me a lot of satisfaction” (26). His lack of moral 
responsibility manifests itself in how he is left unshaken by witnessing 
the deaths of his comrades. Nevertheless, his emotional numbness yet 
spontaneous outburst of feelings, “‘I’m sure I’ll ϐly again,’ he replied, 
as if giving the second half of a joke” (23), and eventual suicide are all 
symptoms of suffering from PTSD, demonstrating that he is not only a 
perpetrator but another victim of the war.
Finally, the concept of “the will to meaning” is based on 
Kierkegaard’s identical term, which was utilized by Viktor Frankl in 
the ϐield of psychology. After Freud's psychoanalysis and Adler's in-
dividual psychology, Frankl’s logotherapy was regarded as the Third 
Viennese School of Psychotherapy. In contrast to Adler’s Nietzschean 
doctrine of the will to power, logotherapy is founded upon the belief 
that the striving to ϐind meaning in one’s life is the primary and the 
most powerful driving force in man. In addition, this school attempts 
to make the patients fully aware of their “responsibility” by helping 
them to realize “for what, to what, or to whom he understands himself 
[or herself] to be responsible.”8 Along with critics like Guignery and 
Moseley, I believe that the most dominant drive of the main charac-
ters in Barnes’s ϐictional work is to gain meaning. The will to meaning 
manifests itself in the desire of both protagonists to ϐind answers to 
certain questions. As a young girl, Jean is preoccupied with the idea 
of revealing the mysteries of the world and, at the same time, she en-
joys her state of enchantment: “When she grew up, someone would 
explain the code to her; though in the meantime she felt quite happy 
not knowing” (7). Staring at the Sun narrates Jean’s slow disenchant-
ment, how her need for and belief in questions and their answers, as 
expressed in the passage “as she grew up, she would ϐind out the other 
answers. Answers to all sorts of questions” (14), are transformed into 
her insistence on the mere certainty of things: “Her ambitions were no 
longer speciϐically for happiness [...] but for something more general: 
the continuing certainty of things. She needed to know that she would 
carry on being herself” (125). However, her inquisitive and critical 
mind persists throughout her life of a hundred years. As a child she 
dwells on contradictions: “It seemed to her that you were in a position 
to ask a really correct question only if you already knew the answer, 
and what was the point in that?”(17). Yet, by her elderly years she is 
persistent in believing that all things have a course of their own which 
8.  Viktor Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning: An Introduction to Logotherapy, trans. 
Ilse Lasch (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992), p. 114.
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they should follow: “when she heard a story or watched a ϐilm, she 
cared much less whether the ending was happy or unhappy; she just 
wanted it to turn out properly, correctly, in accordance with its own 
logic” (125). Even though Jean deals with questions of less existential 
nature than does her son, it is she who embraces the indeterminability 
of things and accepts that the most important inquiries will never lead 
anywhere and that her quest for answers will never reach its end: “The 
serious questions always remained unanswered” (151).
Unlike his mother, Gregory is depicted as an indifferent child who 
grows up to be even more uncurious of the world. His inability to ϐind 
happiness is analogous to Jean’s problem with asking the right ques-
tions. As he is not capable of enjoying himself, he wonders how others 
ϐind joy in the world: “How could they know in advance where pleas-
ure lay?”(107). It is only in his sixties, when Gregory awakens to the 
inevitability of death, that this realization triggers two drives: ϐirst 
the will to live, as discussed earlier, and later the drive to make sense 
of his life, the will to meaning. His anxiety springs from his failure to 
ϐind meaning and is mirrored by his growing obsession with death. 
He turns toward religious belief in the hope of ϐinding something that 
would provide safe passage to an afterlife without experiencing the 
inevitable pain of death. The list of 15 alternative answers to “the God 
question” (162) and his inquires on the same matter from TAT, The 
Absolute Truth computer, reϐlect that his character wishes to approach 
spirituality and faith as such in an entirely intellectual manner. Sufϐice 
it to say, understanding, not to mention gaining, spiritual belief based 
on pure reason is paradoxical and, therefore, faith remains unattain-
able for him.
Mediocrity
Although Barnes scrutinises the psyche of the two protagonists, all the 
characters, along with Jean and Greg, are depicted as having limited 
insight into their own identities. Jean, for instance, rejects the idea that 
her inclination to travel to “somewhere, anywhere else” (85) is a sub-
stitute for some other desire, and she does not understand, or even 
contemplate, why she should explore the underlying reasons for her 
decision to see the world. The fact that even Gregory notices Jean’s 
unwillingness to consider her reasons for travelling is quite conspicu-
ous “[i]f you asked her why, she’d smile and say something about tick-
ing off the Seven Wonders. But that wasn’t why. And yet why didn’t 
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seem to bother her” (110). From among the disappointed reviewers of 
Staring at the Sun, it was perhaps Hamilton who criticized Jean’s char-
acter and commented on her apparently limited intelligence the most 
harshly: Jean “is portrayed as near-retarded, according to any conven-
tional deϐinition of brain power.”9 In the light of her uneventful adult 
life, visiting the Seven Wonders of the World gives her hope of experi-
encing, being affected by, these miraculous places, seeing an “ordinary 
miracle” (2) just like Prosser’s seeing the sun rise twice. Besides her 
reluctance to think about her motivation to travel, another instance of 
her incomprehensible disinterest is when, in her recollection of her 
childhood, she recalls how glad she felt at the outbreak of the war: 
“the war began […] Things had all been taken out of her hands; she 
no longer needed to feel guilty” (16). Jean does not elaborate, or feel 
the need to elaborate retrospectively, why this sense of guilt arose in 
her as a child. When the focalization shifts to Gregory, we move from 
one extreme to the other, since his character thrives on theorizing. The 
list of 15 alternatives regarding God and afterlife gives evidence of his 
obsession with death. Nevertheless, his interest remains in the private 
domain, as he is solely concerned with his own, individual well-being 
and cares little for others: “he would shift his gaze to the trafϐic below, 
to the wailing ϐlow of people quickly going to other places. He stared at 
them without envy” (85).
Even though Staring at the Sun stands out from the rest of Barnes’s 
early works due to thematic, structural and stylistic differences, the 
protagonists of the novel demonstrate one of the most prominent 
features of Barnes’s character construction: his main characters, just 
like Jean and Gregory, are the embodiments of mediocre anti-hero-
ism. Postmodern literature often exploits anti-heroic characters, who 
evolved from what Northrop Frye calls the hero of the low mimetic 
mode:
4. If superior neither to other men nor to his environment, the 
hero is one of us: we respond to a sense of his common human-
ity, and demand from the poet the same canons of probability 
that we ϐind in our own experience. This gives us the hero of the 
low mimetic mode, of most comedy and of realistic ϐiction.10
9.  Qtd. in Frederick M. Holmes, Julian Barnes, New British Fiction (Basingstoke; 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 147.
10.  Northrop Frye, Anatomy  of  Criticism:  Four  Essays (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1971), p. 34.
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While in realistic novels the characters’ relation to the external world 
is emphasised, modernist ϐiction focuses on the characters’ conscious-
ness, a feature maintained in postmodern ϐiction. The focus of post-
modernist narrative, however, shifts to ontological matters in terms of 
the author, the narrator and the characters themselves. Barnes utilizes 
all three modes of narrative conventions in his ϐiction, as both the ex-
ternal and internal worlds of the characters are depicted. In addition, 
self-reϐlexive inquiries can be found from both the narrator and the 
characters. Still, the unheroic nature and inadequacy of anti-heroes/
heroines are further emphasised by Barnes’s employment of medioc-
rity in designing his characters. Using mediocre protagonists as focal-
izers of the novels is a key element of Barnes’s idiosyncratic style.
Jean’s mediocrity, along with her son’s, permeates the plot of 
Staring at the Sun. Their ordinariness is stressed in three modes: in the 
eyes of others, through their passive nature and in their peculiar per-
spective of the world. First, Jean’s parents were keen to regularly re-
mind Jean of her average looks: “‘You’re not pretty, but you’ll do’” (19); 
her husband, Michael, having failed at consummating their marriage, 
uses the exact words of her parents to hide his disappointment with 
her: “We aren’t talking about it […] That’s enough now. You’ll do” (60). 
Gregory’s mediocre character is regularly reϐlected on by his mother 
continuing the habit of Jean’s parents: “No one could object to him; but 
no one had any particular reason for liking him” (84). His personality 
is usually described in free indirect speech: “He had girlfriends, but 
[…] never felt quite what he was expected to feel” (108), as only his 
mother shows true concern for him. Owing to the abundant display 
of free indirect speech, Staring at  the  Sun was criticized by scholars 
for having characters that serve as mere mouthpieces for ideas dis-
cussed in previous novels of Barnes. Yet the use of this rhetorical tool 
can serve other purposes, which will be further elaborated in the fol-
lowing subchapter. Jean’s wishes for her son not only predetermined 
his character, but also reϐlect her own fears that shape his personality:
she had all the normal wishes for her son […] But she had also 
seen enough to doubt all this […] And so Jean also wished for her 
son the negative things, the avoidances. May you avoid misery, 
poverty, disease. May you be unremarkable. May you do the best 
you can but not chase impossibilities. May you be safe within 
yourself. May you not get burnt, even once. (107)
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Accordingly, Gregory grows up to be a man of unremarkable talent, 
cold rationalism and indifference. His personality stems from his 
mother’s fears, most of which are based on experience other than her 
own; therefore, these fears can be seen as irrational. Even though Jean 
is depicted as a once open-minded young girl who was entertained 
by things she could not understand, her character never attempts to 
reach the impossible or to become remarkable. The last sentence of 
the quotation above is a clear reference to Prosser’s answer to her 
question with regard to Michael being a good future husband for her: 
“You’ve got to get burned once. Just try not to get burned twice” (38). 
Her wish for her son never to experience this poorly deϐined phenom-
enon comes true. Getting burned implies experiencing something 
devastating in Prosser’s and disappointing in Jean’s case (the war and 
having married Michael, respectively), which dramatically changes 
the individuals’ personality. Perhaps Gregory’s realization of the end-
less indecidability signalled by “[e]nough thoughts” (189) can be read 
as the third example of getting burnt. Hence, the passage following 
the quoted line will be returned to, as it is a key element in terms of 
Gregory’s character development underlining a change in his attitude 
towards the spiritual domain.
Secondly, the passivity of the two protagonists also undermines 
their ϐigures, especially when it is Jean herself who reϐlects retrospec-
tively on their lack of achievements: “She had done little in her time, 
Gregory had done less” (182). Even though Jean managed to leave her 
husband, which was certainly courageous of her to do, the reason she 
gives for staying with him for all those years – “I stay because eve-
rything says I should go, because it doesn’t make any sense, because 
it’s absurd” (117) – shows that her staying was not based on rational 
arguments and, therefore, her ϐlight cannot be read as an act of reason, 
nor as an act of courage. As already mentioned, Gregory is more of an 
observer than a participant of the world around him: “Other people’s 
lives, deaths and pleasures: they seemed increasingly mysterious to 
Gregory. He peered out at them through his horn-rimmed spectacles 
and wondered why they did the things they did” (110). Perhaps he is 
the least round or articulated character of the Barnesian oeuvre, which 
justly led the reviewers to doubt Gregory’s character and to assume 
that he served as a mask to conceal the author, who could then present 
his own thoughts on God and religion.
Third, the peculiar world view represented by the characters is 
rather symbolic of their inability to change their fates. Both characters 
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fail to shape their lives according to their needs, as they never realize 
what it is they actually desire; however, it is only Jean who realizes 
that her life was not chosen but that it simply happened to her: “Most 
people didn’t do anything […] you are allowed to think that adult life 
consists of a constant exercise of personal will […] Most of life is pas-
sive, the present a pinprick between an invented past and an imagined 
future” (182). Leading a meaningful life is a central issue for Jean in 
Staring at the Sun and the fear and the realization of life passing you by 
is actually a recurring motif in the entire Barnesian oeuvre. However, 
it is only Jean who openly admits having witnessed her life instead of 
having lived according to what she had once imagined. Her expecta-
tions are not met by what the world has to offer, and the text implies 
that her person lacks a certain characteristic vital for a prosperous life.
The Courage to Believe
As Guignery correctly points out, “Barnes named courage as the main 
theme of Staring at the Sun, and indeed courage and the lack of it, or 
fear, ϐigure prominently in the novel and take up several forms.”11 I con-
sider courage an even more prominent theme than fear, as the novel 
deals more with the various forms courage may take in the private and 
the public domain. Jean stresses the complex nature of the notion in 
her recollection with regard to the characters. According to Prosser, 
“You can’t talk about it. […] it isn’t the sensible thing” (47), while Uncle 
Leslie believes it is the opposite of “running away” and “being windy” 
(49). The female perspective is complemented by Rachel on this mat-
ter, who shows admiration of Jean having left her husband; it is said 
at this point that perhaps courage is “a matter of doing the obvious 
when other people saw it as unobvious” (127), whereas with regard 
to Rachel’s character it is deϐined as “to carry on believing all your life 
what you believed at the start of it” (181). Having visited Uncle Leslie 
at his deathbed, Jean once again revisits the concept of courage and 
concludes that “[p]erhaps courage in the face of death was only part 
of it; perhaps faking courage for those who loved you was the greater, 
higher courage” (192). Jean is so keen to deϐine this term as if courage 
were the single element by which one’s life could be judged as wor-
thy. Interestingly, believing in God or any divine reality is regarded to 
be simply nonsensical by Jean, even though it could be regarded as a 
form of being courageous, as it shares some features of courage listed 
11.  Guignery, p. 55.
Book-Barnes2.indb   124 2014.11.23.   21:15:53
125
above. Believing in a divine being or reality is far from being sensible 
in an age founded on science and technology, since belief or faith be-
longs to a purely spiritual world. Moreover, deciding to have faith in 
the modern secular age can be deϐinitely regarded as doing the unob-
vious instead of the obvious. Furthermore, “believing all your life what 
you believed at the start of it” (181) can refer to believing in not only 
a religious but also an enchanted world, which was advocated by Jean 
as a child. The multifaceted nature of courage symbolizes the indeter-
minability the characters face in the novel. Actually, the abundance of 
meaning assigned to such seemingly trivial concepts is frequently dis-
cussed explicitly or implicitly in other works of Barnes and in works of 
various postmodern writers. The crisis of meaning and referentiality 
manifests itself in the relativity of single concepts, an issue of inquiry 
present in most postmodern texts.
I would argue that the main characters, Jean and Gregory, remain 
on the level of mediocrity because they are unable to cast off their 
anxiety of uncertainty. While Jean, although disheartened, accepts 
that all the big questions remain unanswered, Gregory fails in mak-
ing peace with the state of uncertainty. Still, neither of them succeeds 
in embracing the indeterminability of things. Barnes’s text inherently 
refers to one particular form of eliminating this anxiety, and that is 
to take the courage to believe, which dovetails with the above men-
tioned courage motif. By acquiring the courage to believe, both central 
characters could act according to their desires instead of leading their 
lives determined by their fears. Jean is afraid of being disappointed 
once again and her fear is transmitted to Gregory who, probably due 
to his mother’s inϐluence, is unable to reach out and make meaning-
ful connections. Neither character can believe in matters outside their 
world: Jean needs empirical proof, whereas Gregory requires rational 
reasoning to believe in the existence of things. However, the courage 
to believe refers to believing in a world where miracles may happen 
alongside the world of the ordinary. The enchanted world does not 
defy the world governed by reason, it merely supplements the latter. 
Man can never get the world of enchantment under his control, as the 
very moment he would succeed, this world would cease to exist.
Courage to believe is implicit in Jean’s narrative: Jean experiences 
some form of sacred epiphany at the sight of the Grand Canyon which 
“stunned her into uncertainty” (98). She is unable to verbalize the feel-
ings and thoughts the sight of the canyon triggers. However, the free 
indirect speech that follows introduces the issue of religion in Jean’s 
discourse, which is also the ϐirst time religion arises as a matter of 
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inquiry in the novel: “It was said that one of the worst tragedies of the 
spirit was to be born with a religious sense into a world where belief 
was no longer possible. Was it an equal tragedy to be born without 
a religious sense into a world where belief was possible?” (99). This 
question enforces her image as an irreligious character who lacks the 
essential religious capability to embrace divine reality. Jean is unable 
to submerge herself in the idea of a world designed by a divine being 
because a world not based on reason but faith, a world that will remain 
hidden and impenetrable until you decide to believe in it, is inconceiv-
able for Jean. Her character always longed for answers that would pro-
vide certainty. In her elderly years, Jean wanted things to “turn out 
properly, correctly, in accordance with [their] own logic” (125); in 
other words, life should not defy her, her own logic and her cumulated 
knowledge of the world.
While his mother’s fear of disappointment is based on rational 
grounds, Gregory’s fear of death leads him to spiritual grounds by ask-
ing the questions “[i]s death absolute?”, “[i]s religion nonsense?”, “[i]s 
there a God?” (185). Jean’s fear of disappointment and Gregory’s fear 
of death derive from their anxiety of uncertainty, the main reason for 
their mediocre lives, since Jean lacks the will, while her son lacks the 
courage, to believe in a spiritual mode of existence. The Grand Canyon 
incident that “stunned her into uncertainty” (98) shows that Jean un-
derstands why people see a divine reality behind the world we live in, 
yet she does not wish to join their community. Jean fails to acquire the 
religious sense that could enable her to embrace the sacred; therefore, 
life for her is a series of incidents due to her blindness to the mystery 
of life. Her character epitomizes the spiritually disabled modern indi-
vidual who deϐies any religious view of life and suppresses the modern 
existential angst of man. Greg’s obsession with death and suicide is the 
manifestation of how the modern individual is consumed by this exis-
tentialist despair. His theorizing leads to an inϐinite number of possi-
bilities and alternatives of God scenarios and reaches a climactic point: 
“Enough thoughts. No more. […] Finally, you realized that question and 
answer were the same, that the one enclosed the other. Stop the loom, 
the futile chattering loom of human thought. Stare at the lighted win-
dow and just breathe” (189). This sudden halt implies either a sur-
render of his mind due to despair or a spiritual experience owing to a 
sudden epiphany. I propose the latter to be a more adequate reading 
of the section. Light has long been associated with the Divine Being, 
while inhalation suggests a shift from the cognitive to the bodily. The 
combination of Gregory’s earlier line of “[b]elief should just happen” 
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(188) and the line of “[s]tare at the lighted window and just breathe” 
evoke the concept of self-transcendence introduced to the English lit-
erary world by Aldous Huxley in the Epilogue of The Devils of Loudon. 
Gregory’s sudden spiritual awakening can be explained with the con-
cept of the divine reality as both immanent and transcendent. Aldous 
Huxley claimed that man is capable of ϐinding the divine being within 
himself: “man possesses a double nature, a phenomenal ego and an 
eternal Self, which is the inner man, the spirit, the spark of divinity 
within the soul. It is possible for a man, if he so desires, to identify 
himself with the spirit and therefore with the Divine Ground, which 
is of the same or like nature with the spirit.”12 Gregory’s experience 
evokes Jean’s epiphany at the Grand Canyon, owing to both characters’ 
sudden halt and the closely associated motifs of the sun and the light. 
Having said that, Grergory’s epiphany is left unelaborated and hence 
his spiritual awakening is debatable.
Staring at the Sun tells the story of Jean’s disenchantment; there-
fore, following their common traits, Gregory is expected to pass 
through the same stages of disillusionment. However, the slow disen-
chantment of Jean seems to trigger an inverse process in the narrative 
itself. The third part of the tripartite structure denies readerly expec-
tations on several levels, as both the mode of narration and the generic 
elements of the novel are altered. In terms of generic features, the 
novel “incorporate[s] elements of bildungsroman, historical ϐiction, 
political satire, and futuristic, speculative ϐiction.”13 The third chapter 
introduces the futuristic General Purpose Computer and TAT, both of 
which are conspicuously odd and raise more questions. The presence 
of different genres in the novel intensiϐies the tensions and contradic-
tions in the book. With the increasing use of free indirect speech noted 
earlier, the narrative becomes more blurred as the novel proceeds. 
According to Elena Semino, “FIS [free indirect speech] is typically as-
sociated with the creation of distancing effects with respect to the 
character whose speech is being represented.”14 This distancing effect 
may question or deny the characters’ insights, which in the case of Jean 
and Gregory undermines their faith in reason and their denial of the 
world as a place of miracle.
12.  Qtd. in George Woodcock, Dawn and the Darkest Hour: A Study of Aldous Huxley 
(Montréal: Black Rose Books, 2007), p. 5.
13.  Holmes, p. 124.
14.  Elena Semino, Representing  Characters’  Speech  and  Thought  in  Narrative  
Fiction (Lancaster: Lancaster Eprints), p. 12, accessed 25 October 2014 <http://ep-
rints.lancs.ac.uk/1238/1/England_England_Style_paper.pdf>.
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The abundance of personiϐications in the ϐinal scene also exempli-
ϐies the changed narrative style and depicts an enchanted world hidden 
from the eyes of reason. This ϐigure of speech is ingeniously placed here 
to imply the animate in the inanimate. Thus, the scene suggests the pres-
ence of the same Divine Reality that Gregory had partly experienced a 
few pages earlier. As the aeroplane gains height, Jean notices the Green 
Heaven, where as a child they had been “lying in Heaven and scream-
ing at the sky” (194). The screaming game symbolizes modern man’s 
irrational yearning for a holy Other; it is the manifestation of existen-
tial frustration intermingled with naive hope in the sacred. Jean’s strong 
self-discipline – “[s]he did not smile and she tried very hard not to blink” 
(195) – shows her acceptance of death. This ϐinal act of Jean’s deϐiance 
can be read as Barnes’s decision to abandon religion in his search for 
meaning. However, the abundance of personiϐications on the last pages 
of the novel is signiϐicant: “the sky now provided its own hand; four 
broad ϐingers of cloud” (194); “[t]he ϐingers of cloud no longer lay be-
tween her and the sun. They were face to face”; “earth did not greedily 
chase it [the sun], but lay ϐlatly back with its mouth open” (195). They 
reϐlect the insigniϐicance of human life in comparison to the grand cycles 
of nature. Moreover, the ϐinal paragraphs suggest a hidden enchanted 
world which the characters, along with the readers, are also part of: the 
realm of the Divine that is immanent and transcendent at once.
In contrast to the earlier description of the sun setting in the 
Grand Canyon, the lavishly described embrace of the sky, the sun and 
the earth are so overwhelming in their vividness that Jean’s spiritual 
resistance becomes irrelevant. Therefore, the reader, instead of admir-
ing Jean’s strength, only feels a sense of sorrow at her imminent death. 
Fuentes states that the main riddle posed in the novel is “are ordinary 
human beings condemned to ordinary, humdrum lives, or is there still 
a possibility of enchantment?”15, which is valid, yet in the light of my 
analysis the loss of man’s religious sense becomes more signiϐicant. 
By the end of the novel, the narrative has symbolically regained its 
mysticism and no longer conϐines itself to ordinary material reality. 
The ending of the book stuns the reader into uncertainty regarding the 
nonexistence of the transcendental instead of reassuring Jean’s cer-
tainty in the nothingness behind the glow of the sun.
15.  Carlos Fuentes, “The Enchanting Blue Yonder,” New York Times Book Review 92 
(12 April 1987), p. 3.
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Miklós Mikecz
 Personal  as  National/National  as  
Personal
Interactions  between  Narrative  Strands  in  Julian  
Barnes’s England, England
“I do not believe in God but I miss him,”1 begins Julian Barnes’s Nothing 
to be Frightened of (2008), a memoir about death, religion, and mor-
tality. This opening sentence does more than expressing the author’s 
vexed relationship with God; the image of a non-believer longing 
for belief eloquently captures the peculiar type of sentiment that is 
Barnes’s own, almost his trademark feature. Few would deny that the 
bread and butter of Barnes’s works are irony and scepticism, question-
ing, if not ridiculing, apparently stable notions such as truth, memory, 
and history in a playful and sophisticated manner. Yet, apart from the 
overarching sense of cynicism that characterizes Barnes’s authorial 
conduct, one can also ϐind a humane warmth at the heart of his works 
that sometimes verges on sentimentality. 
One of the possible answers for the emotionally touching aspects 
of Barnes’s prose might lie in the speciϐic treatment of his characters. 
To explain, his novels are populated with characters full of uncertainty 
and doubt in a seemingly meaningless world, where all the reassuring 
guidelines of the past seem to be stripped of their relevance. Yet, what 
often accompanies these characters’ existential anxiety is a strong 
sense of longing for a ϐirm conviction regarding the existence of an 
irrefutable truth that could govern their lives. As Matthew Pateman 
writes, all books of Barnes “have characters who are striving for some 
way of ϐinding meaning in an increasingly depoliticized, secularized, 
localized, and depthless world.”2 Therefore, to reformulate the open-
ing sentence of Nothing to be Frightened of, Barnes might give the im-
pression that he does not believe in universal meaning and unwaver-
ing truth, but he sorely misses them, thus creating his characters in 
1. Julian Barnes, Nothing to be Frightened of (London: Random House, 2008), p. 1.
2. Matthew Pateman, Julian Barnes, Writers and Their Work (Horndon: Northcote 
House, 2002), p. 2.
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a way to be in constant pursuit of personal meaning and inner truth, 
even if such endeavours often prove to be unfruitful.
This is especially true in the case of Barnes’s England, England3 
(1998), since it casts its protagonist, Martha Cochrane, as a cynical 
sceptic hardened by life, who nevertheless believes in the idea that 
happiness is attainable for her through the search for a meaning that 
would elucidate her private life. However, the protagonist’s quest 
throughout the novel for truth about herself is only half of the st ory 
and, in fact, it is the less spectacular strand of the novel: England, 
England is more readily recognized as the story recounting the out-
landish project of building an enormous leisure resort on the theme 
of England, in which the replicas of all the characteristic places and 
natural sights of the country, as well as the enactments of the vari-
ous decisive events in English history, are presented together in order 
to convey the essence of Englishness. For those for whom England, 
England is about this story, the novel is a farcical take on the tangled 
relationship between the original and the constructed as it pertains 
to the identity of an England that seeks to deϐine itself through its 
supposedly authentic traditions, yet constantly has to confront the 
possibility that those traditions are no more than mere inventions of 
a hazy past.
However, as already indicated, the novel is not only a story about 
Englishness but also the private story of the protagonist. As Barnes 
says in an interview,
[t]here are these disparities and opposing extremes running 
through the book between the public and the private, between 
the fake and the authentic. […] And what’s happening in the pub-
lic story is the creation of something that is completely false and 
what’s going on in the private story is the search for some sort of 
inner truth about life and love.4
In simpliϐied terms, the novel is in fact two novels or, more precisely, 
two narrative strands in one text. Seemingly, the two narrative layers 
intersect each other only at the rarest of occasions, since their stylistic 
registers are fundamentally different: the public story of the Project 
is farcical, satirical, comic and thoroughly suffused with irony, while 
3.  All parenthesized references are to this edition: Julian Barnes, England, England 
(London: Picador, 1998).
4.  Qtd. in Frederick M. Holmes, Julian Barnes, New British Fiction (Basingstoke; 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 93.
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Martha’s private biography is more serious, melancholic, emotional, 
philosophical, often moving and occasionally sad. As regarding their 
relation to each other, the public story is placed in the foreground and 
the private story seems to play only a secondary role. However, closer 
scrutiny can reveal that the novel contains passages which are sug-
gestive of subdued, nevertheless palpable relations between Martha’s 
story and the story related to England and Englishness. Therefore, 
the aim of the present essay is to investigate various instances of in-
terpenetration between the private and the public stories within the 
novel, to assess the consequences of these narrative strategies, and to 
prove that the text contains traces of a closer proximity between these 
two layers.
England, England utilizes a conventional tripartite structure that 
encloses a large middle part with a prologue and an epilogue. The pro-
logue concentrates on the childhood memories of Martha and it is her 
private story that dominates this section, while the much larger middle 
part ϐleshes out the realization of the grandiose plan of Sir Jack Pitman, 
which, for the most part, is concerned with telling the public story of 
the novel. Martha is employed by Pitman to fulϐil the position of the 
“Appointed Cynic,” whose acidic remarks are expected to make a cer-
tain contribution to the development of the Project, as it is simply re-
ferred to. Eventually, the original plan of the Project to offer the replica 
of the real thing in a compressed version on the Isle of Wight slowly 
gives way to the birth of a new country called England, England. During 
the arduous process of assembling the mini-country, Martha develops 
a romantic relationship with another employee, Paul Harrison and, 
due to an unexpected chain of events, the couple manages to outplay 
Pitman through blackmail and force him to resign. While Martha be-
comes the CEO of the establishment, her relationship with Paul even-
tually deteriorates to such an extent that Pitman manages to convince 
Paul to become an ally in undermining Martha’s leadership. The ploy 
proves to be successful, thus leaving Martha with no other option but 
to quit. The epilogue is set in a future England that has collapsed due 
to the overarching success of its replica, England, England. Once again, 
this section concentrates on the private story of Martha, yet one can 
also ϐind relatively large portions of text concerned with adding the 
ϐinal touches to the public story by describing the concrete details of 
the downfall of “Old England.” This desolate, pre-industrial country 
becomes the home for the aged Martha, who is depicted as stoically 
observing the ϐirst steps of the fallen country rebuilding itself by the 
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invention of new myths and traditions, just as the Project did on the 
Isle of Wight.
The prologue, entitled “England,” is dedicated to the portrayal of 
the protagonist’s reminiscences of her childhood and starts off with 
a series of loosely connected ruminations on the nature of personal 
memories. Martha is shown to mistrust her memories because of their 
self-deceptive nature, since “a memory was by deϐinition not a thing, 
it was […] a memory. A memory now of a memory a bit earlier of a 
memory before that of a memory way back then” (3). Furthermore,
if a memory wasn’t a thing but a memory of a memory of a mem-
ory, mirrors set in parallel, then what the brain told you now 
about what it claimed had happened then would be coloured by 
what had happened in between. It was like a country remember-
ing its history: the past was never just the past, it was what made 
the present able to live with itself. The same went for individu-
als, though the process wasn’t straightforward. (6)
Even at this early stage of the novel, one can see an instance of bring-
ing into close proximity the private and the public domains as per-
sonal memories are likened to the remembrance that a country might 
have regarding its own history. Undoubtedly, this comparison partially 
functions as a device of foreshadowing the later stages of the text 
when Englishness and the history of England as major themes would 
come into the forefront. One can ϐind numerous instances of this type 
of foreshadowing in the prologue that, at least in principle, should 
only be concerned with the tentative recollection of Martha’s intimate 
childhood memories. Yet the prologue is also scattered sparsely with 
motifs related to England, which intrude repeatedly into Martha’s 
reminiscences: the vivid depiction of a typically English Agricultural 
Show that Martha visited with her parents; the particular manner in 
which Martha was taught the subject of History in her primary school; 
and, most memorably, the memories related to a Counties of England 
jigsaw puzzle that Martha used to play with as a child. The latter is by 
far the most often cited and analysed passage in the book:
she would get to the end [of ϐinishing the puzzle] and a piece 
would be missing. Leicestershire, Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire, 
Warwickshire, Staffordshire – it was usually one of them – 
whereupon a sense of desolation, failure, and disappointment at 
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the imperfection of the world would come upon her, until Daddy, 
who always seemed to be hanging around at this moment, 
would ϐind the missing piece in the unlikeliest place. What was 
Staffordshire doing in his trouser pocket? How could it have got 
there? Had she seen it jump? Did she think the cat put it there? 
And she would smile her Nos and head-shakes at him, because 
Staffordshire had been found, and her jigsaw, her England, and 
her heart had been made whole again. (5–6)
These memories of the missing pieces gain increasing signiϐicance in 
the light of what is going to happen: the disappearance of Martha’s 
father who leaves behind his family for good and whose act of betrayal 
coincides with the disappearance of the piece of Nottinghamshire, 
rendering Martha’s puzzle permanently incomplete. What Martha as 
a child can deduce from all of this is that “Daddy had gone off to ϐind 
Nottinghamshire” and “he’d be back and all would be well again” (14).
The location of Nottinghamshire on the map of England is quite 
signiϐicant: it sits right at the centre of it, at the very heart of it all. The 
missing piece comes to signal the trauma that Martha suffers upon the 
loss of her father, who had left her behind with a sign of lack, leaving a 
“fretsaw-cut hole within her” (24). Yet again, this jigsaw image might 
be regarded as a narrative device of foreshadowing which provides 
the reader a passage that can be argued to contain in a condensed 
form the basic tenets of the main theme of the novel that would be 
duly demonstrated later on its ensuing pages. As already mentioned, 
the elaboration of this central theme involves the satirical portrayal 
of endeavours to assemble a mini-sized replica of England that goes 
along with insinuating doubts about the authenticity of established 
notions concerning the history of England and Englishness in general. 
This strategy gives way to a growing sense of awareness about the 
duplicities involved in the social and cultural make-up of England as 
a nation-state. The identity of the country comes to be represented 
as a construct with an overall structure that is made possible by vari-
ous inventions and distortions of such an extent that there seems to 
be no real essence of the country that could be unearthed. Instead, 
one is presented with disarray and supplied with countless individ-
ual fragments that do not add up to a coherent picture that would be 
wholly original and not copied partially from elsewhere. The fragmen-
tary state of Martha’s jigsaw map of England comes to correspond to 
the fragmentary state of England’s identity that was assumed to be 
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authentic. The incomplete jigsaw map that signiϐies the protagonist’s 
private loss and the incoherence caused by the lack of an ultimate deϐi-
nition of Englishness are, therefore, mirroring each other. The loss of 
the father that generates an all-encompassing mistrust of the world 
for the protagonist might be seen as a metaphor for the loss of belief 
in the capacity of one’s fatherland, in this case England, to provide one 
with the means to unearth, or at least to construct a representation of, 
the essence of the country.
The desired effect of the jigsaw passage is to evoke nostalgic feel-
ings for a lost innocence in the reader, for a sense of wholeness that 
is now fractured to pieces. The image might be regarded to express 
one’s sentiments upon the realization that the identity of one’s own 
country is far from being uniϐied; in fact, it is composed of a plethora 
of differing and therefore contesting voices. In this scheme, the role 
of national traditions is to act as a remedy to the excess of different 
perspectives. In addition, what is highly peculiar in the jigsaw image 
is that it emphasizes fragmentariness and disunity along with the 
wholeness and the unity that reside in its poetic economy. The jigsaw 
image establishes various metaphoric links within the novel in such an 
explicit manner and with such conspicuous potential that it comes to 
be increasingly close to being somewhat obtrusive in its obviousness. 
Consider the conjoining of the italicized phrases in the following sen-
tence: “because Staffordshire had been found, her jigsaw, her England, 
and her heart had been made whole again” (6, emphasis added). No 
wonder that virtually every critic assigns crucial signiϐicance to the 
image and expresses an opinion about what it might signify, and, in 
doing so, quite dissimilar interpretations are created. Sebastian Groes 
and Peter Childs, when discussing the gaps and omissions that are so 
characteristic of Barnes’s novels, maintain that the missing piece ob-
tains an enigmatic status in the overall economy of the novel: “on its 
part, England, England rests on the missing jigsaw piece at the heart 
of Martha’s map of Britain.”5 Matthew Pateman writes that the image 
“is a handy metaphor for the idea of a country being constructed, 
arbitrarily divided into administrative centres, historically open to 
change.”6 Dominic Head states that the “[l]oss of faith in the Counties 
of England jigsaw, with its bald certitude about the composition of 
5.  Sebastian Groes and Peter Childs, “Julian Barnes and the Wisdom of Uncertainty,” 
in Julian Barnes, Contemporary Critical Perspectives, eds. Sebastian Groes and Peter 
Childs (London; New York: Continuum, 2011), 1–10, p. 9.
6.  Pateman, p. 76.
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England, signals a haziness about origins.”7 Vanessa Guignery asserts 
that the “image provides a metaphor for the essence of history and 
memory, whose wholeness is a mere illusion.”8 For Barbara Korte, the 
jigsaw puzzle is “an obvious image for the postmodern idea that all 
nations are constructs.”9 Richard Bradford's reading of the image is 
even more peculiar; he dismisses the obvious interpretive potentials 
by maintaining that “from a hand much less subtle than Barnes’s such 
a passage might beg for explanation, the unpicking of registers of pri-
vate loss from the broader fabric of a fragmented, forgotten nation.”10 
As it seems, Bradford cannot accept at face value such a suspiciously 
straightforward and overtly direct metaphor that links private matters 
and the state of England in a compact, uniϐied form, because such a 
possibility would be at odds with Barnes’s skills as an author. But, per-
haps, there exists a way other than defending Barnes and surmising 
that the author’s intention must have been something altogether dif-
ferent from what seems to be the case. Barnes’s intention might well 
have been to give an impression of not being subtle at all. Accordingly, 
one could approach the problem of the interpretation of the image 
by following the internal logic of the text and reminding oneself that 
the passage presents one of Martha’s memories, and the reason why 
it is constructed so blatantly and is granted such a central position 
is because the overall recollection of the protagonist’s childhood in 
the prologue is done from the perspective of the adult Martha. “We 
invent, ransack and reorder our childhood,”11 as Barnes himself says 
in the interview already quoted. Therefore, the blatancy of the jigsaw 
image might be explicable by it being the product of such a reorder-
ing process; in other words, the product of the creation of a personal 
myth that functions to show how the early childhood of Martha in fact 
anticipated the later events in her life, especially her involvement with 
the Project to disassemble and then reassemble England on a smaller 
scale. It might easily be the case that Barnes, once again, plays an elab-
7.  Dominic Head, The Cambridge Introduction to Modern British Fiction, 1950–2000 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 120.
8.  Vanessa Guignery, The  Fiction  of  Julian  Barnes:  A  Reader’s  Guide  to  Essential  
Criticism, Readers’ Guides to Essential Criticism (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006), p. 106.
9.  Barbara Korte, “Julian Barnes’s England, England: Tourism as a Critique of Post-
modernism,” in The Making of Modern Tourism: The Cultural History of the British Expe-
rience, 1600–2000, eds. Hartmut Berghoff, Barbara Korte, Ralf Schneider, Christopher 
Harvie (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 285–304, pp. 288–9.
10.  Richard Bradford, “Julian Barnes’s England, England and Englishness,” in Julian 
Barnes, Contemporary Critical Perspectives, 92–102, p. 100.
11.  Qtd. in Holmes, p. 92.
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orate game with the reader and deliberately includes the jigsaw image 
in his text in this particularly obvious manner in order to demonstrate 
his own maxim that childhood memories cannot be taken as innocent 
facts but are products of acts of recollection, since various distorting 
processes are always involved. In our case, the memory lends an en-
compassing priority to a (reconstructed) event from the past that ex-
plains in its own way the present circumstances, which happens to be 
the major theme of the book.
If the above interpretation seemed a little too speculative, then 
there exists an even more complex interpretative possibility, accord-
ing to which the jigsaw image could be seen as a manifestation of 
Barnes’s frequently mentioned self-reϐlexive style. In this case, Barnes 
emphasizes the central theme of the work – namely the inevitably con-
structed nature of all narratives pertaining to notions or identities – by 
an act of using a blatantly construed image to comment upon the fabri-
cated nature of his own text. In other words, the image serves to stress 
the idea that his novel is not an exception; it is the result of multifari-
ous constructions, similar to the identity of England that it portrays. 
Admittedly, this line of argumentation may be too speculative for its 
own good, as it attempts to present an assumed shortcoming of the 
text as its strength. Nevertheless, these speculative endeavours to ex-
plain an innocent image prove a very important point, namely that the 
jigsaw image powerfully suggests its own crucial importance in any 
interpretation of the novel as a whole.
The large middle section of the novel, entitled “England, England,” 
is undoubtedly the motor of the whole narrative, recounting the subse-
quent stages of the assembly of the leisure resort as well as the phases 
of the romantic relationship that develops between Martha and Paul. 
While the public story on the larger scale and the private story that is 
restricted to the relationship of the couple are unfolding side-by-side, 
the two narrative layers intersect only on two occasions. The ϐirst oc-
curs near the end of the section when Martha’s relationship with Paul 
already starts to falter and she ϐinds numerous things that she cannot 
share with him. In order to understand Martha’s line of thought, which 
is fundamentally about her own nature, identity and self, one must be 
familiar with certain episodes that happen prior to this scene. The ϐirst 
such episode depicts a conference room meeting where Sir Jack and 
his employees, including Martha and Paul, discuss nature as opposed 
to urban surroundings. Consider Sir Jack’s opinion on the subject:
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I stood on a hill the other day and looked down an undulating 
ϐield past a copse towards a river and as I did so a pheasant 
stirred beneath my feet. You, as a person passing through, would 
no doubt have assumed that Dame Nature was going about her 
eternal business. I knew better, Mark. The hill was an Iron Age 
burial mound, the undulating ϐield a vestige of Saxon agricul-
ture, the copse was a copse only because a thousand other trees 
had been cut down, the river was a canal and the pheasant had 
been hand-reared by a gamekeeper. We change it all, Mark, the 
trees, the crops, the animals. And now, follow me further. That 
lake you discern on the horizon is a reservoir, but when it has 
been established a few years, when ϐish swim in it and migrating 
birds make it a port of call, when the treeline has adjusted itself 
and little boats ply their picturesque way up and down it, when 
these things happen it becomes, triumphantly, a lake, don’t you 
see? It becomes the thing itself. (60–1)
Therefore, according to Sir Pitman’s argument, the countryside he 
was visiting, contrary to its appearance, was and is continuously con-
structed by culture and society; nature, instead of being a source of 
pure origins, is merely a man-made construct. The process is depicted 
to work even further: an artiϐicial segment of the landscape, a reser-
voir can turn into a lake as if it were the product of completely natural 
processes. Hence, the opposition between nature and culture is pre-
sented to be increasingly ambiguous and entirely arbitrary.
The second scene that will be important to understand Martha’s 
reasoning about her identity involves a conversation with Dr Max, the 
Ofϐicial Historian of the Project, by whom she is told that a patch of 
wetland near them is speciϐically designed to discourage certain birds 
from approaching the area. After she asks Paul whether he thinks that 
people are like that patch of land, that is, “[t]he whole business of who 
you … click with and who you don’t” (136), her conclusion is that peo-
ple might indeed be like that and “you could say there is a pattern, but 
it’s one we don’t know, or can’t understand. That there is something 
guiding us without our knowing” (137).
Therefore, human nature is also conceived as being constructed 
and speciϐically designed according to a set of so far unknown princi-
ples. When listing the things that she cannot tell Paul, Martha thinks, 
among others, the following thoughts. Notice her ideas regarding her 
own nature and identity:
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These were some of the things she was unable to say:
— that none of it was his fault;
— that despite Dr Max’s historical scepticism, she believed in hap-
piness;
[…]
— but […] her happiness depended on being true to yourself;
— true to your nature;
— that is, true to your heart;
— but the main problem, life’s central predicament, was, how did 
you know your own heart?;
— and the surrounding problem was, how did you know what your 
nature was?;
— that most people located their nature in childhood
[...]
— here was a photo of herself when young, frowning against the 
sun and sticking out her lower lip: was this her nature or only 
her mother’s poor photography?;
— but what if this nature was no more natural than the nature Sir 
Jack had satirically delineated after a walk in the country?;
— because if you were unable to locate your nature, your chance of 
happiness was surely diminished;
— or what if locating your nature was like locating a patch of wet-
land, whose layout remained mysterious, and whose workings 
indecipherable?;
— that despite favourable conditions, and lack of encumbrances, 
and despite the fact that she thought she might love Paul, she 
had not felt happy. (226–7)
Martha comes to question the natural foundations of her identity 
when her doubts about her childhood as a source of truth arise again 
in the same way as she was shown to mistrust her memories in gen-
eral. Martha is depicted to seriously entertain the idea that her iden-
tity is fabricated, much like the countryside Sir Jack was walking in 
or that patch of wetland that has a certain conceptual design that Dr 
Max was talking about. Therefore, the central theme of the public story 
regarding the constructed and invented nature of the nation-state of 
England is conjoined with the emerging theme of Martha’s private 
story, namely the possibly constructed nature of her identity.
It is at the very end of the section that the narrative truly reveals 
Martha’s thoughts on the Project, after she has been betrayed by Paul 
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and forced to resign from her post as CEO and leave the Isle of Wight. 
The scene takes place in the church of St Aldwyn “in one of the few 
parts of the Island still unclaimed by the Project” (218), where Martha 
goes in the hope to ϐind salvation “among the remnants of a greater, 
discarded system of salvation” (236). The text presents Martha’s 
stream of consciousness split into two inner voices conducting a ϐierce 
debate about “a recognition that life, despite everything, has a capacity 
for seriousness,” which leads to the proposition that “life must be more 
serious if it has a structure, if there is something larger out there than 
yourself” (236). According to the side of Martha that argues for this 
idea, “[l]ife is more serious, and therefore better, and therefore bear-
able, if there is some larger context” (237). Sickened by the sham she 
helped to develop, and even governed for a while, as well as hurt by the 
failed relationship which drove her to the conclusion that maybe “love 
was not the answer for her” (227), Martha is portrayed as longing for 
an idealized past where the certainty about one’s position in the world 
as well as one’s relation to it could be taken for granted. This side of 
her maintains that if life has no pattern to it, “[i]f life is a triviality, then 
despair is the only option” (236). The cynical side of Martha mocks 
such statements and calls them instances of “sentimental yearning” 
(237), as “[b]rittle cynicism is a truer response to the modern world” 
(237). In her most important thought, Martha concludes that “[a]n in-
dividual’s loss of faith and a nation’s loss of faith” (237) are more or 
less the same, the text once again making obvious parallels between 
the private and the public domains. Martha is referring to herself and 
to her own absence of faith, which she compares to the present state 
of England: “Look what happened to England. Old England. It stopped 
believing in things. Oh, it still muddled along. It did OK. But it lost se-
riousness” (237).
Indeed, one is faced here with the pressing dilemma of what is to 
be done if it turns out that certain notions and concepts are no longer 
trustworthy: is it possible to continue to believe in them in any form 
or manner, even if their incoherence cannot be denied any more? 
Martha’s answer is surprisingly harsh: some larger context is neces-
sary for life to be better, even if that context “is arbitrary and cruel, 
even if its laws are false and unjust” (237). Martha’s cynical side re-
sponds to this by alluding to such sins of the past as the Inquisition or 
the great dictators. Eventually, the “sentimental” side of Martha gives 
up, believing that one is no longer capable of talking about things like 
these, since, as she reasoned earlier, “the words, the serious words, 
Book-Barnes2.indb   139 2014.11.23.   21:15:54
140
have been used up over the centuries […] [t]he words don’t seem to ϐit 
the thoughts nowadays” (237). Her resolution to solve the issue is to 
forget words altogether, or, as she says to herself, “[l]et the words run 
out, Martha” (238).
At this point, the text brings up the image of the “Heavens to Betsy” 
incident that was the basis for the logo of the entire Project, based on 
the supposedly real story of an English woman in the nineteenth cen-
tury who was swept off a cliff by the wind but, thanks to her umbrella 
and her undergarments which acted as parachutes, she was miracu-
lously saved and landed safely:
Into her mind came an image, one shared by earlier occupants of 
these pews. Not Guilliamus Trentinus, of course, or Anne Potter, 
but perhaps known to Ensign Robert Timothy Pettigrew, and 
Christina Margaret Benson, and James Thorogood and William 
Petty. A woman swept and hanging, a woman half out of this 
world, terriϐied and awestruck, yet in the end safely delivered. 
A sense of falling, falling, falling, which we have every day of our 
lives, and then an awareness that the fall was being made gen-
tler, was being arrested, by an unseen current whose existence 
no-one suspected. A short, eternal moment that was absurd, im-
probable, unbelievable, true. Eggs cracked from the slight con-
cussion of landing, but nothing more. The richness of all subse-
quent life after that moment.
Later the moment had been appropriated, reinvented, cop-
ied, coarsened; she herself had helped. But such coarsening al-
ways happened. The seriousness lay in celebrating the original 
image: getting back there, seeing it, feeling it. [...] Part of you 
might suspect that the magical event had never occurred, or at 
least not as it was now supposed to have done. But you must 
also celebrate the image and the moment even if it had never 
happened. That was where the little seriousness of life lay. (238)
The event that served as a basis for the logo of the Project appears in 
this passage in a remarkably different light. Although the image was 
made to stand as the emblem for a falsiϐied and copied England, here it 
is made to be devoid of the grossly inappropriate connotations that its 
connection to the Project would entail. Martha recognizes herself in the 
terriϐied woman of the image and, in her emotional despair, she seeks 
consolation in the possibility that, after all, she can be saved as well. 
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The image represents in its purity a possibility of hope and redemp-
tion as well as a partial answer to Martha’s question regarding the lost 
seriousness of life. The larger context that Martha was depicted to long 
for appears here in the form of an extraordinary moment that is capa-
ble of convincing one about the possibility of a life-altering change that 
can save one from anguish, that is, the sense of falling “which we have 
every day of our lives” (238).
At this point of the narration the story of the Project and Martha’s 
story meet for a second time and merge through the inclusion of this 
particular image. The Project exploited the image of the falling woman 
with an open umbrella to create a catchy logo for its enterprise. Sir 
Jack exclaimed with joy upon hearing the story behind the image: “I 
love it. I don’t believe a word of it, but I love it. It’s here and it’s magic 
and we can make it into now” (122). Similarly, Martha exploits the 
symbolic potential of the image to create for herself a meaningful, if 
disillusioned narrative with an accompanying explanation, namely 
that authenticity plays no part in the contemplation and celebration 
of such extraordinary moments and images. What does matter is that 
such moments and images can offer a means of enriching one’s life, 
aiding one in overcoming obstacles, and helping to feel closer to those 
generations of the past for whom these moments and images meant 
something similarly personal. If Martha could not ϐind the answers she 
was looking for, and if she is unable to relocate the lost seriousness of 
life, at least here, with the help of this image, she ϐinds some sort of 
solace. The image connects the Project’s search for self-identity and 
Martha’s search for personal meaning, thereby merging in a subtle 
manner the public and the private stories.
The last section of the novel, entitled “Albion,” portrays Old 
England in a state of collapse: Anglia, as it is called now, is depicted as a 
nation-state that had reverted to its own rural, pre-industrialized past, 
a “place of yokeldom and willed antiquarianism” (254). Once again, 
the childhood memories of Martha involving the Counties of England 
jigsaw puzzle seem to anticipate in their own way speciϐic events that 
would occur later in the novel:
Her mother told her less often that men were either wicked or 
weak. She told her instead that women had to be strong and look 
after themselves because nobody else could be relied upon to do 
it for them.
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In response to this, Martha made a decision. Each morning, 
before leaving for school, she pulled the jigsaw box from be-
neath her bed, opened the lid with her eyes closed, and took out 
a county. […] On the bus, she would reach behind her and push 
the county down the back of the seat. […] There were about ϐifty 
counties to dispose of, and so it took her almost the whole term. 
She threw the sea and the box into the dustbin. (17)
The image of Martha as a child progressively getting rid of the pieces 
of the puzzle can be easily regarded as a metaphor for the decline of 
Old England that had “progressively shed power, territory, wealth, in-
ϐluence and population” (251) and, at its endpoint, had terminated its 
“old administrative division into counties” (253) to replace them by 
provinces “based upon the kingdoms of the Anglo-Saxon heptarchy” 
(253). Martha’s decision to throw away the pieces of the puzzle piece-
meal was born out of learning from her mother that she had to be 
strong on her own because her father would never come back to bring 
with him the missing piece that would complete the puzzle and, even 
more importantly, to make the family once again a uniϐied whole. The 
discarding of the puzzle pieces is the sign of the full apperception of 
her loss, although she does not know “whether she was meant to re-
member or to forget the past” (17).
England’s decay, on the other hand, is partially the result of its 
unsuccessful attempt to compete with its replica, England, England, 
that took away the distinctive features of Englishness from the origi-
nal country to such an extent that “Old England had lost its history, 
and therefore – since memory is identity – had lost all sense of itself” 
(251). The image of the gradual disposal of the pieces of the jigsaw 
puzzle and the description of the steady disintegration of England are 
echoing each other, as both events were triggered by a sense of loss; 
no matter how toned down, there exists a metaphoric connection be-
tween this speciϐic episode of Martha’s private (hi)story and the latest 
stage of the public history of England.
Once again, one might stipulate that the reason Martha remem-
bers this action of hers so vividly can be explained by the fact that it re-
minds her of the decline of England, yet such a line of argument, once 
again, would remain a speculation. Nevertheless, the text portrays the 
slow disintegration of England twice: entirely ϐiguratively at ϐirst, as 
the pieces of the jigsaw England are gradually discarded, but quite lit-
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erally the second time, since England as a nation-state is depicted as 
falling apart.
All of the above examples prove that there are indeed palpable 
connections between the personal and the national or public levels 
within the novel. The question of what purpose they serve from the 
point of view of the narrative remains. One of the possible answers is 
that these passages of the novel function to bring into closer proximity 
the two stories of the novel in order to increase cohesion in the narra-
tive. In this way, the novel provides the reader with several points of 
connection between the otherwise separate narrative domains, which 
helps one to connect the several disparate themes and create an inter-
pretation of the novel as a uniϐied whole.
The more problematic answer is that they emphasize the possibil-
ity that meaningful correlation does exist between the inner workings 
of the individual and the mechanisms of society at large. Yet, all of the 
connections between the private and the public within the novel are 
elaborate constructions engendered by the narrative to provide the 
reader with a sense of unity, a unity which is quite duplicitous. Take, 
for instance, the much analysed jigsaw image. The missing piece signi-
ϐies loss experienced by the individual and loss related to the coun-
try as a whole, which, according to the novel, is the loss of faith in a 
straightforwardly meaningful existence, both in terms of private and 
public lives. Thus, unity between the personal and the public level is 
achieved only to give expression to the reign of disunity, symbolized 
by the doubly signiϐicant missing piece. In other words, unity in form 
is used to express disunity in content. One can observe the same phe-
nomenon in all of the other instances as well. Consider the view that 
nature in the sense of the material world is a social construct surpris-
ingly similar to human nature and individual identity: the chief mean-
ing that can be excavated from these two pieces of observation is that 
they correlate. Once again, one is presented with harmonious narra-
tive unity that masks potentially disharmonious relativism.
“I do not believe in God but I miss him,”12 writes Barnes. It seems 
that he does not believe in solid meaning either but he does seem to 
miss it, at least as demonstrated by his tendency to wrap ambiguities 
and ambivalences in nicely formed, seemingly symmetrical structures 
that emanate a sense of unity and suggest stable meaning. This ten-
dency is given expression through a variety of examples in England, 
England. These examples aptly demonstrate Barnes’s talent for arrang-
12.  Barnes, Nothing, p. 1.
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ing patterns of unity that are capable of achieving their artistic effect 
despite the overall sense of doubt that pervades the novel. Barnes’s 
insistence on creating structures of unity that are in contrast with the 
postmodern relativism of his texts might be one of the decisive fea-
tures of his prose that set him apart as an author from other contem-
porary writers of British ϐiction.
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Epilogue: 
The Barnesian Text




Not that you believe in autonomous subjects or you are interested spe-
ciϐically in the ones you take. Just take any two. By the time you ϐinish 
your work, they will resemble you anyway.
If you are not happy with them, one of your subjects might as well be 
an object. A piece of jigsaw puzzle. My two suitcases. Or the parrot.
If there are no suitable subjects or objects around, take their memory. 
Their ϐirst memory. That will surely help you start posing your ques-
tions. About those heavy topics.
Pose them.
Take two subjects.
In the pale orange light of your questions – let them pose.
Eszter Szép
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The Barnesian text is open; it is self-contradictory, multifaceted, meta-
phorical and ironic.
You never know where you are in it but you know you will be reminded 
of your uncertain location by strong intratextual markers reinforcing 
textual cohesion. These markers will range from verbal repetition 
through variation and adaptation to multiple metaphorical levels of 
text and meaning. Markers may include verbal or textual references, 
generic references, geographical references, cultural references, refer-
ences to other authors, mentioned often enough to notice the repeti-
tion in spite of the strong elements that pull the Barnesian text apart 
by refusing to provide a linear plot, a consistent narrative strategy or 
a uniϐied structure.
A Barnesian text is strongly intertextual; and the references will very 
often point cross channel. The intertextual links will be primarily liter-
ary but can also be cultural in a wider sense, even including the politi-
cal.
The Barnesian text works through metaphors even when it avoids 
metaphors. Metaphors will cluster around certain concepts such as 
language, writing, love and Englishness.
The Barnesian text is English. It is an English gentleman’s text; the text 
of an English intellectual, that of an English writer, who is trying not to 
feel sorry for himself.
The Barnesian text will have a Barnesian narrator, who will be a sad 
English person, preferably male. Female characters and narrators will 
tend to be strong, no-nonsense, unimaginative but perfectly capable 
of living their lives according to their own wills, values, preferences or 
unexamined presuppositions.
Barnesian narrators may be slightly autistic; at any rate, they will have 
difϐiculties reading other characters’ behaviours and emotions and 
will be somewhat bewildered by other living persons.
For the Barnesian narrator, dead authors and dead texts appear much 
safer.
Judit Friedrich
Book-Barnes2.indb   149 2014.11.23.   21:15:55
151
A fundamental feature of a “Barnesian” text is its observable postmod-
ern nature, though not in the fashion of the “classical” postmodern 
practised by Pynchon or late Beckett. Barnesian texts are often pre-
occupied with competing parallel universes which mutually exclude 
each other yet are, in a sense, necessary for the existence of the other 
(e.g., belief versus scepticism, youth versus old age). Although the 
Lyotardian postmodern “incredulity towards metanarratives” is typi-
cal of Barnes, a Barnesian text is never as desperately experimental or 
as eager to subvert the existing order as, for instance, a Pynchon text. 
Subversion in the Barnesian text lies rather in its playful humour and, 
of course, in its irony. I might call it ‘mild postmodern.’
The Barnesian text often undermines itself in a postmodern manner 
by the confusion of different ontological universes (e.g., dream versus 
reality), but never so aggressively that it would hinder coherent world-
views shaped in the text. The Barnesian text is unreliable; it often 
merges real life and ϐiction (e.g., in the characters), and thus aims at 
subverting established views on both.
The Barnesian text is full of vivid, striking images that support its ironic 
mode. A metaphorical imagery is typical to Barnes’s novels, which also 
abound in poetical features such as echoing structures or epiphoras.
Most importantly, the Barnesian text is brilliantly, educatedly and con-
fusingly intertextual. It is so perhaps in a slightly fortuitous manner, 
probably also seeking to enter into the great postmodern game which 
– according to Brian McHale – aims at deconditioning the reader and 
undermining readerly expectations to ϐind meanings and solutions in 
the text. The Barnesian text provides the reader with a polyphony of 
voices and gives him/her the opportunity to form judgements, whether 
these are in or out of harmony.
Ágnes Harasztos
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For me, a Barnesian text...
... is an experiment. An experiment to grasp the nature of recurring 
issues like identity formation and growing up; time, memory and his-
tory; religion, death and suicide; men vs women and sexuality; and de-
ϐining Englishness.
... is a quest for an authorial voice, or for a deϐinition of being an au-
thor, manifested in the image of the parrot and in the minute analysis 
of, and more or less constant references to, Flaubert’s life and works, 
or in the godlike gesture of throwing something (e.g., a letter in Tony 
Webster’s case) into a character’s life and seeing what happens.
... challenges the reader. It leads the reader on according to its own 
purposes by using subjective viewpoints and irony, and controlling the 
amount of information provided. Thus, the reader will sense a degree 
of unreliability, the text will evoke suspicion, even unease, and it will 
be up to the reader to decide what to believe.
... teaches by asking questions. By raising problems related to everyday 
life (and death), the Barnesian text invites the reader to (re)consider 
these questions and reϐlect on his/her own life and status in the world.
... creates the Barnesian character. Whether mediocre and average, or 
a highly educated scholar, the Barnesian character tends to wonder 
about life instead of living it and to meditate on the issues mentioned 
above instead of taking action. Often, he fails to be in control of his 
life and realises only in hindsight, when it is probably too late, what 
has become of him – a person he once desperately wanted to avoid 
becoming. It is, however, not only Christopher Lloyd in Metroland, 
George in Staring at the Sun, Geoffrey Braithwaite in Flaubert’s Parrot, 
or Tony Webster in The Sense  of  an Ending that can be looked upon 
as Barnesian characters, but also Barnes himself as he is depicted in 
Nothing to be Frightened of. There, similarly to Tony, Barnes wonders 
about the deϐiciencies of his memory, which is challenged by his broth-
er’s version of their past. Like these four characters, he is paralysed by 
his fear of death and keeps wondering about suicide, euthanasia and 
the possibility of a Zolaesque belle mort. Moreover, a number of auto-
biographical elements and anecdotes mentioned in Metroland resur-
face in Nothing to be Frightened of, morphing Barnes into a character 
resembling Christopher.
Thus, a Barnesian text is also a means of self-reϐlection for the author 
himself.
Dóra Vecsernyés
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Barnesian /ˈbɑːnziən/ adj. 1 written by or related to Julian Barnes: 
Flaubert’s Parrot is arguably the most ~ of all his novels 2 (of style) wry, 
erudite, clever, playful, seemingly distanced but deeply personal at 
heart 3 concerned with art, love, memory and the fear of death.
My admiration for Barnes dates back to my undergraduate years, when 
I was introduced to A History of the World in 10½ Chapters. For several 
consecutive years, I kept reading everything by him which I managed to 
lay my hands on. Four years later I wrote my MA dissertation about his 
work but decided to read on. When I was living in London, I was lucky 
to hear him speak during an event promoting Nothing to be Frightened 
of. I remember telling him afterwards (while he was signing my copy 
of the memoir) that he meant as much to me as Flaubert had meant 
for him (to which he said, “That’s very sweet of you”). In one of the 
interviews I read at the time, Barnes let slip that he lived near Tuffnell 
Park Tube station, which I felt compelled to visit the following day. I 
also made a trip to Northwood on the Metropolitan Line – Barnes’s 
childhood home and the setting of Metroland. By then, Barnes had 
been more than my favourite writer – I was perhaps becoming (only 
slightly) obsessed with him in the way that Geoffrey Braithwaite is with 
his French master. Some weeks later I had the privilege of attending the 
“Julian Barnes and the European Tradition” conference in Liverpool, 
which was also attended by its hero. During a brief chat, I admitted to 
having visited Tuffnell Park for his beneϐit, to which he reacted with 
mock horror at standing face to face with a stalker and said, “Oh, you 
know what? I don’t actually live in London at all. I live up in Norwich!” 
Those two meetings mark the peak of my fascination with Barnes. For 
the next several years, I found myself appreciating his new books a lit-
tle bit less. I did not value The  Sense  of  an  Ending as highly as most 
critics (and the jury of the Man Booker Prize) did, and I turned to other 
writers. Recently, however, I had to reread Metroland, which I was half-
expecting to ϐind disappointing. Instead, I admired the novel more than 
ever before. I feel relieved that my scepticism was only a phase. I would 
perhaps still maintain my (rather light) charge that the narrators of his 
novels often articulate ideas and hold opinions that Barnes would also 
subscribe to. But – when placed alongside his stylistic ϐinesse, his re-
markable experiments with generic forms and his Flaubertian dedica-
tion to “gazing into the black pit” – that really is a minor criticism.
Wojciech Drąg
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When I consider a book characteristically “Barnesian,” the style is of 
utmost importance for me. Barnes’s characteristic style is easily recog-
nisable; however, what this style exactly consists of is rather difϐicult 
to grasp. Probably the most appropriate adjectives are elegant, sophis-
ticated, pleasant and diverse, though the Barnesian text always has a 
little ironic overtone, an ironic edge which does not let his reader ease 
off completely. For instance, the way he uses curses and swear words in 
his prose is very typical. He (mostly unexpectedly) drops these harsh 
expressions here and there in his streams of polished sentences. This 
sharp contrast – among many other techniques – also reinforces his 
ironic tone, ranging from the subtle to the most poignant, with which 
he criticises not only the phenomena or characters appearing in his 
work but the reader as well.
Aside from his peculiar style of writing, his choice of themes is some-
thing that must be mentioned. Probably the most important topic 
around which all other minor sub-topics may be arranged is the rela-
tion of the present to the past. Myriads of questions may be posed: 
How do we know the past? Can we know it at all? How do we confront 
the events/harms/wounds of the past in the present? What effects do 
they have? How can we deal with memories or how can we remember? 
Is it possible to remember? How do consciousness, memories or even 
persons, personalities or relationships change over time? How can we 
relate to history – to our own or to history in general? How do we ac-
count for our past mistakes? And so on... From these questions we may 
turn to the characters themselves posing questions on questioning in 
Barnes’s novels, as the theme of questioning is also a beloved topic of 
his: How do we ask the right questions? Can we ask good questions at 
all? At the end we always get back to the root of the problem, to a state 
of uncertainty: namely, that we cannot ever even learn the right ques-
tions, let alone the right answers.
A key method of Barnes – which is, of course, also indispensable to the 
Barnesian type of writing – is that in his novels he relentlessly holds 
back information. The reader constantly has the feeling that something 
is deferred; what we get are only crumbs of information and he is hold-
ing back the most surprising things. We cannot be sure of anything 
until the very end of his books, and the punch line is always shock-
ing. This technique may arouse irritation, frustration or suspense in 
the reader; some feel it pleasant, some unpleasant, but it is certainly a 
most effective technique.
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Barnesian ϐiction is usually written in the ϐirst person singular and 
tends to be autobiographical, or centres around one particular charac-
ter on which the narrative focuses. Although most of Barnes’s novels 
belong to the genre of ϐictional autobiography, he usually mixes other 
genres in his writing. From journalistic excerpts to university exami-
nations, we ϐind a range of different elements lifted from other – often 
even non-ϐictional – genres.
Dorottya Jászay
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We were talking about writers and autism, and you proposed that I 
start with that issue. Julian Barnes is deϐinitely not autistic, based on 
his texts that I have read so far. His observations regarding the ϐiner 
details of other people simply rule out that possibility. Although one 
might trace some tendency of inwardness to be present in his narra-
tives, I believe that his aim is to write about people rather than about 
things or ideas. He seems to me to put a lot of effort into building com-
plex characters, which might be his most effective narrative skill.
Clearly, he is quite obsessed with avoiding repetition as he strives to 
reinvent his authorial practice with each work. Oddly, this struggle to 
constantly prove his technical versatility is what makes me a bit suspi-
cious about him – he seems to care too much about his self-represen-
tation as an author. Perhaps the most Barnesian feature of his text is 
his insistence on proving how exceptionally well he can write. For me, 
it is this insistence on not being Barnesian that is the most Barnesian. 
I might be wrong, maybe I am just really fond of this conceit, because 
I would like to sound original and I do not have anything else to say. 
But do not get me wrong: he does write exceptionally well, in fact, his 
writing is annoyingly close to perfection.
So maybe I am just jealous when I say that I ϐind his prose to be too pol-
ished and too sophisticated, which I could happily overlook if his ideas 
were more daring, subversive, or audacious. Again, I do not question 
their originality, but they are a little bit soft, a bit too well-mannered. 
If we talk about contemporary British writers, then I miss the kind 
of rawness in the works of Barnes that I truly appreciate in those of 
McEwan, Fischer, or Amis. Again, maybe I am the one to be blamed. We 
will see.
Miklós Mikecz
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You know you are reading a Barnesian novel when even under baleful 
scrutiny you fail to ϐind major ϐlaws. Barnes’s novels draw our atten-
tion to trivialities of life, under which he uncovers the most dazzling 
problems of human existence. The manner he approaches and elabo-
rates these issues, varying from the irretrievability of the past to animal 
rights, is subtle and yet ϐlies in the face of literary, historical, at times 
psychological conventions. His heterogeneous style and playful use and 
abuse of literary forms enable him to discuss the enquiries of the mod-
ernist tradition in a different light, thus postmodernist and modern-
ist features intermingle in his works. His idiosyncratic use of suspense 
never ceases to test his readers’ dedication, and his irony may stay hid-
den from those who are less well-versed in his writings. The milestones 
of his enquiry in his earlier works are art, religion and love, whereas 
his recent works, which are less playful compared to his early ones, 
directly face passing, remorse, death and mourning. The two phases 
interlink inasmuch as both seek to unveil the hopelessness and despair 
of our own existence and soothe the pain of uncertainty, which may 
derive from our inherently fragmented world of memory, language, or 
knowledge. Barnes’s treatment of existential and moral questions is 
not prescriptive; the answers to these questions are not implicit in his 
works. However, in my reading some novels show a suppressed desire 
to reconstruct some grounds for moral and ethical values.
Eszter Tory
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I’ve always considered people who claim to have a ϐirst memory of 
Julian Barnes slightly suspicious. Hearing his name at the university 
as an author famous for his irony, for instance. How do I know if it isn’t 
just a projection of my present understanding of Barnes? Or what if 
it was Barth and I confuse the names of two writers of ironic ϐiction? 
In the long run – and what is our past if not a sweaty and disgraceful 
marathon – ϐirst memories are either lies or illusions. Now, if I can’t 
recall when my involvement with his oeuvre started, does that mean it 
will never end? Will I never get rid of him?
This is how I imagine a paragraph in a book by Barnes. It is easier to 
write a parody of his texts than a description – I can’t ϐind features I 
would consider distinctly Barnesian, uncharacteristic of every other 
writer. Still, most of the time when I open a Barnes novel, I feel that the 
voice is recognizable. The unique quality of his prose, then – if there is 
such a thing as unique in the postmodern age – must lie in the speciϐic 
mixture of some recurring motifs and narrative devices. The compo-
nents of this mixture include (but are not limited to):
The  voice  of  an  essayist. A voice that can make effortless transitions 
from “traditional” storytelling to a mini-essay on the irretrievability 
of the past, to a discussion of Géricault’s The Raft of the Medusa, or to 
some other non-novelistic prose form.
Puzzle  games. Some of his novels are built of parts which stand in 
contrast to each other, or the connection between them is not appar-
ent, and the process of reading is led by the desire to ϐind the implicit 
connection. (This level of uncertainty might contribute to the feeling 
that Barnes can be best described by the term ironic, though – strictly 
speaking – it is not irony if the parts are only in an ambiguous relation, 
rather than truly negating each other.)
Autobiographical  elements. Especially in connection to marriage and 
inϐidelity. Interestingly enough, in most cases they are not found in the 
metaϐictional paragraphs but rather on the diegetic level (in the dia-
logues and monologues of the characters).
Péter Tamás
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Barnesian, a term coined by the so-called Barnesian Eights, a group of 
Hungarian PhD students active at the beginning of the 21st century, at-
tempts to deϐine the characteristic qualities of the well-known British 
author Julian Barnes’s (1946–) ϐiction. After much heated debate and 
discussion, the group agreed that the term covers such diverse aspects 
of the writer’s ϐiction as the linguistic, the structural and the thematic. 
While from a linguistic point of view the term has been accepted as 
one referring to the conspicuous meta-thematization of the problem-
atic relationship between signiϐier and signiϐied, there has been con-
siderable controversy over the use of the term from a structural point 
of view. Although the members all agreed that the use of paratextual 
elements (titles, episode as well as chapter headings) and parallel nar-
ratives are to be considered as essential characteristics of Barnes’s 
works as the primary means of signalling a multiplicity of viewpoints 
and versions of truth/reality, a consensus concerning the use and 
even the existence of the narrative strategy of generating suspense in 
Barnes’s oeuvre has not yet been reached. In Barnes’s works suspense 
can be considered as a narrative technique which, strengthened by the 
reader’s expectations that are constantly tested, justiϐied or subverted, 
represents in a miniature and on a (semi-)ϐictional level the ways in 
which ontological and epistemological questions are investigated by 
real, ϐlesh-and-blood people. As a result of the fact that Barnes’s ϐic-
tion is, to a large extent, reader responsible, the effect of his use of 
this strategy may vary from reader to reader (resulting possibly even 
in boredom or frustration). From a thematic point of view, the term 
Barnesian denotes a wide variety of topics, such as personal identity 
and memory, national identity and cultural memory, the deϐinition 
of success, the question of responsibility, the decline of religion and 
the loss of faith as well as a constant search for the unattainable as a 
substitute for religion, the inadequacy of language and art as possible 
means of representing reality, and the irretrievability of the past.
What happened to the Barnesian Eights is not recorded.
Janina Vesztergom
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